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A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

BY

HEREFORD B. GEORGE, M.A., F.R.G.S.

FELLOW OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD

REVISED

BY

REGINALD W. JEFFERY, M.A.

FELLOW OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD

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PREFACE

MY object in writing this little book has been to present a general survey of the British empire as a whole, with the historical conditions, at least so far as they depend on geography, which have contributed to produce the present state of things. The historical geography of these islands of course goes very far back; in the rest of the empire the history, so far as it is English at all, is comparatively modern. In doing this I have tried to bring into special relief the unique character of the empire, both politically and geographically; for from this uniqueness a most important inference logically follows: no historical precedents exist to guide us as to its probable future.

"Empires, like everything else, come to maturity, and are then bound to decay." "Every empire will perish that extends its boundaries beyond what it can effectively defend." "An empire which ceases to grow is sure to dwindle." We are presented with sonorous platitudes of this type, said to be based on historical induction, usually by people who have no goodwill to England, and who infer from them the more or less speedy fall of the empire. Nobody doubts that the British empire may perish; it certainly will if a sufficiently powerful league of enemies should ever be formed against it, or if its own statesmen make really fatal blunders. But it may safely be said that no inferences based on the fall of Babylon or of Rome will help anyone to foresee the event,

still less if they are derived from the one-man domination of an Attila or a Napoleon. The conditions are unique, the problems to be faced entirely new, and as such our statesmen must deal with them.

I have burdened my pages with few names and fewer figures, my object being less to state facts than to elicit their meaning. As to names, I have inserted none that did not seem necessary to make my sketch clear; some, of course, are of historical importance only. Statistical figures relating to the British empire are virtually all official, published freely and copied in a variety of publications, so that they are accessible to all the world. It has seemed useless to add to this little book a fresh copy of information which may be read in every public library, which anyone can buy for himself at the cost of a shilling. Moreover, it seems to me that such things in detail rather detract from the clearness of a statement than add to it. Tell a man that Ceylon is 25,481 square miles in area—I give the exact official number—and he probably does not read the figures, certainly he derives no idea from them. Tell him that it is about half as large as England, and he may take notice. Or again, say that Melbourne had 493,956 inhabitants according to the census of 1900, and on another page that Sydney had 483,382, and little effect is produced on the reader's mind. Point out that these two great cities, with nearly half a million souls each, are comparatively near together, and that no other town in all Australasia contains more than a modest fraction of that number, and the reader will probably see that the fact is significant, and will look for an explanation. It is therefore on principle, and not only to avoid repetition, that I have adopted methods of comparison wherever they occurred to me, and have never gone below round numbers.

This book was originally planned in concert with Mr. C. G.

Robertson, who is preparing a historical atlas of the British empire, to be issued by the same publishers. Circumstances have delayed the completion of Mr. Robertson's atlas, which will supply all maps necessary for the elucidation of the present work. There are, however, plenty of available atlases, both historical to illustrate the early ages of English historical geography, and modern to show the more recent expansion of the empire. To have inserted maps enough to make the present work self-sufficing would have added so greatly to its size and cost as to change its character entirely.

In matters of nomenclature no difficulty arises except in relation to Indian names. These have to be transliterated from languages possessing different alphabets and different sounds from ours. The best accredited system requires itself to be translated to English readers, for it adds to the English letters sundry marks which modify their meaning. It has seemed to me pedantic, in a book intended for ordinary circulation, to discard name-forms which have been established in English use for centuries, though they may have been phonetically incorrect originally. In respect to minor names I have acted in concert with Mr. Robertson, deferring to his superior knowledge of Indian matters generally. The names will accordingly be found to be spelt as in his forthcoming atlas.

HEREFORD B. GEORGE

OXFORD, *May*, 1904

IN the Second Edition some changes in Canada and South Africa have been recorded, bringing the book up to the date of 1st October, 1905. Otherwise it remains unaltered except for a very few verbal corrections.

H. B. G.

THINGS move fast in some parts of the British Empire, and it has therefore been necessary to introduce into the Third Edition a variety of small corrections, in order to bring the book up to the date of 1st March, 1908. None, however, affect its substance, and some merely record the completion of things which in the last edition were mentioned as in progress.

H. B. G.

THE various corrections necessary, after less than a year and a half, to bring the Fourth Edition up to date (15th July, 1909), are chiefly in the African sections.

H. B. G.

HAD Mr. Hereford B. George been alive to-day (July, 1919) he would no doubt have added very considerably to this Sixth Edition of his work. It has been the purpose, however, of the present revisor to alter as little as possible his actual text, and only to make those corrections which after ten years—and ten such years—seemed absolutely essential.

R. W. J.

THIS Seventh Edition has been revised. Some may think that more drastic alterations should have been made with regard to the sections on Ireland and on Egypt. The revisor, however, once again preferred to leave as far as possible the text of Mr. Hereford B. George, merely notifying the great changes between 1920 and 1924 as briefly as possible.

R. W. J.

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NOTE BY THE REVISOR

Hereford Brooke George was born at Bath on January 1, 1838. He entered Winchester as a scholar in 1849, and became a Fellow of New College seven years later. He graduated B.A. in 1860, after having obtained first classes in the final classical and mathematical schools. For three years (1864–67) he practised as a barrister on the Western Circuit; but in 1868 he was ordained, and from that time, until 1891, he acted as history tutor at New College. He took a very prominent part in the work of the University and in the reorganization of his college. For many years he was an active member of the Local Examination Delegacy. He was always deeply interested in the profession of the soldier, and his military histories show not only fertility of illustration, but also considerable critical acumen. Although he enjoyed the physical exercise of mountaineering, his interest in climbing was mainly geographical. He first published his *Historical Geography of the British Empire* in 1904, and was able to revise several editions before his death, which took place at Holywell Lodge, Oxford, on December 15, 1910.

R. W. J.

Brasenose College, *July*, 1919.

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
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A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Part I

INTRODUCTORY

THE character of every state, still more of every empire, must be greatly affected by geographical considerations, and this is pre-eminently true of the British empire, which is unlike any other that the world has yet seen. Her position on the globe, close to Europe yet separate from it, gave England the best opportunity for maritime and commercial greatness. And her people, thanks partly to the admixture of race which other geographical influences had brought about, had the energy to make good use of their opportunities. How far geography helped, or hindered, the consolidation of the British Islands into a single political whole, will be discussed in later chapters. Here it is only necessary to note that political unification, which meant a vast increase in political and military strength, occurred not long after Englishmen had begun definitely to turn their thoughts seaward, and were ready not only to plunge into ocean commerce, but to send out many of their sons as colonists of new regions.

The British empire is in no sense the result of a deliberate policy of aggrandisement, conceived and carried out by a government. It was not made, it grew; and it remains to be seen whether it has quite done growing. In one sense it is certainly very far from having ceased to grow; there is

room for a vast increase of population and wealth within the regions now included in it. On the other hand circumstances may lead to one or another of the young nations which we have called into being, separating from us, as did our first great group of colonies. Half a century ago it seemed probable, some English statesmen expected and even wished, that the colonies would separate from the mother country, as each became able to stand alone. The metaphor of a parent sending children out into the world when full grown, to make their way for themselves, appeared then naturally applicable. At the present time the opposite metaphor of family affection, of each member of a family group caring for the welfare of the whole, has possession of men's minds. Whether the point of view will shift again, the future only can show; certainly another disruption of the British empire will not be caused by a repetition of the old mistakes.

The loss of the American colonies was indeed the turning-point in the history of the British empire. When that happened, the expansion of England, to use the phrase which Professor Seeley has made familiar, had been going on for a couple of centuries. It had been twofold all through; our commerce had extended almost all over the world, leading to trade settlements in tropical regions and to geographical discoveries further and further afield. And simultaneously colonisation had gone a long way in America, though not as yet elsewhere. The dominant motive, however, was altogether commercial; the trade of the colonies was fettered in the supposed interest of the mother country. No greater mistake could be made in theory, though all nations were then under the same delusion; that the practice was far less stringent than the theory mitigated the evil considerably, but only mitigated it. The revolt of the American colonies no doubt arose out of questions going deeper still; but these differences might never have become acute had not England deemed it vital to her interests, as well as theoretically her right, to control their trade.

It is something more than a coincidence that Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* was published so nearly at the moment when we abandoned the attempt to coerce the revolted

colonies, backed as they were by half Europe. If his economic principles had been accepted a generation earlier, they might never have rebelled. The influence of Adam Smith's theories has been an important factor in determining English policy towards Canada and Australia.

In another sense also it is true that the British empire was not made, but grew. The acquisition of additional dominions was in more ways than one forced upon us. Had not the French aimed at occupying the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi, thereby enclosing our colonies along the Atlantic coast, and depriving them of all room for expansion, the conquest of Canada would not have been undertaken. And though Canada meant comparatively little in the middle of the eighteenth century, it carried, as we now know well, enormous possibilities. Similarly the contention whether France or England should be the leading European power in India was forced to an issue by Dupleix. And when that contest also had ended in our favour, supremacy throughout India followed inevitably. The East India Company was sincerely, almost ignobly, averse to acquiring new territory, and thus increasing its liabilities: its business was to earn dividends for its shareholders, not to build up an empire. Nevertheless the company was unable to avoid fresh annexations; and the British government, since it assumed direct responsibility for India, has deemed it necessary to do the same. Analogous circumstances have produced similar results in other parts of the world, and not in the case of England only.

The enemies of England abroad are in the habit of sneering at her greed of territory, fulminating against her endless intrigues, threatening her with the vengeance of outraged humanity, and so forth. Englishmen in general know that their country has a clearer national conscience than most others, and that the last thing their government would dream of doing is to intrigue. Hence they are apt to treat all hostile remarks as mere ebullitions of spite or envy. It is perhaps expedient for those who would understand the complicated inter-workings of historical and geographical influences upon the formation of our empire, and its maintenance when

formed, to inquire what is the basis of such ill-will, and whether our conduct justifies or excuses it.

Those who look only at the map, and do not ask themselves the meaning of what they read there, say that England has obtained possession of many of the fairest portions of the earth, leaving very little room for other nations to do the like. Under such circumstances is it wonderful that other nations should envy England, and dream of partitioning her empire? It is no answer, though it is true, that some of them at least had the same or better chances, but failed to utilise them. The sting of past failure only gives additional force to the desire to redress the balance; and after all there are new nations which had no such chance in the past, and now find the world more or less filled up. Hence envy of our good fortune is inevitable, and even reasonable as human nature goes. The wealthy landowner must expect to be envied by his less fortunate neighbours; but his conscience need not be uneasy at this unless he treats them unfairly.

The real question therefore is whether the policy of the British empire, as a whole or in its several parts, is unfair to other nations. And it is obvious that, so far from this being the case, England stands alone in the favourable treatment which she affords to foreigners. It would be, of course, preposterous to imagine that this is done for their sakes. We consider that our own interests are best served by the policy which we have adopted, though there are not wanting Englishmen who think that there is a mistake in the calculation. Still, as a matter of fact, other nations have no fair ground for ill-will, rather every reason to be satisfied at the use which we make of our dominions. The foreigner is not excluded, nor treated as an interloper. He can settle under the protection of laws which guarantee full personal liberty. He can trade as freely in any of our ports as a born Englishman. In face of the policy of commercial exclusiveness of which some nations almost boast, the second best alternative for every civilised man is that England should own any given place, even assuming that the best would be for it to be possessed by his own state.

From another point of view also the national conscience is pure from any taint of greed or selfishness. We draw no revenue from any of our dominions beyond seas; on the contrary, we spend large sums on the armed forces which are to defend them and ourselves alike. Every shilling of revenue that is raised in any dependency is expended there; in case of need the resources of the United Kingdom are taxed to give assistance. No doubt we gain indirectly, security for our trade, outlets for our population, careers for a few of our sons. If these advantages did not compensate, roughly and in the long run, for such expenditure as would not be required were the empire limited to the British Islands, the maintenance of the empire could not be economically justified. It is still true that no single individual among the hundreds of millions who live in peace under the British flag is mulcted of a penny for the benefit of the British exchequer. Moreover, we govern them for their benefit, not for ours, with such reservations as the safety and welfare of the whole may demand; and we give them such opportunities of making their needs and wishes known as are possible under the varying circumstances of each case.

The most marked characteristic of the British empire, taken as a whole, is the small extent to which the mother country has imposed her own system, political, legal, social, ecclesiastical, on the various colonies and dependencies. This holds good not only in the definitely self-governing colonies like Australia, but in places like Ceylon, which have no self-government at all. We have habitually accepted the legal system already established in colonies acquired by conquest or cession. The Roman-Dutch law was in force when we took over the Cape of Good Hope, and remains so still. The Roman Catholic church had a wealthy establishment in Lower Canada before the British conquest, and it is still dominant, though no longer exclusive. The intricacies of Indian laws, especially of inheritance, are proverbial, there being complicated Hindu and Mohammedan systems administered in the same country. Moreover, we have to a large extent abstained from imposing on the genuine colonies

the laws and institutions prevailing in England, and let things shape themselves, after the first stage of absolute novelty was past. The colonists of New England were allowed to build up their own social and ecclesiastical system, in which Puritan ideas were predominant such as never obtained more than partial and temporary acceptance at home.

It must not be supposed that all this was due originally to deliberate calculation. It would be scarcely relevant, if possible, to attempt to discover what motive swayed the home government in each instance. To leave standing the existing laws in a newly conquered island was obviously the easiest thing: and experience soon showed how far they could be retained without modification. To leave English colonists to settle their own affairs accorded well with the national disposition: Englishmen on the average are able and willing to manage for themselves, and like to see government interference reduced to a minimum. Doubtless also there would have been great practical difficulty, in days of slow maritime communication, in maintaining effective and permanent control. One way or another it became the rule, and is now accepted in principle; the result being that an extraordinary variety of systems, from highly developed codes down to the rude customs of African semi-savages, are administered under the English flag.

It may be expedient to point out in a general way the consequences of this policy, if so definite a name can be applied to what in early instances at least was apparently somewhat haphazard. They have been on the whole advantageous to the entire empire, and in a still greater degree to the various colonies, though not without drawbacks. Inhabitants of newly acquired lands, who found that the change of allegiance made little or no difference to the machinery of daily life, were thereby greatly conciliated. The introduction of British rule has probably nowhere meant less efficient or less just administration, or increased taxation, and in many instances has brought a marked improvement in security and justice. And peace and prosperity obviously tend to

make people contented. There is no more effectual means of binding a community together than to allow its members to manage its affairs, wholly or partially, for themselves. The development of local patriotism is a condition almost necessary to the progress of a society in any sense self-governed. The drawback, from the imperial point of view and to a certain extent from the local also, is that colonists may become too narrow and exclusive in their patriotism, and think only of their own immediate interests. The North American colonies, for instance, in the middle of the eighteenth century, were very slow to co-operate in guarding against the peril which menaced them all from the extension of French power in America. Those which lay further from the danger were not keen to assist those which bore the brunt of it: the latter showed little gratitude to England for delivering them from it. But without the self-government which had incidentally brought about these unfortunate results, they would not have been fit to become a great nation. And the same conditions, without the errors which led to the revolt of the American colonies, have made Canada, for instance, a real and energetic nation in hearty allegiance to the British crown.

It might be argued no doubt that the history of south Africa tells the other way, that it illustrates the evils which result from leaving to a conquered colony its legal and social system, and also giving it self-government. Time will show whether the apparent exception is a real one—whether, when old mistakes have been remedied, old antagonisms will not disappear. Even if this should prove difficult to accomplish in Cape Colony, a wider survey of the British empire as a whole justifies the conclusion that the normal British policy is wise and just. Communities differing in race and the social habits which accompany race, in climate and consequently in mode of life, in position on the globe and consequently in political relations—differing, in short, in all the manifold conditions of geographical environment, cannot thrive under a rigid uniformity of government. With a wise diversity of system, with self-government greater or less according to circumstances, the widely dissimilar portions of

the British empire exhibit also a concordant unity which is unique in the history of the world.

The British empire exhibits the dominant race in almost every possible relation to other races, apart from the fact that the home population comprises an unusually large number of diverse elements, apart also from the descendants of other European peoples inhabiting lands which England has acquired by conquest or treaty. In India there is a miniature world, comprising many different races, some with very ancient civilisation of their own, some almost savages, and of many intermediate grades. And the whole is held together, constrained to peace and order, by an army of English officials, civil and military, and governed in accordance with what England believes to be the best interests of the subject population. In Canada the original inhabitants have almost disappeared, and the population is European. The same holds good in Australasia, though in the tropical portions the question arises whether it may not be necessary to introduce people better fitted than the Anglo-Saxon to work in the hot sun. In the West Indies, though the white men are few, and the now emancipated negroes not too industrious, the labour problem solves itself tolerably, and the coloured races share in the limited amount of self-government allotted to those small communities. In Africa, both east and west, the population is entirely black, and English authority goes little beyond the influence of a civilising mission. In south Africa white men and black live side by side, and the problem of their relation to each other is for the future to solve.

The British empire comprises so many diverse elements that it is practically impossible to distribute its component parts upon any single system, geographical or political, without losing sight of its historical meaning. By a statute (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63) the term colony is made legally applicable to all British possessions over sea, with the exception of India. Colony has always been an ambiguous word, and it is certainly not rendered more definite by being made to include things so totally unlike as Canada and Gibraltar. Nor are matters very much improved by dividing

colonies, as is commonly done, into those which are self-governing and what are called crown colonies. For the latter is practically a negative term, comprising every British possession, whatever its origin, population, or form of government, which is not virtually a separate nation united to England by the tie of the crown, and by a control from home which is theoretically very small and is in fact not exercised. Moreover, there are not a few quarters where we have powers and responsibilities, as well as interests, far too great and too permanent to be ignored in any survey of the empire as a whole, which cannot possibly be called colonies.

India is usually styled a dependency, a term which implies merely some kind of subjection to the British crown. As a matter of fact, India is not homogeneous, as it comprises a number of vassal states besides the regions under our direct rule. But if we look at British India only, we shall see that it is sharply distinguished from a daughter-nation like Canada in three main respects. (1) It is a country peopled by natives, for which England supplies the governing classes—the actual administrators and the actual garrison exclusively, except so far as natives are admitted to subordinate employ, and a considerable part of what may be called the unofficial governing classes, such as lawyers, journalists, bankers, merchants. (2) It is ruled altogether by English authority; the government takes its own means for discovering what measures will be pleasing to its subjects, as well as what will benefit them, but gives them no authoritative voice. (3) The English governing classes do not make India their home: they go thither to discharge certain functions for a longer or shorter period, and then depart. The so-called crown colonies are in an intermediate position, but on the whole much nearer to India than to Canada. In most of them the bulk of the inhabitants are of native and generally inferior race, negroes of west African origin in the West Indies, Hausas in Nigeria, Bantus and others in south Africa, and so forth. In all the ultimate authority rests with the home government or its representatives, though in most of them the people have, by usage or by definite grant, control over their own local affairs to an extent which varies greatly. In many the

climate renders it impossible that Englishmen should be permanent settlers, regarding the colony as their home.

Again, there has been a great difference historically, as to the motives with which we took and retained possession of our various dominions beyond sea. Some were settlements originally made by Englishmen, or acquired by conquest, in which our people could form new homes under the old flag and the old institutions, modified so far as changed circumstances might render expedient. Others are isolated spots all about the world, which have been acquired either directly as trading stations, or for the sake of protecting commercial and other interests. These stepping-stones, as they may be called, are by no means all in the same political category, or of even approximately equal importance; but they are alike in this, that they are all held for the sake of the empire as a whole.

Besides these there is a new kind of dependency attached to the British Empire since June, 1919. It was decided at the Peace Conference in Paris to dispose of the German colonies, not as spoil to the conquerors, but rather as a trust to be administered by the different Great Powers on behalf of humanity. The government, therefore, of a portion of the German colonies has been handed over to the British, and the responsibility of the Empire has been enormously increased by the addition of 800,000 square miles.

It will conduce to clearness of view if we class the various components of the British empire in accordance with these considerations. The division will not be logical, but it will serve to bring out the historical and geographical meaning of the whole. After dealing with the British Islands themselves, we shall therefore discuss in succession "the Stepping-stones," "the Daughter-nations," "the Dependencies," "the Protectorates," "the British dominions in Africa," which last include specimens of all classes, but are linked together more or less closely, and are therefore best treated together.

Part II

THE BRITISH ISLANDS

§ 1. STRUCTURE

THE most important event in English history occurred long before history began. At an epoch late in geological time a great subsidence of the earth took place, forming the British Islands. Before this, the continent of Europe extended over the North Sea, the English Channel, and the whole region of Britain. The ocean does not attain a depth of 100 fathoms till fifty miles or more from the west coast of Ireland and Scotland, beyond which it deepens rapidly. Thus it may be fairly assumed that the subsidence was of something like this amount. The effect was to form a group of islands large enough to constitute a separate realm in historical times, having a climate generally favourable to the development of man, so situated that its south-eastern angle is visible from the Continent, yet separated from it by more than twenty miles of sea. Thus it is easily accessible for peaceful purposes, and yet possesses the most certain and defensible of frontiers, the only kind of frontier along which border quarrels are absolutely impossible.

Geologists are not fully agreed as to the sequence or exact circumstances of these physical changes, though of their general character there is no doubt. It is probable, for instance, that the subsidence was not altogether simultaneous, and that an isthmus, afterwards cut through or submerged, existed where now are the Straits of Dover, long after the western side of the British Islands had assumed something like its present form. It is certain that in the far distant past there were many risings and sinkings of the land, total

or partial, of which the present configuration is the resultant. These things, however, are completely outside the ken of historical geography, which simply deals with the consequences of them. Similarly it is outside the province of history to dwell on the physical forces which have contributed to mould the surface of the British Islands, both before and after this great change. The net result, attained before the dawn of history, probably before the arrival of any race of men which has contributed an element to the historical population, was to leave the group of islands much as they are now, if the eye of imagination could eliminate all traces of human life. Some portions are fertile and comparatively level, others are hilly and more or less incapable of cultivation; the coalfields and other mineral deposits, which have been of inestimable value in modern times, were hidden from the eyes of primitive man.

It is however worth while, before proceeding to consider the physical structure of Britain as it is, to observe that the subsidence of the land which formed these islands would have entirely altered their character if it had extended a little further, or had stopped short a little sooner. The three chief facts in the structure of the group are:—

1. The portion of England lying nearest to the Continent is, roughly speaking, level and fertile, tempting immigration originally, and interposing no serious obstacles to exploration inwards.

2. Beyond this plain, the whole remainder of Britain is hilly, with the result that, when the subsidence took place, the river valleys on the western side became inlets of the sea, and the higher parts of the hill ridges became islands. Thus the same geological movement which made Britain insular gave her also an abundant supply of harbours on the ocean side, an essential condition for her becoming a great maritime nation.

3. Ireland is completely severed from Great Britain by a fairly wide arm of the sea. This physical separateness has doubtless contributed greatly towards keeping Ireland apart. But for the Irish Sea, Ireland would probably have been incorporated with England almost as soon and as easily as

Wales. And seeing that Ireland is far too poor to stand alone in the modern world, and so situated geographically that it cannot possibly be connected politically with any other country than England, it may safely be said that Ireland has lost much, and England also something, because the geological conditions made them two separate islands.

It is also obvious that if the last great change of level had lowered the land one or two hundred feet more, a great part of south-eastern England, the plain which divides the Scotch Highlands from the Lowlands, and much of central Ireland, would have been submerged, and nothing would have been left capable of containing a great nation. On the other hand, if the subsidence had been materially less, the Straits of Dover would not have been formed; and instead of the history of England, which is almost entirely based on its insularity, there would have been a history possibly not unlike that of the Spanish peninsula.

The essential fact in the structure of Britain is that, for practical and historical purposes, it may be divided into two regions, one of plain, the other of hills, though from the nature of the case it is not possible to make a sharp demarcation between them. If a line be drawn from the mouth of the Tees to the mouth of the Severn, a direction roughly south-westwards, and continued thence to the south coast, the region to the south-east of this line is more or less plain. That is to say, the hills in it are nowhere high or rugged enough to form serious barriers, and nearly all the surface is fertile and approximately level. The region on the north-west side of such a line is mainly hilly, though there are portions of plain which are important in history. A considerable part may be called mountainous, the hills being high and rugged, and presenting real obstacles to human intercourse, with a large proportion of soil useless for cultivation. The plain section may be fairly described as altogether Teutonic in population, except so far as the continual absorption of individual foreigners and the modern facilities of locomotion have contributed to cause an admixture of blood. The hill section contains all those districts in which Celts or their predecessors have remained in any numbers, though with a

considerable infusion of Teutons. It is no exaggeration to style it predominantly Celtic.[1]

Natural features cannot of course be described intelligibly without the use of names given by man, but the history is best understood, in its relation to the geography, by obtaining a general idea of what the country was like before history began, irrespective of human occupation.

The plain or Teutonic region is roughly triangular in form, the southern and eastern faces of the triangle being sea coast. The southern side along the English Channel is approximately straight, and has but one important indentation, where the Isle of Wight protects the two great harbours of Southampton and Portsmouth. (The other valuable harbours of the south coast lie on the shore of the hill region to the west.) The eastern side of the triangle, which faces the North Sea, is very far from straight. At the southern corner Kent projects eastwards, forming the Straits of Dover. Consequently the main route of communication with the Continent naturally lies through Kent, which was much more really a peninsula in prehistoric days than it appears to be on the map, since Romney Marsh and the great forest of the Andredeswald practically separated it from the lands to the west. North of Kent is the deep inlet of the Thames, opening a navigable waterway far up towards the heart of the country.

North of the Thames estuary East Anglia bulges out again to the eastward, so that the inlet of the Wash, which bounds it on the western side, is north of London. This region is on the whole the flattest in England, there being hardly any ground within it which rises to 300 feet above sea-level. It has also, generally speaking, the driest climate, as being furthest from the Atlantic, off which the rain-bearing winds blow. Hence it is the best suited for corn growing, insomuch that a large proportion of the total wheat crop of Britain is raised in Norfolk and Suffolk. During prehistoric times, and indeed for long afterwards, there were fens extending a great

[1] The theories now regarded as most probable as to the races who inhabited Britain before the Teutons, particularly as to the Celts, are summarised below (see p. 21).

distance southwards from the Wash, so that East Anglia, like Kent, was practically a peninsula.

Beyond the Wash the coast is again almost straight, with a trend to the westward, its continuity being only broken by the long, though narrow, estuary of the Humber, into which flow both the Trent from the south, which drains a large part of the midlands, and also the Ouse from the north, which drains Yorkshire. Physically speaking, the coast region further north, from the Tees to the Tweed, belongs to plain or Teutonic England, from which it is separated by no barrier, and as a matter of historical fact the Tees has only at one epoch been a boundary, whereas the Tweed has for many centuries marked the frontier between England and Scotland; but the total area between the lower slopes of the hills and the sea is relatively not great.

The clue to the inland geography of this region is the river Thames. It rises in the high plateau of the Cotswolds, which approach nearly to the Severn where it is opening out into an estuary, and flows thence eastwards, forming a marked line across south-eastern England. Historically it formed in early times a boundary, being thus an exception to the proper function of rivers, which are the most useful of highways before good roads have been made. Its basin is not wide, Salisbury Plain, with its eastern continuations, and the land once occupied by the Andredesweald enclosing it on the south side; but the watershed between it and the English Channel is nowhere high. On the north its tributaries flow out of the Cotswolds, or from the centre of England, where no natural features mark the lines which separate the waters flowing in all directions. In fact, within a few miles of Rugby, the best-known place in that neighbourhood, one finds streams which have their outlet eastwards in the Wash, a tributary of the Trent to the north, one of the Thames to the south, and the Warwickshire Avon, which flows westwards into the Severn.

The Trent, rising not far east of the Severn, makes a great curve to the south, and then turning northwards becomes the chief constituent of the Humber. It is less directed in its course by high ground than either of the other chief rivers of Britain. In fact, it is the river of the central plain, which

in Saxon days was altogether included in the kingdom of Mercia. In later times the Trent was vaguely regarded as the boundary line between northern and southern England; and Newark, where the great north road crosses it, was repeatedly a place of military importance. Corresponding to the Trent on the other side of the Humber, though with a smaller basin, is the Yorkshire Ouse. This river is formed by the junction of several streams that flow from the eastern side of the Pennine chain, which is an important feature of the hilly half of England. But the Ouse valley itself, and the Yorkshire wolds that separate it from the sea, belong essentially to the plain half of the country.

The Severn comes out of Wales in a north-easterly direction, and making a very abrupt curve, flows southwards, with eventually a trend to the west, till it opens out to form the Bristol Channel. Its immediate basin in the part which runs north and south is the western limit of the plain country. Very near its banks on the west are lines of hills, of which the Malverns are the most conspicuous, that are as it were the outposts of hilly Wales. North of the northernmost loop of the Severn there is a wide gap in the continuity of the hill country, between the southern part of the Pennines and Wales. This opens easy access from the centre of England to the north of Wales, and is the line by which the North Western Railway now takes passengers to Ireland. Similarly there is a gap[1] south of the Cotswolds, which are very near the Severn where it is expanding into an estuary, by which access is afforded from the Thames basin to the shores of the Bristol Channel.

In primitive times a very large part of south-eastern Britain seems to have been covered with forest, chiefly of oak, the beech having been introduced by the Romans. There were also extensive fens, especially extending south from the Wash. Primitive man in this country must have dwelt in the woods and supported himself by hunting.

[1] As an illustration of the reality of this gap, and of the nearness to the sea of the most central places in England, it may be mentioned that the Bristol Channel is visible from high ground a few miles south of Oxford.

There can have been but little natural room for domestic animals, though some are known to have existed. The Celts must have cleared away some of the forest, and the Romans perhaps more; and the latter made great roads. But except for the comparatively small portions under cultivation, and the Roman towns, the general aspect of the landscape had not very greatly changed since the first arrival of men in Britain, when the Romans abandoned the island.

The labours that have transformed the face of the country belong almost entirely to much later ages. Foremost among these must be placed the clearing of the forests, of which but scanty fragments now remain, though there are trees enough to give rural England the aspect of being amply well wooded. Hundreds of square miles have in this way been given to cultivation, mainly to pasture, the localities in which the largest amount of clearance has been effected being the weald lying north of Sussex and the northern midlands. An incidental consequence has apparently been a great increase in the rate at which the rivers have carried down soil to silt up their channels and estuaries. Many towns situated some way up rivers have altogether ceased to be accessible as ports; some harbours once of importance have now become too shallow even for vessels of such small dimensions as were used in mediæval times. Human labour has, of course, done much to counteract these effects of the more rapid denudation of the high ground since the forests were removed, as well as to provide purely artificial accommodation and protection for the large ships of the modern world. The draining of the fens and marshes has perhaps not been so important, but it has been more thorough. What were once waste regions, scarcely habitable at all and by no means healthy, impeding communication more seriously than forests or chains of hills, have now become expanses of rich land, a vast addition to the agricultural wealth of the country.

The hilly side of Britain is in fact divided into three portions by the deep inlets of the Mersey and the Severn; and it is more convenient to describe them separately, though they have a certain unity of geographical character.

1. The Pennine hills are the most marked feature in the

geography of England. Though there are deep depressions here and there, the Pennines form a definite and continuous chain from where the Solway Firth marks the western entrance into Scotland down into the northern midlands. And the Cheviots, which form by nature as well as historically the frontier between England and Scotland, are in fact a continuation of the Pennines, though inclined at an angle to them. Placed much nearer to the western than to the eastern shore, the Pennines leave but a narrow portion of coast from the Mersey northwards, while on the other side there is the broad vale of York. About half-way up the formation of the country changes: the streams on the east flow across to the North Sea, instead of uniting to flow southwards into the Humber; while on the western side the mountainous peninsula of Cumbria projects between Morecambe Bay and the Solway Firth. The hills, which in places rise well above 2,000 feet, are high enough to intercept much of the rain from the Irish Sea, so that the climate is much damper on the west than on the east side. Indeed the rainfall at one station among the Cumbrian hills is the highest recorded anywhere in Great Britain. Two gaps, where the height above sea-level does not exceed 500 feet, are of historical importance; one is just south of the point where the Cheviots articulate into the Pennines: the other is not far north of the Mersey.

Cumbria was well calculated as a refuge for a weaker race flying before stronger invaders. The Pennine chain proper is too narrow and too barren—the higher hills are bare even of trees—but served well enough, like the Cheviots, which are very similar, as a practical boundary. As the Cheviots slant across from south-west to north-east, they approach very nearly to the east coast at their upper end. Thus the natural formation of the country furnished two lines of communication between the north and south of the island. The western route is the less definite: it has the high ground to cross which connects the Pennines with the Cumbrian mountain system, and beyond Carlisle the country is hilly, but passable in several directions. On the eastern side there are successive rivers to cross—the Tees, the Wear, the Tyne; and the few miles between the eastern end of the Cheviots and the

sea are covered by the Tweed. Beyond the Tweed the obvious route lies along the coast strip round into the Firth of Forth, and so to the heart of Scotland.

The harbour at the mouth of the Mersey is the most commodious on the west side of Britain. Like many river ports, it has a somewhat inconvenient bar; but it opens on the Irish Sea, which is in the centre of the British Islands, and is therefore more or less land-locked and protected from the Atlantic storms. Moreover, the double entrance, to the north and to the south of Ireland, confers a real advantage as to directness of trade communication, and also in the contingency of an enemy attempting to close the access to the port.

2. The hilly region of the Welsh peninsula, which is separated by a wide gap from the Pennines, includes considerably more than what is politically called Wales. Out of the interior, where the hills are largely bare and unfit for cultivation, valleys open in various directions, the most important being those of the Severn and its tributaries. There is a certain amount of level ground along the coasts, but substantially the whole region is hilly, and not naturally suited, the climate being damp, for an agricultural population. It possesses at the south-west corner the finest natural harbour in the British Islands, if not in Europe. Its distance from the industrial centres has hitherto prevented Milford Haven from being a great commercial port; but it is admirably suited, as a naval station, to guard the access to the Bristol and St. George's Channels, which are separated by the south-western promontory of Wales. The other harbours on the south coast are of purely modern and industrial importance.

3. The whole south-west of England, from the longitude of Bristol, belongs to the hilly part of the island. In primitive times the southern shore of the Bristol Channel was lined with fens, extending far into the heart of the peninsula up the course of the river Parret. At the western part of the Bristol Channel the high bare uplands of Exmoor fall in places precipitously to the sea. And though the valley of the Exe forms a clear dividing line beyond it—the source of

the Exe is within a few miles of the sea on the north—Dartmoor, which fills all the centre of Devon, is of the same general character. The valleys of the streams which drain these highlands, chiefly to the southward, are rich and well wooded, but the moors themselves are worthy of their name. The Devon peninsula possesses a great number of harbours, not of the first class, with the exception of Plymouth, and the fisheries outside have always been of great value.

The mineral wealth of the western half of Britain has made it in modern times also the industrial half. On the coalfields along both sides of the southern Pennines have grown up the great textile industries. A great part of South Wales is one vast coalfield, not without iron in addition. The tin, lead, and copper of Devon and Cornwall, though now approaching exhaustion, were among the earliest known mines of those metals. All this, however, required the hand of more or less civilised man. To the primitive savage, even to the Celtic population whom the Romans found in possession, this region offered few natural advantages, except comparative security when they retired before enemies into the recesses of the hills.

§ 2. INHABITANTS

The earliest traces of man in the British Islands belong to a period when they still formed part of the Continent. Of this primæval race, however, who were contemporary with sundry animals long extinct in this part of the world, no account need be taken historically. The evidence concerning their successors, which is derived from their burying-places, shows that all had skulls of a long shape, but that the hair was dark in the south, fair in the north. It is suggested that the latter may have come from Scandinavia; the former, as there is no reason to doubt, belonged to the race which occupied all western Europe before the Celtic invasion. Ethnologists are now tending more and more to the opinion that the Celtic race counts for but little from the physical point of view. They say that the bulk of the population, throughout what are generally known as the Celtic

portions of the British Islands, and especially in South Wales and in parts of Ireland, must have been of the pre-Celtic stock, to which the name Iberian is tentatively given. If this be so, the Celts must have come in as a small ruling caste, which was lost in the multitude of their subjects. Dominant, however, they certainly were; the inhabitants of Britain had become more or less homogeneous long before the Roman conquest. Moreover, the Celts had so entirely prevailed in matter of language that the earliest type of geographical names, those of rivers and other natural features, are Celtic all over Britain.

The Celts came westwards in two waves, separated apparently by an appreciable interval of time, and easily distinguishable in language. The earlier, as is natural, are found in the remoter parts of our islands. The Erse of Ireland and the Gaelic of the Scotch Highlands are languages closely akin. This branch of the Celts is now called Goidelic, so as to avoid confusion with Gaelic, another spelling of the same word, which is specially applied to the Highlanders. The second portion used to be called Cymric, but as that name seems not to have been employed until after the Romans had evacuated Britain, another name, Brythonic, has been introduced. The various Celts of this branch have each in their own dialect a name for themselves, of which this word is one form; it is therefore more appropriate ethnologically than Cymric, though, in fact, all the Brythons in this island who retained independence after the Anglo-Saxon conquest had made some progress, called themselves Cymry. Their language still survives in Wales, and has not very long been extinct in Cornwall, formerly called West Wales. For historical purposes, however, the name Welsh, by which the Anglo-Saxons called them as being aliens, is the most convenient.

At the time of Cæsar's invasion there was a fairly close connection between the tribes inhabiting southern Britain and those of Gaul. They were all Celtic in speech, if language can be taken as a test of nationality; though in Gaul there was a considerable admixture of people with the round type of skull, who must have been different in physical

origin, though equally Celticised. Many of the same tribal and other names recur in both countries; even the Belgæ, a tribe of northern Gaul who are supposed to have been wholly or partially Teutonic, were found by Cæsar in what is now Hampshire. Inferences based on nomenclature are no doubt open to a certain amount of suspicion. The names in Gaul and Britain alike are known to us only through Latin, and may have been distorted in the process of transference into a foreign tongue. The similarity of names on both sides of the Channel is, however, too great to be accidental.

It is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the disputed question as to what was known of the British Islands to classical antiquity before the age of Cæsar. Doubts have been thrown on the correctness of the long-established belief that the Phœnicians came to Cornwall for tin. The name of Cassiterides (tin islands) was long applied to the Scilly Isles, but they can have furnished hardly any tin; and it is now supposed that the name originally belonged to the little islands at the north-west corner of Spain. It is at least possible that the Phœnicians came for tin to Cornwall, and having no occasion to go further, did not discover that it formed part of so large an island, though the statements that they made settlements in Cornwall for the sake of working the tin rest on mere inference. It is no unreasonable conjecture, also, that after the fall of Carthage the ocean voyages as far as Britain came to an end, and that the tin began to form an article of trade with Gaul, as Britain and Gaul alike grew gradually more peaceful and settled. All, however, that can be maintained with certainty is that Britain was known by name as early as Aristotle, and that British tin reached the Mediterranean by land across Gaul when all western Europe was under Roman dominion.

The Roman conquest of Britain was begun in earnest in A.D. 43, Cæsar's invasions having been little more than reconnoitring expeditions, and was carried to its furthest extent by Agricola, A.D. 78–85. That general defeated the Caledonians, as the Romans called the inhabitants of the far north, also known as Picts, in a considerable battle. The locality is vaguely described as *Mons Graupius* (of which the

modern name Grampian is a corruption), but all that can be affirmed with certainty is that it must have been somewhere north of the Tay. Agricola's expedition, however, did not mean permanent conquest, for in A.D. 122 was built the famous wall of Hadrian, a line of elaborate fortifications from the Solway Firth to the mouth of the Tyne.[1] This wall was intended as a defence for southern Britain, now growing peaceful under Roman rule, against the wild tribes of the north. The country thence to the Firths of Forth and Clyde was again occupied later, and a line of earthworks, the so-called wall of Antoninus, was drawn from the Forth to the Clyde, but it is not unreasonable to say that the effective Roman occupation was bounded by the wall of Hadrian.

How far the Romans really subdued the hilly regions of Wales and the Cornish peninsula is not clear: they have left but slight traces of themselves within these regions. It is significant that the three main military stations were Eboracum (York), Castra Legionis on the Dee (Chester), also called Deva, and Castra Legionis on the Usk (Caerleon), also called Isca Silurum. The first was obviously intended to furnish a support to the garrison along the wall. The latter certainly suggest that it was deemed expedient to guard against similar trouble from Wales.

The Roman occupation was thus substantially limited to the south-eastern, or plain, half of the island, altogether inhabited by peoples speaking the Cymric, or as it is otherwise called Brythonic, language. Latin, no doubt, made progress among them, and Roman municipal institutions were established, with much of the externals of civilisation. The Romans however merely ruled, like the English in India; they did not introduce a new element into the population. They left behind them abundant tokens of their presence in the shape of roads and towns. The former are virtually indestructible, though they have largely been obliterated in process of time; of the latter, though there is ample

[1] The name Wallsend, given to the best-known sort of Newcastle coal, may serve to remind us that the east end of the Roman wall was close to where Newcastle was afterwards built. Hadrian's wall passed through the northernmost of the two chief gaps in the Pennines.

historical evidence of their existence, naturally but few actual buildings survive.

The most important of the towns, besides the three military stations already mentioned, probably all existed before the Roman conquest. The name of London, which contains the Celtic element *dun,* certainly is pre-Roman, and so is apparently Camulodunum (Colchester), though we only know it in its Roman form. London was then, as its geographical position has made it at all times, the chief place commercially, though York, during part at least of the Roman occupation, was the official capital. Venta Belgarum (Winchester) was the headquarters of one of the most powerful British tribes. Glevum (Gloucester) is situated at a point of permanent geographical importance, at the mouth of the Severn, just before it begins to open out into the wide estuary of the Bristol Channel. Aquæ Solis (Bath) was then, as it has been ever since, as according to legend it had been long before, noted for its hot springs, and still possesses the remains of one of the most extensive of Roman bathing establishments north of the Alps. Rutupiæ (Richborough) was the chief port for communication with the Continent, but this, chiefly through physical changes on the coast, has long been superseded by Dover. Other Roman towns worth mentioning are Lindum (Lincoln) and Isca Damnoniorum (Exeter). And it may be said generally that every town whose name has a termination derived from the Roman *castra* (a camp) stands where once there was a Roman military station large or small. The Teutonic word was spelt -ceaster, to which was prefixed, by way of definition, an adaptation of some previous name, of a local stream, or the like. As time went on, diversities of pronunciation modified the original form ; -caster belongs exclusively to the Angle north. The Saxon form -chester is universal in the south, though it is found elsewhere, as at Manchester. In the midlands we find the intermediate form -cester. A good specimen of the whole process is afforded by Gloucester ; the name has obtained its modern form by "phonetic decay" from Glevum, the Roman name, with -ceaster suffixed.

A little study of the map of Roman Britain will show how

their roads, one of the most potent instruments of Roman civilisation, illustrate the geographical conditions. The common idea that they were carried straight up hill and down dale, ignoring obstacles, is truer in detail than on the large scale. Those who have traced one of the many pieces of Roman road that have not been concealed from outward view by the growth of grass, will certainly have been struck by their straightness, but they were skilfully planned to take the best course from one place to another. For instance, Ermine Street, as it was afterwards called, the road northwards from the important military station of Colchester, skirts the south and west of the Ely fens on its way to Lincoln; thence, again, it is taken far westwards to avoid the fens of the Humber, which barred the straight route to York. The most famous of all the Roman roads is Watling Street, which led from the coast of Kent to London, more or less in the line now taken by the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway, thence north-westwards to Chester.

The map of the Roman roads, so far as they have been thoroughly investigated, serves to illustrate what has been said above, as to the very imperfect occupation of the country between the walls of Hadrian and Antoninus, and also of Wales and Devon. There was a road due north from Isca Silurum to meet Watling Street some way short of Chester, and there were roads along both the north and the south coast of Wales; but the hilly interior was hardly penetrated, and no road at all is indicated west of Exeter. Similarly in the north a single road crosses the wall of Hadrian, and is continued to the Forth, though with the usual Roman scorn of difficulties it is carried, not by the longer and easier route along the level strip of coast, but straight through the hills.

When the Romans abandoned Britain in A.D. 410, they left their subjects in some respects the worse off for the four centuries of Roman rule. They had advanced considerably in material civilisation, and they had, more or less, embraced Christianity; but they had lost the habit of defending themselves, and were therefore an easy prey. The fierce Picts of the north, whom Rome had not even professed to tame, plundered and destroyed far and wide through the land.

The great wall ceased to be any effective protection when the Roman legions no longer garrisoned it. Moreover, Teuton marauders from across the North Sea, who had been troublesome for the last century and more of the Roman occupation, became more and more dangerous, as was natural, after the legions had been withdrawn.

The traditional account is that the Britons invited the first Teutons to settle in the island in order to obtain their assistance against the Picts, and found too late that they had brought in enemies far more terrible: for the Teutons proved exterminating conquerors, instead of mere plunderers. Whether this be true of the invaders led by Hengist and Horsa or not is of no great consequence; it was in no sense true of the bulk of the new invaders. What brought the Teuton swarms across the North Sea cannot be certainly known; it is conjectured that the vast disturbance of all central Europe caused by the inroad of Attila's Huns had this remote effect. At any rate, the peoples along the coast, from the mouth of the Rhine to the peninsula of Jutland, were set in motion. The Saxons, whose seats were between the Elbe and the Rhine, were naturally nearer to the south coast of Britain; the Angles, who lay beyond the Elbe, came more readily to the eastern shores. And these two collections of tribes—it would be premature to call them nations—shared Britain between them, so far as it was occupied by Teutons at all. The only exception is the Jutes, from the peninsula which still bears their name lying north of the seats of the Angles; these came first in order of time, but achieved only a little, being shut into the south-eastern corner, Kent, by the presumably superior numbers of the Angles and Saxons.

The course of the Anglo-Saxon conquest was almost entirely determined by geographical facts, given that the invaders were not a homogeneous people. The Jutes first of all (the traditional date is A.D. 449) effected a permanent landing in Thanet, then really an island, separated by a channel navigable for the small vessels of those ages. Thence they spread and founded the kingdom of Kent, which then as now furnished the main high-road from the Continent

to the centre of the island: and Kent, being effectually separated from Sussex by the deep inlet of Romney Marsh, and bounded to the westward by the great forest known as the Andredeswald, could extend no further.

The first Saxons to arrive occupied Sussex (South Saxons), but could not pass the forest which filled the space between the North and South Downs. And since other invaders arrived on the coast to the west of them, the kingdom of Sussex remained small and isolated, so much so that heathenism is said to have lingered there later than anywhere else in England.

Other Saxons came up the estuary of the Thames, and finding the way barred by London, established themselves on the north bank. Their kingdom of Essex (East Saxons) had for its centre the Roman town of Colchester. Thence they seem to have pushed westwards, surrounding London and ultimately obtaining possession of it. When and how London came to be ruined, and left for some time desolate, does not appear. The indications are however clear that London was strong enough to defend itself when the Teutonic invasions began, and for some time afterwards. Else there would have been no reason why the Jutes of Kent should not have extended their kingdom further up the south bank of the Thames, any more than for the East Saxons turning aside to Colchester. It is certain also that the region round London, called Middlesex and doubtless for a while more or less independent, became part of the kingdom of Essex. The name Surrey (Süd-reich) seems to imply that this district was the southern portion of the region occupied by the East Saxons, though it afterwards became part of Wessex. Slowly the three little kingdoms, Kent from the east, and (much more effectively if one may judge from the present county boundaries) Surrey from the north, and Sussex from the south, pushed their way into the great forest until they met. It long remained uncleared, a real barrier against free intercourse; but the Celts seem to have been entirely expelled from the whole region.

By far the most important of the Saxon swarms,[1] at any

[1] For further information on this subject see Oman, *England before the Norman Conquest* (Methuen and Co.).

rate in its after history, came up Southampton water about half a century after the first landing in Thanet. Jutes had previously occupied the Isle of Wight, but they must have been early absorbed; they make no further appearance in history. A more favourable inlet could hardly be imagined, and the topography further inland presented no obstacle. They readily made their way up the basin of the Itchen, and established their kingdom of Wessex (West Saxons) at the old Celtic and Roman city of Winchester.

The further progress of the West Saxons may be likened to the action of a colony of bees, that sends out a fresh swarm from time to time to make a new settlement for itself. The counties of modern England included in the kingdom of Wessex when at its full extent bear tribal names, not town names. They were not administrative divisions, but natural growths. The knowledge which we possess of the gradual expansion of Wessex is scanty, but it in no way contradicts the inference from the nomenclature, that separate settlements were formed one by one, which presently coalesced like Essex and Middlesex into a single kingdom.

From the geographical nature of the case, the West Saxons, when once they had occupied Hampshire, had thenceforth to do all the fighting against the Celts of the south. Hence their expansion was slow, the resistance being from time to time extremely stubborn. Unless the Arthurian legends be altogether without historical basis, which it is difficult to believe, they refer to this warfare, in which the heathen invaders, though in the long run successful, were held at bay for some time, and met with occasional defeats.

One swarm from the West Saxon hive migrated northwards, and occupied Berkshire, the name of which is derived from the British tribe called by the Romans Bibroci. Physical obstacle there was none, unless the marshes along the Kennet are worth taking into account. But the Thames became their northern frontier, the only important river in England which served as a boundary. West Saxons somewhat later crossed the Thames, and settled more or less in Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire; but these presently gave way before the Angles of Mercia, and the Thames formed the frontier

between Wessex and Mercia when those two kingdoms were at the height of their development.

The first expansion westwards was not achieved without serious fighting; but West Saxons in the middle of the sixth century conquered the British town of Old Sarum, and established within a few miles the headquarters of a new colony. Not far from Old Sarum, close to the modern Salisbury, which has superseded a place that, however good for defence, has no adequate water-supply, the Wiley and Avon meet, having drained the upland region which we now call Salisbury Plain. A mile or two up the Wiley the new settlers built their town, called Wilton after the river, and their territory has become Wiltshire—the shire, or share, of the Wilsaetas. The district between Wiltshire and the sea, the seat of the British tribe known as Durobriges, occupied after a less severe struggle by another body of West Saxons, is the modern Dorsetshire.

The great forest of Selwood, on the east of what is now Somersetshire, was an obstacle to the direct progress of the Saxons westwards. Hence their next advance was from the north-western corner of the Wiltshire upland, by the gap between it and the southern end of the Cotswold plateau. Through this gap the Bristol Avon descends to join the Severn; and in the neighbourhood of Bath the Avon valley is narrowed by the approach to one another of high land on the north, which is the extremity of the Cotswold system, and hills on the south which are continued to the Mendips. Here, as was natural, there was a severe struggle between Britons and Saxons, and the great victory of Deorham in 577 is the most important event in the history of Wessex. As a consequence of it, the West Saxons reached the western sea, thereby separating finally the Britons of the south-west from those of Wales.

Progress westwards was easy along the broad and fertile strip between the Mendips and the southern shore of the Bristol Channel. More or less simultaneously there was an advance of the Saxons past the southern end of the Selwood forest. Thus in the early part of the seventh century the whole county of Somerset was occupied, in which is included

the fen district of Athelney. Its western limit is formed by the high and bare hill region, much of it scarcely cultivable, which marks off the western peninsula. Far into this high land penetrates the broad vale of Taunton, and the physical obstacles cannot have seriously delayed the Saxon advance as far as Exeter. The centre of Devonshire is filled by Dartmoor, higher and even less habitable than the hills to the east of it; but the coast strip to the south of Dartmoor, and the broad Exe valley between it and Exmoor, invited further progress, and the county of Devon was ultimately formed.

Probability would suggest that as the Britons were driven further and further west, till there was no more room for retreat, their resistance would have become more tenacious. The scanty records give no evidence that this was the case. On the other hand, ethnological inquiry seems to show that to a certain extent in western Somerset, still more in Devon, and almost entirely in Cornwall, the Celts remained in possession.

Christianity had, it is suggested, rendered the Saxons less fierce by the time that they had passed Athelney, so that they contented themselves with conquest and gradually blended with their subjects. Whether this be the explanation or not, the fact is certain that Cornwall, otherwise West Wales—the horn projecting into the western ocean occupied by the aliens—remained almost exclusively Celtic in race and speech, though politically united to Wessex from the beginning of the ninth century. And it is easy to see how important to the strength of Wessex was the subjugation of the western peninsula. Free of enemies in rear, Wessex soon shows itself the strongest of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. On a very small scale the effect is like that produced on the European position of England when Scotland, which had been for centuries unfriendly in attitude and often actively hostile, was added to its power.

The West Saxons brought under Teuton dominion another district which did not ultimately form part of Wessex. When they had reached the estuary of the Severn they advanced also northwards up the strip west of the Cotswolds, and

occupied the region of the lower Severn, and even across to the Wye. The territory of the Hwiccas, as the tribe or swarm was called, corresponded roughly to the modern counties of Gloucester, Worcester, and Hereford. Their name still survives in Worcester = Hwicwara-ceaster, the town of the people of the Hwiccas, placed where a Roman military station had been. This district, however, did not preserve its connection with Wessex, but was annexed to the Angle kingdom of Mercia and shared its subsequent fate.

As the Saxons monopolised the south coast, so the Angles had it all their own way on the east from the Thames to the Forth. Two separate tribes occupied the counties now known from them as Norfolk and Suffolk, and presently coalesced into a single East Anglian kingdom. The Wash, with the fen region, which then extended very far southwards from the Wash, interposed an effective barrier between East Anglia and the midlands, so that it could not extend, and had relations mainly with Essex.

Other Angles landed further north and established two kingdoms, which also ultimately coalesced, and were known by the single name of Northumbria.[1] The northernmost of these two kingdoms, which extended from the Forth to the Tees, derived its name of Bernicia from the Brigantes, the powerful Celtic tribe whom the Romans found in possession of most of what became their northern province. Deira, the name of the kingdom between the Humber and the Tees, is also said, though doubtfully, to be a word of Celtic origin.

The boundaries of Deira were dictated by nature on all sides except the north, though even there it was appropriate, if there was to be any boundary at all, that it should come where the physical system changes, where the rivers flowing eastwards out of the Pennines cease to unite in order to flow southwards into the Humber, and begin to cross the country straight to the sea. It was some time, however,

[1] The bastard Latin word is convenient here, as in the case of East Anglia, in order to supply a separate and unmistakable name. The contemporary name, Northumberland, now signifies the modern county, a small fraction of the Angle kingdom.

before the Pennine chain, the natural limit on the west, became so in fact. At first the Celts held their ground about Leeds; later on the Angles pushed through the gaps in the chain and took temporary possession of the region about the Mersey, though the southern Cheshire portion soon passed to Mercia. The obvious capital for Deira was York, which had long been the second, if not the first, city of Roman Britain, the natural centre of the broad plain, with its tributary dales, which is watered by the Ouse and its affluents.

Bernicia, in its southern half, was even more obviously marked out by nature. The northern end of the Pennine chain, with the Cheviots continuing it, though inclined at an angle, forms almost as definite a boundary as the sea on the eastern side. But the Cheviots do not reach the sea, and the Angle occupation was extended up the broad vale of the Tweed and along the strip of coast from Tweed mouth to the Forth, pushing its way gradually over the whole of what is now called Lothian. Its capital was deliberately planted at Bamborough, on the coast instead of inland, almost within sight of the Tweed. Another town of Angle foundation within the limits of Bernicia has, however, proved of considerably greater importance. Bamborough, with no natural advantages, has dwindled to nothing; its near neighbour, Berwick, was in the early Middle Ages a place of considerable trade, besides being the essential frontier fortress as soon as the present line of demarcation between England and Scotland had been determined. But Edinburgh, the border town built and fortified as a protection for the extreme north of Bernicia against Picts and Scots, preserves in its name the recollection that it was founded by Edwin, the most famous of Northumbrian kings.

Other Angle tribes entered the country by the Wash, pushing up the rivers which drain into it to the eastern midlands, and also by the Humber estuary and thence up the Trent. The Ely fens separated them from their kindred in East Anglia, the Humber from the Northumbrians. Much of the Trent basin was in those days covered with forest, which no doubt encouraged, if it did not compel, the formation of petty principalities. Gradually, however, the people who

had Lichfield, towards the head of the Trent, for their centre acquired a supremacy, and this developed into the kingdom of Mercia. It is at least possible that if some other of the rival tribes had obtained the lead, the new kingdom would never have been called by this name. Mercia is the *mark*, or frontier-land, towards the Celts of Wales; and this name, perfectly appropriate to a kingdom centred in Lichfield, could hardly have suggested itself if Lincoln, for instance, the most important ancient town in that region, had become the capital. Mercia, however, came to include much more; the Saxon sub-kingdom of Hwiccas, together with the West Saxon settlements north of the upper Thames, were added to it. Finally, the district which is now Cheshire, the region at the north-western border of the English plain which gives it access to the sea, passed from the occupation of the Northumbrian Angles into its more natural connection with the central kingdom.

Mercia thus touched the sea in three separate directions, on the north-east where the Angles had come in, on the north-west, and on the south-west by the estuary of the Severn. Hence Mercia alone was in contact with the Welsh, and it cannot be doubted that this proximity of a restless enemy was an element of weakness, when the final struggle took place which was to decide whether ultimate supremacy over England should fall to Mercia or to Wessex. The fact that the greatest of Mercian kings thought it worth his while to guard against Welsh inroads, by constructing Offa's Dyke along the whole western frontier from the Dee to the Wye, is in itself sufficient proof of this.

Geography in more ways than one influenced the history of the conversion of England to Christianity. During the Roman occupation Christianity had made considerable progress among the British population. A familiar tradition asserts that Joseph of Arimathea came to Britain, and that his staff of Syrian thorn, planted in the ground near where afterwards Glastonbury Abbey was built, continued for many centuries to flower at Christmas; and if the Arthurian legends have any basis of fact, the land was Christian when the Teutonic invaders came. These, however, were entirely

and fiercely heathen, and Christianity practically disappeared before them, at any rate from England. The mission of Augustine at the end of the sixth century naturally landed in Kent, and achieved its first success there. And inasmuch as the king of Kent happened at that time to be the leading prince in the island, it was also natural that the episcopal see established at Canterbury, the capital of his kingdom, should become the metropolitan see for southern Britain, though it is obvious that Canterbury is neither in position nor in relative importance the place which would have been deliberately selected as the seat of an archbishopric for England. From Kent Christianity spread steadily westwards, and it is probable enough that by mitigating the ferocity of the West Saxons it prevented the extermination of the Celts in Somerset. Its progress northwards was helped by personal relations between the kings of Kent and Northumbria, though the centre of the island, where the kingdom of Mercia had not yet been consolidated, remained heathen.

Augustine, as despatched by the Pope in person, naturally represented complete obedience to Rome. But Christianity had meanwhile crossed into northern Britain on the heels of the Scots from Ireland, where it had flourished independently of Rome all through the period of the Anglo-Saxon conquest. From Iona, the monastic centre in the western isles, the disciples of St. Columba carried their faith over the whole north of Britain, penetrating southwards into Northumbria. At the court of king Edwin the representatives of Iona and of Canterbury contended for the allegiance of the Angles, and Rome won the day. The resolution of the synod of Whitby, A.D. 664, that Northumbria should follow the Roman rule—the points of difference related to mere matters of usage, but a vital question underlay them—was of vast importance to English history. Seeing how great was the influence of the church in furthering the consolidation of the Anglo-Saxons, it is no unreasonable conjecture that if Northumbria had adhered to Iona, the island would have divided into two realms, not at the Tweed, but at the Humber. And two fairly equal kingdoms in the same island must have wasted their strength in contests for supremacy, impeding the

progress of both, and retarding the ultimate union, perhaps inducing other and worse evils. As it was, the missionaries of Iona seem to have lost heart, and ultimately all Scotland, as well as England, accepted the Roman obedience.

The geographical and political conditions during the period in which the Angles and Saxons were converted to Christianity are well illustrated by the seats of the original episcopal sees. Kent, where Augustine began his work, contained under Canterbury a second see at Rochester. Wessex, which grew up, as has been shown above, in successive fragments, had bishoprics to correspond—one at Winchester for the original settlement in Hants, with its extension northwards over Surrey, one for Wilts and Dorset, which is now fixed at Salisbury, one for Somerset at Wells, one for the western peninsula at Exeter. The small kingdoms of Sussex, East Anglia, Essex, had each its single see. Hwiccas had its bishop at Worcester, with another at Hereford for the outlying district bordering on Wales. Deira had York, and Bernicia Durham, and the whole centre of England was divided between the sees of Lichfield and, as was ultimately settled, Lincoln. It was not until after the Norman conquest that the great monastery of Ely was made the centre of a bishopric for the fen country, and a bishop was seated at Carlisle for the Cumbrian region now definitely separated from Scotland.

§ 3. CONSOLIDATION

The Heptarchy is the name usually given to the state of things in Anglo-Saxon Britain during the seventh and eighth centuries, and it may serve if not taken too literally. Seven kingdoms were in fact established, partly by fusion of smaller units ; but it would be hard to name a date at which there were seven and no more, independent of each other. The natural tendency was for the weaker ones to fall under the domination of their stronger neighbours, though the process of natural selection, out of which ultimately came union, was doubtless retarded by the fact that the three largest kingdoms had, while the smaller ones had not, Celtic enemies on their border. It is obvious, also, that the division of England

between Wessex, Mercia, and Northumbria is roughly in accordance with geography. If there is no definite physical frontier between Wessex and Mercia, except along the Thames, the former was Saxon, the latter Angle, and the differences between the two kindred peoples were quite real. Mercia and Northumbria were both Angle, but the deep inlet of the Humber cut them physically apart. Northumbria was the first to come to the front, and was apparently at the beginning of the eighth century the most advanced portion of England. Its civilisation however was largely monastic, manifesting itself in schools of learning at home and in producing missionaries to convert Germany. And this intensified the rivalry between Northumbria and Mercia, which long remained heathen. The upshot was the ruin of Northumbria, where Deira and Bernicia temporarily fell asunder again; and in the latter half of the eighth century Mercia was preponderant.

Meanwhile Wessex had been growing in strength, gradually conquering the Celts of the south-west, who at the beginning of the ninth century were finally reduced to submission, and acquiring more and more control over the small kingdoms of the south-east. Moreover Wessex was, as neither Northumbria nor Mercia could be, in touch with the Continent, where the Frankish empire was growing up. It is no mere accidental coincidence that the year 800, which saw the formal establishment of the western empire by the coronation of Charlemagne, saw also the accession to the throne of Wessex of Egbert, the king who first acquired for it an acknowledged primacy throughout England, which no other kingdom afterwards even professed to claim.

Early in the ninth century it became clear—at any rate it so appears to us after the event—that the time was approaching when England might be united under one kingdom, and also that Wessex alone could absorb the others. The popular account which makes Egbert (800–827) the first king of England, though in some sense untrue, yet prefigures the truth. Almost immediately, however, began the Danish invasions, which contributed a new element to the population, and very materially affected the geographical development.

The new element was in race closely akin to the old. The Danes and Norsemen, like the Angles and Saxons, were Teutons in blood and speech, and came from nearly the same region. They brought with them, however, qualities which the Angles had either never possessed or had lost by disuse—qualities of vital importance to the English character as developed in later times—a love of the sea, and of adventure. How strong was this spirit is legible in every page of their early history. The same age which witnessed the first harrying and partial conquest of England saw the Norsemen acquire the duchy of Normandy; not many years later they became the terror of the western Mediterranean, and carved out kingdoms with the sword in Naples and Sicily.

The Danes at first ravaged indiscriminately, but gradually began to attempt permanent conquest. It may have been the accident of having more capable leaders, or it may have been that Wessex was really and permanently the strongest of the three English kingdoms. At any rate, Wessex alone succeeded in beating them off; most of the Angles submitted to Danish rule. At the end of the ninth century there were three definite Danish principalities. East Anglia and Essex, down to and including London, were ruled by Guthrum, Alfred's most conspicuous enemy. Deira was entirely in the hands of the Danes, though they seem to have got no hold on Bernicia. Into the very heart of the country, starting as the Angles had done from the Humber and the Wash, projected what is known as the confederacy of the five burghs, namely, Lincoln, Derby, Nottingham, Stamford, and Leicester. For a time the Danes dominated the whole of Mercia; but their permanent occupation, thorough enough to give to the region that they held the name of the Danelagh, was, roughly speaking, from the Tees to Watling Street.

Alfred himself was for a time very hard pressed by the Danes; and it is to this lowest point of his fortunes that the famous legend belongs of his having taken refuge in the Athelney fens, and having burned the cakes which were left in his care by the wife of the peasant in whose hut he was sheltered. But the tide turned in his favour, and the systematic reconquest of the midlands is a definite stage in

the consolidation of England. Step by step he, his son, and his heroic daughter, "the Lady of the Mercians," won back first Hwiccas, then London, and gradually the whole of Mercia. The Danes were not expelled, but conquered, and became subjects of the West Saxon king, now really and effectively ruler, if not of all England, at least of the whole plain region of the south-east. As Mercia was reconquered, it was organised afresh into shires, each round a town of which it bears the name. The modern map, with its counties all called after their chief towns, from Lincoln to Gloucester, from Chester to Hertford, is a permanent memento of this conquest, and of the historical and geographical conditions under which it was made.

It is not improbable that it was merely distance from the centre of government, no unimportant consideration in days of few roads and slow communication, which prevented the north from being as fully organised under new conditions as Mercia. As a matter of fact the former kingdom of Deira remained undivided, and is now represented by the great county of York, though it is possible that such local names as Cleveland and Craven represent a process at the time of the first Angle settlement analogous to that which in the south created Wilts and Dorset. Of the ancient Bernicia the northern portion passed, as is explained elsewhere, into the hands of the king of Scots. The remainder, from the Tees to the Tweed, formed a diminished Northumberland, within which it seems that the bishopric of Durham had before the Norman conquest obtained a special jurisdiction, which under the Norman kings became the county palatine of Durham.

What happened west of the Pennine range is obscured by the partisanship of later times, dealing with the relations of the English and Scottish crowns. One or two things are, however, clear, and they show the principles of geographical propriety taking effect after history had for a while violated them. The Angles, and the Danes after them, had penetrated through the gap in the Pennines, and annexed to Deira the northern portion of what is now Lancashire, north of the estuary of the Ribble. The Cumbrian peninsula,

between the deep inlets of Morecambe Bay and the Solway Firth, which had originally been part of the Brython kingdom of Strathclyde, eventually gravitated to England. It was not, however, till after the reign of William Rufus that, the frontier with Scotland having been finally settled at the right point, the north-west was organised into counties. Then the outlying portion west of the Pennines was taken from Yorkshire, and the land between the Mersey and Ribble from Cheshire, with which it had little natural connection; and the two formed a new county, Lancashire. And the Cumbrian peninsula, with the strip between it and the Pennines, became Cumberland and Westmoreland.

There was considerable apparent progress towards consolidation during the tenth century, but it took largely the form of extending the sovereignty of the kings over the whole island, rather than of welding Angle and Saxon into one. Indeed the latter process was probably more impeded by the influx of Danes than it was furthered by the increased power of the crown. The Danes had conquered Angle regions, not Saxon, and fused thoroughly with the previous inhabitants, thereby accentuating the ancient, though not very sharp, differences between Saxon and Angle. In relation to the Celtic portions of the island, the advance of the Saxon kings towards supremacy was great in substance, still greater in outward forms, calculated to make themselves more and more of a reality. Edward the Elder, son of Alfred, was recognised by the king of Scots as his "father and lord"; so at least the Saxon Chronicle relates, though we naturally have no explanation as to how much this signified. His son Athelstan won a great victory over a non-Saxon combination. Titles were assumed by the Saxon kings which were deliberately copied from Roman and Byzantine precedents, with the purpose of asserting not merely independence of the western empire refounded by Charlemagne, but also imperial supremacy within the British Islands. The coronation of Edgar, in 973, in Bath Abbey, with the story of his having made vassal kings row him in a boat on the Dee, may serve to mark the zenith of this titular and in some sense real empire. Nevertheless, the fusion of

Angle and Saxon made little progress, and the undoubted advance of England in consideration abroad, and in wealth at home, belongs rather to Wessex than to the whole country.

If we compare the geographic conditions of A.D. 1000 with those of six centuries earlier, we shall find that the changes are not great, except ethnically. The Saxons and Angles, now in most parts Anglo-Danes, have superseded the Brythons altogether in the plain regions of the south-east and centre. There may, of course, have been a large Brython element retained as the thralls of their conquerors, but the available evidence seems to point the other way. At any rate the whole organisation is Teutonic, and the minor place-names, of villages, farms, and the like, are Teutonic also, affording a strong presumption that the Celts were insignificant, probably in numbers, certainly in importance. Beyond the plain region the Brythons are still in almost exclusive possession, though with a considerable admixture of race along the border lands. Politically things vary. The Brythons of Cornwall are merged in Wessex. Those of Wales remain virtually independent, but the princes admit, at least in form, the supremacy of the Saxon. Those of Strathclyde are so mixed up with Scotland that their relation to the English crown can hardly be stated with precision.

The towns are much the same as those of Roman times. The old municipal institutions are gone, having mostly perished in the Saxon conquest; but in their place new institutions are growing up, of a Teutonic type. The one new town of importance is Bristol, which has risen mainly through trade with Ireland. So advantageous is its position —on the Severn estuary yet sheltered up a tributary river, at the southern end of the strip between the Cotswolds and the Severn, at the eastern end of the strip between the Mendips and the Bristol Channel, on the Avon, whose valley leads up towards the heart of the country—that one only wonders it had not risen earlier. The country is probably more important, relatively to the towns, than at the departure of the Romans. A great deal of forest has been cleared, and the land brought into cultivation, but the fens remain as before.

The age when the hand of man is to modify greatly the appearance of the country is yet far distant.

The Danish conquest early in the eleventh century further illustrates the fact that the acknowledged supremacy of the kings of Wessex had not gone far towards unifying England. A great Scandinavian kingdom had arisen, uniting for the moment Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and its kings deliberately aimed at adding England to their empire. No one could have managed his affairs worse than the Saxon king Æthelred, known as the Unready. Weak in buying off invaders, treacherous in attempting to murder all the Danes in Wessex, fool enough not only to follow the advice of a bad counsellor, but to take him back to his side again and again after the most shameless acts of treason, Æthelred would have ruined a much stronger cause. For he had against him not only the race sympathies of the Anglo-Danes, who felt themselves much nearer akin to the invaders than to their Saxon fellow-citizens, but also the ancient jealousies which may fairly be called geographical. Northumbria was ready for anything that might restore its ancient independence of Wessex ; Mercia was, to say the least, not zealous for the Saxon king. Only Wessex was likely to be faithful to him, and the support of Wessex tended to alienate other portions of the country. Swegen, or Sweyn, the Danish prince, was a man of energy, and he had nearly conquered the country when he died in 1014. This gave Æthelred another chance, and his son Edmund now proved a brave and competent commander. The old partition of Alfred's day, the south to the Saxon king, the centre and north to the Dane, had just been agreed on with Cnut, the son of Swegen, when Edmund's sudden death left Cnut master of the situation.

Once undisputed ruler, Cnut governed not as a conqueror, but as a lawful king. He was by no means unmindful of his Scandinavian realms, to which England was now added, and it is said that the desire to establish a certain uniformity between England and Scandinavia led him to adopt his most important measure. He thought that England, far superior to any of his other kingdoms in wealth and population, if not

in extent, might be best ruled if cut up into a few great sections, which might stand alongside of Denmark or Norway. Anyhow, he did in fact establish three great earldoms of Wessex, Mercia, and Northumbria, corresponding to the ancient kingdoms, which again, as has been shown, were in accordance with physical facts. To these he added a fourth of smaller extent, East Anglia, which was not of much importance. The natural result was to strengthen the sentiment of local separateness which had already facilitated the intrusion of the Danes among the Angles, and which contributed in no slight degree to bring Danes, Angles, and Saxons alike under the Norman yoke. Wessex the king kept in his own hands, but the earldoms of Mercia and Northumbria tended, like everything in that age, to become hereditary, giving an extra motive for the separateness that ought, if men could ever see into futurity, to have been regarded as England's worst danger. And when the Danish dynasty had come to an end, and the Saxon line was restored in Edward the Confessor, things became worse instead of better. Godwine, earl of Wessex, was an excellent minister, and his son and successor Harold better still, because a more upright man: but the family rivalry between the house of Godwine and that of Leofric of Mercia worked incessant mischief. To pass over minor troubles, all of which tended to accentuate the opposition between Wessex and Mercia, the success of the Norman invasion may be traced directly to the existence of the separate earldoms. William would probably have tried his fortune in any case, and other conditions besides the local divisions in England favoured him: but he would hardly have succeeded if Harold had been really as well as nominally king of all England. Northumbria, having fallen vacant in the Confessor's time, had been given to Harold's brother Tostig, who proved so tyrannical that a rebellion arose. Harold was unable in fairness to sustain his brother, and being not yet king was obliged to acquiesce in Northumbria being given to Morkere, brother of the young earl Edwin of Mercia, his hereditary enemy. On Harold's election to the throne, Tostig tried with Norwegian help to recover his earldom, and easily got

the better of the new earl, but was defeated by Harold after a desperate battle, which cost the king thousands of his trained infantry. When the Normans landed immediately afterwards, Edwin and Morkere showed their gratitude by not allowing a man from their earldoms to join the king's army, apparently in the idea that the fate of Wessex was no affair of theirs, and that with the Norman in Wessex they would be more independent than before. Thus Harold fought at Hastings with the forces of Wessex only, and since the battle was very hardly contested, it is reasonable to say that it should have been won if Edwin and Morkere had done their obvious duty. Whether this would have been to the ultimate advantage of England is another question: at any rate it is true that one of the most important battles in all history was decided through geographical differences, originally quite natural, being prolonged artificially.

The battle of Hastings made a Norman conquest of England certain, because there was no proper coherence among the English, and no adequate leaders; but it by no means completed it. When William marched on London, he found, like the Jutes six centuries before, that he could not cross the Thames in face of the city's resistance. So just as the East Saxons had pushed westwards from Essex to threaten London from the north, he moved up the Thames, crossed it at Wallingford, there being no point of passage lower down, and worked round to Berkhampsted on the north. Thereupon the hearts of the leaders failed them, London submitted, and William was duly crowned king. England, however, for good and for evil was not homogeneous. Each separate portion of the country had to be conquered, but for lack of concert they could be conquered one by one. The west was still attached to the house of Godwine, and Exeter, true to its position as the frontier city of the western peninsula, stood a siege: its capture was followed by the pacification of the whole region. Then it was the turn of the north: the insurrection was on a larger scale, was renewed more than once, and was backed by a Danish fleet in the Humber. William, however, induced the Danes to withdraw, and systematically devastated the whole of Yorkshire, a blow to the

relative prosperity and importance of the north which was felt till the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century. Finally Hereward held out in the isle of Ely, where the fens protected him until with infinite labour causeways were made into the heart of them.

All the time there had been desultory resistance along the Welsh border, where the Saxon leaders could obtain Welsh assistance, or in case of need retire into the hills. Accordingly, when this region was pacified, William took account of the geographical conditions in resettling the administration. He gave special powers to the earls of Chester and Shrewsbury, who were his outposts of defence against the Welsh; and on the same principle he made the bishop of Durham also earl of the county, to guard the frontier against the Scots. His two general measures which are concerned with geography were (1) the dissolution of Cnut's earldoms; (2) castle-building.

William knew by his own experience the results of a country being divided up into a few great sections. He was himself as duke of Normandy theoretically vassal to the king of France, but practically he was not only independent, but equal or superior in power to his sovereign. He was determined not to be king of England in so maimed and ineffective a fashion. Accordingly he appointed earls only over single shires, and over by no means all of these. Moreover the earl, though he received part of the revenue from the shire as his payment for administering it, was in no sense its owner. Indeed William took care that the lands given to those of his followers whom he was bound to reward most highly should be scattered over England, so that none of them might have too great power in any one locality. A considerable step was thus taken towards unifying the country; though in later ages we find the rival parties, for instance in the Wars of the Roses and in the Great Rebellion, divided by lines more or less geographical, we never after the Norman conquest hear of Northumbria regarding itself as a separate land from Wessex. And this may fairly be attributed in a great degree to William's measures, partly no doubt to the feeling that all sections of England alike were subject to an alien master,

but more to the care which he took to break down the local divisions.

Castles were things unheard of in Anglo-Saxon England, partly perhaps because architecture was relatively backward, mainly because there was no place for them in the Anglo-Saxon organisation. They were an obvious means of enabling the Normans, necessarily a small minority, to control a people more or less hostile at heart. Originally they seem to have been intended as royal strongholds, entrusted to the earl of the county or some other nominee of the king; but it is obvious that a noble in possession of such a castle was thereby strengthened for opposition to the crown if he chose to rebel. Moreover, the tendency throughout feudal times was for offices to become hereditary, so that a castle which might in theory be royal, came practically to be thought of as the earl's property. A number of castles were, moreover, built by individual nobles during the confusion of Stephen's reign, and not all of these were destroyed when Henry II. restored good order.

The Norman conquest threatened, it would seem at first sight, to destroy the insular separateness of England. The new dynasty possessed continental dominions which were immensely increased in the fourth generation, when Henry, count of Anjou and husband of the heiress of all south-western France, inherited Normandy and England. Foreigners by origin became the possessors of a great part of the lands, the holders of practically all high offices. The Church was brought into much closer connection with Rome. England under Henry II. must have appeared to the world a mere appendage to the great continental power which he steadily endeavoured to build up. Fortunately however for England, and for France, insularity prevailed. The policy of William the Conqueror, who claimed the crown of England as lawfully his, had maintained the Anglo-Saxon laws and social system except where he had definite reasons for change. His measures for preventing thorough feudalism from taking root in England and weakening the effective supremacy of the crown, followed up and extended as they were by his predecessors, made England more homogeneous than it had

ever been under the Saxon dynasty. The small minority of Normans gradually blended with the English, to whom after all they were akin. Probably the example of Henry I., in marrying a descendant of the Saxon royal house, contributed towards this result. It was a real nation, conscious of its unity and mindful of liberties that had been recognised for centuries, which extorted the great Charter from John. His son was perhaps the most thoroughly alien in feeling of all English kings ; but the strength of the national spirit was strikingly exemplified in the fact that Simon de Montfort, the leader of the patriotic resistance to Henry III., was a Frenchman born, an Englishman only by inheritance from his mother. Edward I. was by descent even more completely foreign than Montfort ; not one of his ancestors for many generations, except the wife of Henry I., was even remotely of English blood ; yet his policy and his sympathies were entirely English. The consolidation of the island was of far greater importance in his eyes than the retention of what remained of his predecessors' French territories.

It is not, of course, to be supposed that their island realm had any sentimental attraction for the Plantagenet kings. English wealth and prosperity, which were due even more to strong government than to insular security, aided the continental schemes of Henry II., paid for the crusade of Cœur-de-Lion, gave John his weight in European politics. While other countries of Europe were slowly emerging from the "organised anarchy" of feudalism, and beginning to grope their way towards national life, England, thanks to the protecting sea, had already laid deep and strong the foundations not only of a real nationality, but of sound constitutional freedom.

Edward I. was the king who took seriously in hand the effective consolidation of Britain into a single realm, but the beginnings of the process dated three or four centuries earlier. Apart from the complete reduction of the Cornish peninsula, and from the imperial position claimed by the Saxon kings, substantial progress had been made with the assimilation of Wales. There were still practically independent Welsh princes, who from time to time harried the border counties,

and had to be controlled by force. But the configuration of the country rendered this no difficult task, when English kings set about it in earnest. The hilly centre of the country had, indeed, furnished a refuge to the Brythons when the Anglo-Saxon immigration took place, and was not valuable enough to tempt systematic conquest. But the valleys through which the Severn and its tributaries flow eastwards offered access for armies to the heart of the country, though doubtless it might have been difficult to penetrate into the recesses of the hills, and make conquest complete. As early as the reign of Edward the Confessor Harold had gone very near to the reduction of Wales, and perhaps, if he had been allowed to reign in peace, he might have finished it. But the Norman conquest supervened, and altered the complexion of affairs. Wales became a refuge for Englishmen disaffected to the Norman rule; and William of Normandy found it expedient to give special powers to the earls along the Welsh border. The strip of tolerably level country round the coasts, however, gave the opportunity for reducing Wales in detail. Along it castles were built one after the other, which shut up the wild Welsh in the mountainous interior. It was doubtless not done of set purpose; it was only an extension of the method adopted throughout England to hold down the vanquished race. But it served to keep the Welsh in check until Edward I. set about the task of conquest systematically. He was assisted by rivalry among the Welsh princes, and succeeded in making Wales part of his own immediate dominions. Nevertheless, the separatist influence of ancient race traditions by no means died with the last native prince, if it can be said to be dead yet. Nor was it till the reign of Henry VIII. that Wales was divided into counties, and assimilated for all purposes to England.

Edward I. set himself a much harder task when he attempted to subjugate Scotland. The frontier between the two countries had in English eyes been settled since soon after the Norman conquest, at the line of the Cheviots. The Scottish kings had from time to time laid claim to Northumberland and to Cumberland, striving to enforce these pretensions by arms whenever they had a favourable

opportunity, but never retaining possession of either. The building of Newcastle in the Conqueror's reign, and of Norham castle in 1121, obviously implies that the Norman kings, while deeming it necessary to protect Northumberland against attack from Scotland, considered Lothian to end at the Tweed. Similarly William Rufus, in restoring Carlisle and providing it with a castle, showed that he considered Strathclyde to end at the Solway. That they thus acted does not, of course, prove that right was on their side; but the further fact that, in spite of repeated hostilities from Scotland and of their permanently superior power, the Norman kings never attempted to annex territory beyond the Cheviots, offers a strong presumption that they had a clear and sincere belief as to their own rights.

The matter was further complicated by the vexed question of the relation between the two crowns. If the Scottish king claimed Northumberland as equally with Lothian part of the ancient Bernicia, that had undoubtedly been part of England, and therefore its ruler was but an English earl. Did he claim Cumbria as part of Strathclyde, the kingdom had once been in some kind of vassalage to England. In the feudal age it was common for a given prince to be in several relations, at first sight inconsistent with each other. He might be vassal to two different sovereigns for different parts of his territories, while entirely independent for the rest. He might even be lord to his own sovereign, if that prince happened to own some lands within his dominions. Thus the Scottish king who undoubtedly had united Scotland, Lothian, and Strathclyde, might well be supreme in one, vassal for the others, and not necessarily vassal with the same obligations for both. The Norman and Plantagenet kings had always reigned as lawful successors of the Saxon line, and therefore as inheritors of whatever supremacy these had held over the whole island. It is easy for us to see how little that might amount to. If the king of Scots had taken Edward the Elder to father and lord, was the act personal, or did it bind his successors? Assuming that Strathclyde had been handed over by Edmund to another king of Scots, did that create a permanent vassalage, seeing

that Strathclyde had had to be subjugated afresh afterwards? Lothian had been part of an English earldom; on what terms had it passed into the hands of the king of Scots? Relations dating back into a distant past were, at best, difficult to disentangle. Again, the Scottish kings had repeatedly done homage to England, without either party making it clear beyond question for what the homage was done, and had repeatedly declared, when circumstances made them strong enough, that their homage had only been for lands which they held in England in their private capacity. Moreover, centuries had passed; feudal relations had grown more and more definite. Edward I., who was himself vassal to the king of France, and knew perfectly well what obligations this involved, assumed that he had himself corresponding rights over Scotland. He was doubtless wrong in part; the English suzerainty had descended from times when the mature feudalism of the thirteenth century had hardly been developed, certainly was not established in Britain. It does not however follow that he was wrong in all; the Scots were guilty of exaggeration on their side when they asserted that Edward had no rights at all. Under all the circumstances it was inevitable that the quarrel should be fought out; and the result was to give Scotland acknowledged independence, while leaving the frontier at the line which the English kings since the Norman conquest had always maintained, the line which is obviously best in accordance with physical geography.

The Scottish war of independence had much more important consequences for Scotland than for England, and these are best discussed in connection with the geographical history of the smaller country. Here it may suffice to say that English statesmanship never lost sight for long of the policy which Edward I. had initiated, and that the union was ultimately effected in the manner best calculated to conciliate the Scots.

The continental possessions of English kings have had but little connection with English history, when looked at from the geographical point of view: and this is due mainly to the dividing sea. A continental power after a successful war

with a neighbour annexes territory, which geographically at least becomes an integral part of the victorious state. The conquered people may or may not become reconciled to their lot, or be re-transferred later to their original allegiance: but at any rate geography does not keep them separate. It would be going too far to say that the sea rendered it impossible for England to annex and absorb territory on the Continent, but it very greatly increased the difficulty. William the Conqueror, in a sense, annexed England to Normandy, but when in the fifth generation John lost Normandy and much else, England was not really affected. A certain amount of English wealth had been expended on the French schemes of the kings, and one incidental advantage had been derived for English liberties. The commutation of military service for money obviously served to reduce the armed strength of the nobles, and thus to facilitate good government. It was more or less forced on Henry II. by the impossibility of employing his English vassals in warfare on the Continent: the whole period of service due might be expended in waiting for a favourable wind. Similarly the claim of Edward III. to the French crown helped to strengthen the control of Parliament over the king, while severely draining the resources of the country. There never was any dream of annexing France: the nation supported its king in his attempt to gain a separate crown, to which he had a plausible claim, and that was all. It is true that Calais, the last scrap of French territory retained after the inheritance of the Plantagenets had been lost, was held in the supposed interest of England as a door of access to the Continent. It is true also that after the loss of Calais more than one effort was made to acquire a similar *pied à terre*, with only ephemeral success. These attempts, however, are really parallel to the occupation of such places as Gibraltar—the acquisition of isolated spots which may serve the commercial or political interests of the nation. It is true also that the possession of Hanover by the Georges influenced at times, perhaps unduly, the policy of the English government, but there was never an idea that Hanover should or could be united to their British dominions. Geography dictates that the United Kingdom shall include all

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that is on this side of the narrow seas, and nothing beyond them, and history has been in full accord with geography. The one exception, in some respects a very singular one, is the Channel Islands; but these are dealt with later.

The long period between the Norman conquest and the close of the Middle Ages shows but few changes in England which bear on geography. It had been, on the whole, a time of internal peace: the Wars of the Roses, the one apparent exception, seem to have affected the nation but superficially, though they facilitated the effective supremacy of the crown, which in the seventeenth century passed to Parliament. The Wars of the Roses brought into prominence no new geographical facts. They illustrate, like the Great Rebellion afterwards, the preponderance of London and the south-east. Wales, as earlier in the days of its quasi-independence, was an element to be reckoned with, and was on the losing side. Wales siding with the Lancastrians, and Gloucester held for the Yorkists, are the geographical facts which determined the last campaign of the Wars of the Roses, just as analogous conditions turned the scale against Charles I.

With peace and fair prosperity had come an increase of the lands under cultivation, and some growth both of home industries and of foreign trade, but no marked shifting of the population, such as began late in the eighteenth century. The great demand for English wool had led to more and more land being used for pasture, a movement which was stimulated by the difficulty of obtaining agricultural labour after the great pestilence known as the Black Death. The tin and lead mines, for which England had been noted in and even before Roman times, were still worked: and the profits of the tin doubtless counted for something in giving to Devon and Cornwall their prominence during the Elizabethan age. A little coal was dug, a little iron raised for home use, but there was no idea of the vast stores available, still less of the revolution which they would one day work.

The towns had grown somewhat, in accordance with the increase in the population generally, but they were substantially what they had been in Roman times. Indeed there

were but few places of any importance whose names do not occur in the Roman itineraries, three only which deserve special mention. Bristol was at the end of the Middle Ages the second port in England, and destined to rise to still greater importance, as almost monopolising, till late in the eighteenth century, the new trade with America. Hull owed its foundation to Edward I. Oxford had grown from very little through becoming the seat of a great university. London was what it had been under the Romans, the chief seat of commerce, and was several times as large as any other city in the country; and it had become, what it was not at the date of the Norman conquest, the permanent seat of government. The other towns were pretty much what they had been to the Romans, though with some variation in their relative importance. York, Lincoln, Norwich, Exeter, Gloucester, were local markets and centres of agriculture; some of them also ports for the slowly rising commerce that was carried on in vessels small enough to come up the rivers. All of these were also seats of bishoprics and county towns: and the local administration gave to them, and to others of less antiquity, like Salisbury and Derby, an importance which there were then no rich industrial towns to overshadow.

There are data available for calculating roughly the population of England near the beginning and the end of this period. From the information collected in *Domesday Book* for William the Conqueror, it is believed that the total at that date was about a million and a half. The figures recorded as to the number of men capable of bearing arms in Elizabeth's reign give a probable total three times as great as five centuries before. And there is reason to think that the growth had been tolerably steady and continuous, as might have been expected in view of the political conditions. The one marked interruption was caused by the Black Death, which in the middle of the fourteenth century swept away more than a third of the population. But for this disaster, the increase must have been greater; but whether this would have meant more rapid industrial development, or a decline in prosperity through the resources of the country being unduly strained, can only be conjectured.

§ 4. EXPANSION

Down to the end of the fifteenth century the British Islands were unfavourably situated for all purposes, except that they were protected by the sea. To the classical world, with its vague knowledge of geography, Britain seemed even more remote than it really was. But it was in fact at the edge of the known world, practically out of reach of the Mediterranean, then the centre of commerce and civilisation, and while the Roman empire lasted the centre of government also. It was of slight commercial account to the ancient world, except as supplying tin; and though, as Anglo-Saxon England consolidated into a single kingdom, and still more after the Norman conquest, a certain amount of trade grew up, the real commercial importance of England before the sixteenth century was, that during the later Middle Ages it exported great quantities of wool, which found a market at the nearest possible point in the cities of Flanders, then at the height of their prosperity.

The great maritime discoveries, among which the voyage of Columbus takes rank as the chief, changed the whole face of the commercial world. Geographically the Mediterranean ceased to be the area upon and around which nearly all trade was carried on that exceeded petty local limits, and was superseded by the northern Atlantic. To that section of the ocean converged all the traffic from America, and from India and China round the Cape of Good Hope. Thus the western coasts of Europe obtained a natural advantage corresponding to what Venice and Genoa had hitherto enjoyed. Politically, the discovery of America involved the rise of new powers, situated on the Atlantic, to maritime preponderance. Spain and Portugal, the two nations which as discoverers had the first chance, failed for various reasons to profit by it, and were entirely superseded first by Holland and later by England. Many causes co-operated to produce this result, which are only partially geographical. The growth of the Baltic trade in the later Middle Ages was obviously more beneficial to Holland and England than to countries further south. And since branches of commerce, apparently distinct, tend to flourish

better in connection than when isolated, this circumstance doubtless helped these countries towards obtaining a larger share of other trade. Similarly the French policy of keeping colonies and commerce under state control, which fettered much more than it fostered, deprived France, otherwise highly favoured by geographical conditions, of her full chance in the competition for commercial supremacy. Obviously, too, the greater size and insular security of England helped her to outstrip Holland when trade rivalry between them was fully developed.

Nevertheless, the result accords exactly with what might have been predicted on geographical grounds only. If one takes a globe and turns it into such a position that the maximum of land is included in the hemisphere visible to the eye, it will be found that something like seven-eighths of the total land surface is included in that hemisphere, and that London is pretty accurately at the centre of it. And since the sea is continuous everywhere and accessible to all, this means that London is nearer to practically every strip of sea coast in the world than any other city. On the average, of course—Marseilles is nearer than London to Smyrna, San Francisco to Yokohama, Bombay to Shanghai. But measure the distances by sea to the fifty greatest seaports in existence, from London and also from any other place whatever, and add them together, and the total of distances from London will be appreciably smaller. And when to this (so to speak) mathematical advantage is added the security of an insular position, geography must recognise that the maritime preponderance of England is in accordance with physical principles, whatever other influences may have helped to produce it.

The early growth in England of national coherence, and of constitutional unity and freedom, was partly, as has appeared already, the result of her insular separateness, assisted by other influences, such as the continental ambitions of the Plantagenet kings. There was probably more effective energy latent in the English nation than in any other, when the discovery of America opened new fields for the exercise of it. England was not very quick to seize the opportunity, though Cabot, the second American discoverer, did set sail from an

English port under English patronage. In spite of having possessed great naval power in earlier times, England was not then truly maritime. Few Englishmen were engaged in distant trade, none had exhibited the adventurous spirit which rejoices in overcoming difficulties. It is impossible to explain with any certainty why and how that spirit rather suddenly developed itself.[1] It is easy to talk of the Renaissance kindling a thirst for knowledge, of the Reformation creating religious independence, of Englishmen sharing the blood of the Norse rovers. And it is reasonable to infer that the Renaissance helped to form Shakespeare and Bacon, that the Reformation was congenial to a people who already had some measure of political freedom. The problem still remains, why the heritage of Norse blood, hitherto inoperative, should suddenly have become active; why the new spirit which was working all over Europe should have taken this special form in England. Whatever the explanation, the fact remains; the Elizabethan age produced men of a totally new type, daring sailors, restless adventurers, keen traders, above all, eager explorers; and this type has been common among Englishmen ever since.

Similarly it is reasonable to presume that the local self-government which had existed in England since Anglo-Saxon times helped to produce individual enterprise, as distinguished from state enterprise. The adventurers who during Elizabeth's reign forced an entrance into the new world which Spain claimed as her exclusive property, acted on their own private account. The queen took a share in this venture, knighted the leader of that, publicly disowned a third, according to circumstances. Her policy may have been crooked, one such action or another may have been dictated by regard to the political conditions of the moment, and on

[1] Englishmen had, of course, been conspicuous in various fields of military adventure before the sixteenth century. There had been plenty of English crusaders. Sir John Hawkwood was not the only man of his race among the *condottieri*. The distinctive mark of the Elizabethan age is that the adventure is especially maritime, and in a sense peaceful; fighting may be a necessary part of the business, but it is incidental, not the main purpose.

them her judgment may have been at fault. Her public disapproval of this or that expedition may have been a diplomatic falsehood, or the sincere expression of annoyance at conduct which seemed to her inopportune. But below all the wavering Elizabeth's government was on the whole true to one principle. Englishmen were to work out their new enterprises in their own way, subject to such control, or under such royal patronage, as might seem expedient in each separate case. Nothing resembling the French practice, of making colonisation entirely a government affair, was ever really feasible in England. A mere mention of the trading companies great and small, among which the East India Company was the most important, is all that is appropriate in dealing with the historical geography of England itself. They were granted charters, which conferred exclusive rights within the limits defined in each, for political reasons of various kinds; and the charters were withdrawn when circumstances changed. It matters not whether the reasons for giving or cancelling these charters were sound according to modern social and economic theories, nor even whether the reasons were always free from taint of corruption or party spirit. The fact remains that they served the purpose of encouraging, without unduly cramping, the energies of individual Englishmen, and that as time went on, enterprise, whether of trade or colonisation, tended to be more and more emancipated from state patronage and control.

The Devonshire worthies of the Elizabethan age, who may serve to typify the new spirit, were men of very diverse characters. There were high-minded enthusiasts like Sir Humphrey Gilbert, business-like traders like Hawkins, men of genius like Ralegh, who felt the charm of a new world and desired to do great things in it for themselves and their country, daring sea-captains like Drake. Some were peacefully inclined, and only fought when they must; others were mainly freebooters, though ready for peaceful trade if it was open to them. All alike were convinced that the claim of Spain to monopolise the New World was iniquitous, and might reasonably be combated by force. And naturally the knowledge that Spain was a standing menace to England

and to Protestantism whetted their zeal against her, so much so that the high-handed proceedings of Drake and others gave Philip of Spain a series of legitimate grievances against Elizabeth's government.

After the Armada had been destroyed, and the danger from Spain was past, the adventure which had taken the form of exploration, where it had not been semi-piratical attack on Spanish America, settled down into more regular and business-like action. In the east the primary object was trade. The East India Company, which received its charter in the last days of Elizabeth, had indeed to be prepared to protect itself with the strong hand, but it had no desire for conquest. Settlements were naturally formed in the East Indies, but they were merely commercial stations; the name by which they were known, factories, is significant. They did not even claim to be independent of the local potentates; they were mere business establishments in a foreign land. Nor did Englishmen dream of making their homes in the east; they merely served while they were wanted, and then returned home, with or without a fortune earned in trade. Ultimately no doubt the modest factories expanded first into independent settlements, then into an Indian empire; but this was not within the range of the most fervent imagination till several generations had passed.

In America, on the contrary, the primary object was colonisation, though commerce was by no means ignored. Our earliest colony indeed, Newfoundland, was commercial; the fisheries were everything, and the colonists were only such as were required to supply all the needs of the fisheries. On the mainland what the new settlers sought was a land which they could inhabit with better prospects than at home. Virginia, the earliest colony in what are now the United States, was established simply from this point of view. The New England colonies, a little later, were peopled by men who sought to escape from what they deemed religious tyranny at home. The Quakers, later still, were the dominant element in Pennsylvania. All alike resorted to the New World in order to make homes there, and it was only incidentally that valuable commerce arose.

Far more important to the ultimate future of the British empire than the growth of American commerce, which indeed was long controlled by England in her own supposed interest and with disastrous consequences, was the political spirit of the English nation. For on the one hand the colonists, being Englishmen, had learned to value their heritage of political freedom, and thought themselves entitled to carry it with them beyond the ocean. And on the other hand the nation, which was asserting its own liberties against the despotic theory dominant almost everywhere else, could not refuse all sympathy, when the stress came, with the colonists who appealed more or less to the same principles. If the doctrine of "no taxation without representation" was valid at home, it was applicable also in America. Thus the great constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century, whether the king or the nation should be supreme, has an aspect, invisible doubtless to the combatants, which belongs to historical geography. Ideas crossed the Atlantic from England, took root on the American shore, and were brought back somewhat transformed by the effect of the new soil.

There are however sundry points, not in the constitutional conflict itself, but in the civil war that was its outcome, wherein we see the direct bearings of geography on history.

1. The division of parties was fundamentally one of principles: the nobility and country gentlemen were, with marked exceptions, on the side of the king, the citizens and the mercantile classes mostly favoured the Parliament: the Nonconformists were all against the king, while zealous Churchmen regarded church and king as inseparable. Nevertheless a geographical division can be made; south-eastern, Teutonic, England on the whole supported the Parliament, while the more Celtic north and west were almost entirely favourable to the king. And the cause which was adopted by the then more populous and progressive half of the country definitely triumphed, though for reasons which are in no way geographical much of the work was undone at the Restoration.

2. Though there was undoubted preponderance of one or

other party in different regions, there were partisans of both sides almost everywhere. Hence the war assumed a character which is at variance with the principles of strategy usually recognised. Each side attached great importance to retaining strongholds within districts mainly favourable to the other, as a means of keeping alive its own views and encouraging its partisans in the neighbourhood. And each, therefore, was anxious to reduce such hostile strongholds, instead of taking for granted, as under ordinary conditions would be done, that success in the field would involve their surrender, or at least facilitate their capture. It is said, with a certain modicum of truth, that the generals on both sides were inexperienced and ignorant of the art of war; but political considerations, here as in other cases, afforded good reason for departing from ordinary military rules. A single illustration may suffice. When the civil war began, Hull, Gloucester, and Plymouth were all held by parliamentary garrisons within regions on the whole royalist. Plymouth alone, it may be said, kept alive the parliamentary cause in the Devon peninsula. Hull made it impossible for the northern royalists to move southwards out of Yorkshire; and Gloucester prevented any land communication between Wales, which was entirely royalist, and the south-west of England, which was almost equally favourable to the king. So important did Gloucester appear to Charles I. that he would not risk an advance on London when his cause seemed most prosperous in the summer of 1643, but devoted his energies to besieging Gloucester, as it turned out unsuccessfully.

3. The fact that Scotland, separate constitutionally but under the same king, was adjacent to England, materially affected the conditions of the struggle. Charles having quarrelled with his Scottish subjects, their rebellion took the form of an invasion of England, and the king found the English very reluctant to support his cause. The easy success of the Scots and their occupation of Newcastle, whence London already derived its main supply of fuel, rendered the calling of the Long Parliament inevitable. When the war was in its second year, and the king had on the whole the upper hand, the Scottish army sent into England to support

the Parliament contributed largely towards the victory of Marston Moor, which was the definite turning-point of the conflict. Later on supreme power in England passed to the Independents, with whom the Scots had no sympathy. They accordingly invaded England in the king's interest, and were decisively overthrown through Cromwell's skilful use of a geographical fact, the gap in the Pennines at the head of Airedale, through which he fell on the flank of their line of advance, that had been made *viâ* Carlisle and west of the Pennines for political reasons. The result of Cromwell's great victory at Worcester, when he destroyed the second Scottish army that invaded England on behalf of their hereditary king, the constitutional union of England and Scotland dictated by geography, was temporarily undone through the subsequent reaction against all the acts of Cromwell's government.

Completely as the future destinies of England and of much beyond England were staked on the issue of the struggle between Charles I. and the Parliament, the development which was to lead up to a British empire beyond the seas was not altogether suspended while the dispute lasted. The accession of James I. to the English throne had added much, theoretically, to the weight of England as an European power. Practically, however, his futile policy, and the internal conflicts of his son's reign, postponed for half a century the date at which the new power began to make itself felt. Nevertheless all through that period the movement of expansion, begun in Elizabeth's reign, continued both in commerce and in colonisation, though at no very rapid rate. The troubles, political and religious, which culminated in the Great Rebellion, tended indeed in more ways than one to encourage colonisation. The Pilgrim Fathers, with whom originated the New England group of colonies, were exiles for conscience' sake, who crossed the Atlantic in order to find a new home in which their religion might be unmolested. The system which they established was, indeed, at least as intolerant as anything that they had left behind in England; but none the less it was a good thing, as well as a new one in the modern world, that men

should be able to found a new society after their own pattern, and that men who remained in the old country should realise that this resource was open to them. The story that Hampden and Cromwell had resolved to emigrate to America, if the Grand Remonstrance had failed to pass, may not be true of them individually; but many an Englishman on both sides acted on the same principle. Moreover, the civil contests in England rendered it almost impossible for the government to interfere greatly with the colonies, even if it had desired to do so.

The naval strength of England, which had given such striking proof of itself in the destruction of the Spanish Armada, grew steadily during the next half-century. The expedition of Buckingham to the Isle of Ré, ill-managed and unsuccessful as it was, could never have been sent had England not been strong at sea. When the government of the Commonwealth, alive to the growing importance of commerce, passed the Navigation Act, and in consequence were involved in war with Holland, they found no difficulty in providing fleets which, after severe and doubtful conflict, got the better of the greatest naval power then existing. And the Protector was able through his fleet to lay the foundation of our West Indian dominion, besides making himself effectually felt in European waters.

The reign of Charles II., however ignoble his policy, however great the incidental disgrace, saw a real augmentation of English possessions beyond the seas, chiefly in America, but also in India. The view was widening on all sides, though the day of great industrial expansion was yet distant. The revolution of 1688 placed on the English throne the undying enemy of France, and also led the French king to champion the cause of the exiled Stuarts, and therefore to declare himself inveterately hostile to the new order of things in England. The enmity between the two countries not only involved us in continental wars, which however interesting from the geographical point of view are irrelevant for the present purpose; it also began the century-long struggle in which the prizes were infinitely more important, if more distant, than victory on the field of Blenheim or Ramillies.

It began by giving England the naval preponderance, dating from the battle of La Hogue, which made all the rest possible. It ended in our spoiling the French dream of dominating the New World, and in making England instead of France supreme in India.

With the eighteenth century begins the period of English naval supremacy, and therewith a steady expansion of trade. Colonisation in the strict sense of the word was almost at a standstill during most of the century, which nevertheless saw enormous extension of the British dominions beyond seas by way of conquest, notably in India and Canada. During the same period the North American colonies revolted and established their independence, and the enemies of England thought that they had dealt her a deadly blow by helping the American revolt. But the spirit which had founded those colonies was as strong as ever, and wiser by experience. It is no mere coincidence that the decade which witnessed England's renunciation in the Treaty of Versailles of her claim to dominion over the new United States of America, saw also the foundation laid for another commonwealth of English nationality in the southern ocean. Nor have the mistakes been repeated in Australia which cost us the allegiance of Virginia and New England. There has been vast expansion since, in both colonies and commerce, but this has been largely due to the industrial revolution at home, which began in the middle of the eighteenth century.

§ 5. MODERN ENGLAND

Until the eighteenth century England was in no sense a manufacturing country. Something was known of the coal and iron fields, and a certain amount was raised for home consumption. The wool, which had been England's chief source of wealth as an export in the Middle Ages, had come to be worked up at home, at any rate partially. Flemish immigrants had set going one branch of manufacture in Norfolk; fine cloths were woven in various towns of Somerset and Gloucester. The expulsion of the Huguenots from France by Louis XIV. had led to silk weaving, originally worked by

them, becoming a considerable industry in London. On the other hand, for the sake of wool and silk, the manufacture of cotton was discouraged by the legislature, though the value of cotton fabrics was beginning to be appreciated. Two discoveries opened the way for a great development of manufactures, and thereby brought about a complete transformation of English society, which is legibly written on the map.

It was found feasible in the middle of the eighteenth century to smelt iron with coal instead of with wood. Hitherto it had been supposed that the use of wood as fuel was necessary, and consequently iron had been smelted in districts where wood was plentiful. For instance, Sussex, which produced a little iron, had available the great forest of the Andredesweald, the disappearance of which may be attributed largely to the exigencies of smelting. The casting of iron was practised to a certain extent, but it is obvious that the casting of large masses was impossible as long as the capacity of furnaces was limited by the need of heating them with wood. When the use of coal began, two things became obvious. First, the production of iron could best be carried on in localities where coal and iron were found together or in very close proximity, as fortunately for England is the case over a considerable part of the country. Secondly, the iron, being less bulky in proportion to its value, could be conveyed to the coalfields much more advantageously than coal could be brought to the iron.

About the same time the steam engine was made a practical reality by James Watt, though the principle of it had been known for a century or more. It was not yet applied to locomotion; the railways and steamships which have revolutionised communication belong to the nineteenth century. But it made all the difference to the use of machinery, which was beginning to be applied to the textile manufactures. The inventions of Hargreaves and Arkwright bear nearly the same date as Watt's first patent for the steam engine, 1769; but without the aid of steam they would have been of comparatively little value, since they could have been employed only where water power was available to drive the machines. With the introduction of steam, all this was changed: the

factories could now be erected anywhere, and obviously to most advantage on the coalfields, where fuel for driving the engines was cheapest. Moreover, machinery could be worked at much greater profit on a large scale; hence the textile industries, which had been principally carried on in the homes of the workmen, not only increased immensely, but also became more and more concentrated. Manufacturing towns sprang up rapidly, on or close to the coalfields, thereby entirely changing the relations between town and country, and between different parts of England.

The earliest coalfield to attain importance was that of which Newcastle is the centre, extending over the southern part of Northumberland and most of the county of Durham. Little inferior in production of coal are those lying east and west of the Pennine chain towards its southern end. The eastern one covers all the south-west of Yorkshire, and extends southwards into Derby and Nottingham. It has become the main seat of woollen manufactures. The western one, in south Lancashire and Cheshire, is almost monopolised by cotton, the damper atmosphere on the Atlantic side of the Pennines being found specially favourable to cotton spinning. South of these, and much smaller, is the North Staffordshire coalfield, which supplies Birmingham and the Black Country generally with the fuel for their iron industries. Unique in character, and therefore possibly first in importance, is the South Wales coalfield in Glamorgan and Monmouth, which contains by far the largest quantity yet worked anywhere in the world of the smokeless coal so valuable for naval use. There is plenty more coal in the country, but on no other fields have industrial towns arisen on a sufficient scale to affect the balance of population.

It is obvious from the map what was the change in this respect that was caused by the industrial revolution. Hitherto London had been not only immensely larger and more populous than any other city in the country—it is that still—but practically the only great centre of industry and commerce. The towns which grew up under the new industrial conditions —they were mostly, as was natural, the development of existing places comparatively small and unimportant—were at a

distance from London, and became large and wealthy enough to have a separate life of their own. In spite of the vast growth of London, consequent on its being the administrative and financial centre for a greatly augmented nation, it has not increased so much in proportion as the new centres of industry, which collectively fairly balance London in wealth and population. The centre of gravity of England, to use a mathematical metaphor, is no longer in the capital, but some where between the two systems represented by London on the one hand, and Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool on the other.

To give a general idea of the shifting of population caused by the industrial revolution, and of the great increase mainly due to it, a few facts will suffice. Early in the eighteenth century it is estimated that the average of population north of a line drawn from the Wash to the mouth of the Severn fell far short of one hundred to the square mile. The same region has now considerably over three hundred to the square mile, in spite of the fact that it includes the large mountainous regions of Wales and Cumbria, in which population has increased but slightly. At the census of 1801, when the change had been working for some years, England and Wales contained less than nine millions of people. In 1919 they contained about thirty-seven millions, or more than four times as many. It is to be observed that this increase is mainly in the towns; the rural population has become a much smaller fraction of the whole, and is likely to grow still less in proportion. The effect of this movement upon the national health and vigour, and upon the political relations of different parts of the country, is a matter of great concern for statesmen, but hardly comes within the sphere of historical geography.

The introduction of railways, which belongs to the second quarter of the nineteenth century, operated in more ways than one to quicken the industrial movement, while somewhat altering its character. The demand for rails stimulated iron mining, though perhaps no more than the steady increase in machinery. Greater facility of communication made it easier for men to move about in search of work, and so stimulated immigration into the industrial towns.

Railways also, by increasing tenfold the speed with which goods could be transmitted and the quantity that could be carried, rendered it feasible to bring the coal to iron when special circumstances made this desirable. Without railways, neither Middlesbrough nor Barrow-in-Furness could have grown into great centres of the iron industry.

Railways have now superseded, as channels of inland commerce and passenger travel, both the roads, and also the canals constructed in the eighteenth century, when the need for facilitating the carriage of bulky goods first began to be felt. The circumstances under which the English railway system came into existence precluded its being formed upon a single plan. The first railways ever made were necessarily tentative; no one knew as yet what the demand would be over long distances, or what gradients could be successfully worked. Moreover they were all the product of private enterprise, though necessarily under some state control; consequently rival companies, contending for the traffic of this or that locality, have made competing lines, wasting land and capital that might have been saved if it had been possible to foresee the future, and make a comprehensive plan for the whole country.

Nevertheless, the railways run in fairly close accord with the dictates of geography. If one compares a railway map of to-day with one showing the physical features only, it will be seen that railways have been made along all the ancient and natural lines of communication. They are taken into Scotland up the broad vale of York, and thence near the coast to the gap between the Cheviots and the North Sea, and again up the coast strip of Lancashire and so through the Carlisle gap. The Irish mails run across central England to Chester, and thence along the northern coast of Wales. Here and there the progress of mechanical science has made it possible to overcome a natural obstacle. For instance, till very recently all land communication between the south of England and Wales was compelled by the Severn estuary to go round by Gloucester. Now there is a tunnel under the Severn, where ever since Roman times there had been a long and troublesome ferry.

The railways, of course, agree with geographical conditions as they are, not as they were. They emphasise and increase the importance of the capital; they serve mainly the industrial centres, to and from which there is continual traffic. They leave out in the cold a place like Cirencester, which, though an important Roman station, has become comparatively insignificant, having no great industrial advantages of its own, and not being on the direct route between places which have them. On the other hand, they give additional importance to places which, usually no doubt for geographical reasons, have become junctions where many lines meet. The English railways were planned for commerce, and secondarily for travel generally; there never was any thought of their serving strategic purposes, our fortunate position as an island rendering it possible to leave such considerations in the background. Nevertheless, the conditions of life in England have demanded the construction of railways enough for defence in case of need. If there were an attempt at invasion on the south coast, it would certainly not be the lack of railway facilities which would interfere with its being met promptly and in abundant strength.

The industrial changes of the last half-century have affected historical geography rather from the imperial than from the strictly English point of view. The steady development of machinery, and the practical superseding of sailing ships by steamers, a very large proportion of the latter being built of iron, have caused an enormous increase in the English production of iron, which now certainly equals, if it does not exceed, in importance the textile industries. And railways have greatly facilitated this; for instance, iron shipbuilding is largely carried on in the mouths of the Tyne and Wear, far enough from the iron mines, though on the coalfield. And the steamers have led to a vast increase in the output of coal in South Wales, whence the smokeless coal is exported in large quantities. All this, however, has meant on the whole further advance in the direction indicated above. The industrial centres already established have grown in population, both absolutely and relatively to the rest of the country. So, too, the comparative decline of the older ports

which had no great depth of water, and could not obtain it artificially, had begun already, and has merely been hastened by the rapid increase in the size of ships which has followed on steam becoming the general motive power. The great change of England, and especially London, becoming the commercial centre of the world, would have been impossible but for its position on the globe, not probable without steam power: but the policy of free trade has certainly contributed very greatly, though any attempt to discriminate and determine how much was due to one cause, how much to another, would be unprofitable from the nature of the case.

The most recent of industrial developments, the introduction of electricity as a motive power for all manner of purposes, may possibly have a geographical effect. Electric force is transmissible, and it may prove more convenient to generate it on the coalfields, and transmit it thence to the places where machines are to be driven. Should this happen, the inducement to concentrate manufactures would be diminished, and the future may see some redistribution of the industrial population. It is certain to see some diminution of the smoke which at present injuriously affects the public health in such places as Sheffield. These things, however, can produce but slight alterations; substantially England is, and must remain, an industrial country, with its population distributed according to the influences set in motion by coal and steam.

A few figures are necessary to show the volume of British trade and its bearings on our historical position. The total of our imports and exports approaches 1,700 millions, and for the carriage of it we have shipping to the amount of 20 million tons. We export about 160 millions' worth of textile fabrics, importing for the purpose all the cotton and three-quarters of the wool used. Nearly all the cotton goods are manufactured on the Lancashire coalfield, nearly all the woollens on the West Yorkshire field. The minerals are on the same scale, though much more is of home production. About 200 millions' worth of coal is raised, and of this more than a quarter is exported, half of it the smokeless coal of the South Wales field; the remainder is consumed at home,

being essential to our manufactures. The iron obtained out of British soil annually before the war was valued at nearly 20 millions, but this gives a very faint idea of its commercial importance; for with the aid of some 15 millions' worth of imported iron, we exported some 51 millions' worth of machinery and 57 millions' worth of other iron goods, irrespective of the vast quantity consumed at home, and of 9 or 10 millions' worth of shipping built for foreign customers, most of which was of iron.

It will be obvious from these brief statistics how great is the value to England of her coal and iron, found as they are near together. Other influences have contributed to her commercial eminence, but these minerals are, as it were, the raw material to be worked up by those other motive forces. So long as they last, England will have herself to blame if she falls behind in the competition with other nations.

It is, however, essential to realise what a vast population largely occupied in manufactures, and all that is involved in manufactures, implies from another point of view. The population being far greater than can be fed from home resources, we have to import over 200 millions' worth of food, or nearly £5 worth for every man, woman, and child in the United Kingdom. A little of this no doubt is for luxuries like wine, but the bulk of it is for necessaries of life—corn, meat, sugar, etc. Our agriculture is still a highly important interest: over three-quarters of the soil of England is either under crops or pasture land. But the produce is so far from sufficient to feed the people, that about three-quarters of the corn consumed has to be imported. And this fact necessarily dominates our policy: it makes a preponderant navy vital to our safety, as shown in the recent war, and implies the maintenance of coaling-stations in many seas. It furnishes an interested motive for doing what is dictated by other reasons of sentiment and policy, drawing closer the ties that unite us to our colonies, which do, or can, supply the food necessary to our national existence.

It remains to point out the changes written on the map as

the result of this industrial revolution, which are chiefly in the form of increased importance to towns generally, and altered relations between them individually.

The reasons which caused the growth of towns in particular localities, ten or twenty centuries ago, have mostly ceased to operate in modern, industrial England. The military reasons in particular why certain towns were important in the past have no longer any significance. Gloucester, Berwick, Chester, were vital strategic points under conditions that cannot recur. Maritime places originally well situated, as being accessible up navigable rivers yet far enough inland to be out of reach of a sudden hostile attack, are positively disqualified for modern commerce which employs large ships, unless artificial means are adopted to improve access to them. Even the importance of primitive emporia, where routes crossed each other, or where a river could be bridged, may be diminished by railways taking different directions from the ancient roads, or by new engineering achievements. The *vis inertiæ* is, of course, always influential: if a given place has long been a centre for a particular interest, there must be overwhelming reasons before its special business will be transferred elsewhere. Oxford is not likely to cease to be a great university because the advantages of its position, which obviously contributed towards the university growing up there and not elsewhere, have ceased to signify. Thus the importance of modern towns is dependent on several considerations—the historical fact that they have long existed, even if the original reason why they grew no longer counts for anything, their practical convenience for modern industry, climatic conditions, possibly even the pecuniary interests of individuals or companies.

The position of London has always made it the chief town in the British Islands, since towns began to be a reality, except perhaps during a brief period soon after the Saxon conquest began. It was not always the seat of government, but it has been so now for many centuries. From the nature of the case the capital of every settled state tends to centre in itself many departments of the national life. Everything that is in any sense official must almost necessarily have its

head quarters there. Literature and art will most readily find support there. National collections of all kinds can hardly be seated anywhere else. The great scientific establishments which have a national character—Greenwich Observatory, Kew Gardens, the new national school of science — are naturally planted within the area of London, or in close proximity. And all these things attract an ever-increasing number of other residents, who find the capital their most convenient home. London, however, has much more than this. Before the industrial revolution it was the one centre of national commerce, and the main focus, at any rate, of political thought. And though the new manufacturing centres have somewhat diminished the relative importance of London, its absolute importance has gone on steadily growing. Nor is this all: with the increase during the nineteenth century of British wealth and commerce, London has become the monetary centre of the world, the place with which every form of business, wherever it is locally situated, must needs have relations. Its actual extent, in area and population, may be very differently stated according to the principle of calculation adopted. From the historical point of view it is obviously right to include those suburban regions whose inhabitants are in fact absorbed in the manifold life of the capital. And on this method London may be reckoned as containing more than seven millions, or one-sixth of the total population of the British Islands.

Next after London in importance are the great industrial centres, which have grown up, as already said, upon or in close relation to the coal and iron fields. These are on the whole in regions not specially valuable for agriculture, so that there has been but slight loss to set against the vast gain of the wealth produced in the manufacturing towns. The cotton industry centres in Manchester, which with its allied town of Salford has a population of about three-quarters of a million. The other cotton towns, which lie around Manchester mostly at a very short distance, contain at least as many more. This represents an increase of about eightfold during the nineteenth century. The woollen manufactures do not employ quite so extensive a population, nor is any

single centre comparable to Manchester. But the south-west of Yorkshire contains towns with an aggregate of over a million inhabitants, among which Leeds and Bradford are pre-eminent. These also have grown during the last century at a rate even greater than in Lancashire.

The places where iron is the material of the main industries are more scattered. The largest centre of all, Birmingham, is considerably nearer to London than the great seats of textile manufactures. If we include with it what is known as the Black Country, the region stretching for twenty miles to the north-west, for all of which Birmingham is in some sense the economic and commercial centre, it has a population of a million and a quarter, Birmingham itself with its suburbs accounting for about half, at least ten times the figure of a century ago. Of half the size, but more completely occupied with iron and steel, is Sheffield, on the edge of the Yorkshire coalfield. Exclusively devoted to iron are Middlesbrough, in the Cleveland iron district, and Barrow-in-Furness, a place on the Lancashire coast which has grown out of nothing in a very few years, on the strength of the exceptional excellence of the iron found there.

Coal is mainly to be thought of as providing fuel for factories, and therefore as determining the localities in which such work can most advantageously be carried on. But there are two districts in which, though other industries exist on a large scale, coal for its own sake is far more important. These are the region round the mouths of the Tyne and Wear, and Glamorganshire. Newcastle-on-Tyne was long the only place from which coal for domestic fuel was produced in any quantity, and still supplies the largest amount of coal exported abroad for this purpose. Cardiff pre-eminently, other places on the same coast in less degree, are very recent in their growth, and owe their prosperity to the steam-coal of which they have something like a monopoly.

Proximity to coal is an almost indispensable condition for industries generally, even though other considerations come in. Burton is said to owe its predominance in brewing to the quality of the water, but it is also close to the southern end of the Yorkshire coalfield. Copper has to be imported from

abroad, and therefore smelting it is for obvious reasons best done at a seaside place. Swansea is naturally suitable, as having the resources of Glamorganshire coal. The series of towns known collectively as the Potteries are beside the North Staffordshire coalfield. The considerable towns which have grown round railway works at Crewe and Swindon owe their rise to the deliberate selection of the companies, but in both cases coal is easily accessible. Iron shipbuilding must needs be carried on beside the sea, and therefore iron has to be brought to the spot. What more natural than that it should be brought to the mouths of the Tyne and the Wear, where coal is in unlimited quantities?

There is nothing in which geography has more influence on the history of a country than in relation to its seaports. Man can improve them, can deepen a river channel or shelter a harbour mouth with a breakwater, but he cannot create them except at gigantic cost. If England had no natural harbours, her coal and iron would be of comparatively little value: her insular condition would mean isolation rather than security. Obviously, too, the geographical position of the ports goes far to determine the character of their trade; and their relative importance varies from age to age according to their commodiousness for the size of shipping in use, and according to the developments of industry. In modern England, the ports which serve the needs of the textile and iron industries must needs have the largest trade, apart from the capital: and as a matter of fact most of them have other manufactures within their circuit which greatly swell the volume of their commerce.

Liverpool is by far the greatest of these; through it is imported virtually all the cotton used in Lancashire, although some part of it is now carried past up the Manchester ship canal. To Liverpool, both as the most commodious harbour on the west coast, and as near a thickly populated region, comes a large proportion of the food imported from America, and nearly all the passenger traffic. It of course exports most of the cotton goods sent all over the world, and it has also a virtual monopoly of the African trade. Nor are the manufactures unimportant of the district immediately round

Liverpool, such as the glass and chemicals of St. Helen's. Under these conditions it is not wonderful that Liverpool, with its adjacent towns, has a population of nearly a million.

The other great ports of the industrial north of England are on the east coast. Newcastle, in the mouth of the Tyne, and Sunderland, on the Wear, both do much iron shipbuilding, besides their export of coal. Both of them, if the adjoining towns are added in, have populations verging on 400,000. Hull, on the Humber estuary, is smaller than these aggregates, but is more exclusively a port, its speciality being, as geography would suggest, the Baltic trade. Close to it is Grimsby, which has of late years become by far the largest of fishing ports, being excellently situated for the North Sea fisheries. There are, of course, many other places with large fishing industries, but thanks to its comparative proximity to the teeming population on the coalfields, thanks also to improved railway service, Grimsby surpasses them all.

The oldest of English commercial ports, Bristol, has been long eclipsed by Liverpool, which has an equally favourable position for trade with America, accommodation for more and larger ships, and the vast advantage of neighbourhood to the cotton district. Bristol, nevertheless, retains a fair share of its former trade, especially in the importation of tobacco, which two centuries ago it almost monopolised, and in provisions for the mining district of South Wales, which is close at hand. Within the last few years it has been shown that new docks at the mouth of the Avon are counteracting the disadvantage under which Bristol has suffered for more than a century, through its river not admitting large vessels. Nothing, however, can entirely compensate for its distance from the most thickly populated industrial regions.

Southampton, the only other commercial port which requires separate mention, is mainly a place for passenger traffic. It shares with many other towns on the south and east coasts what has been called the ferry business to and from the continent of Europe. But it has also, as its excellent docks deserve, a considerable share in the ocean traffic, and is still, as it was in the Middle Ages, a good place for the embarkation of troops, as we may remember from the experience of the recent war. This is partly due to the

conveniences of the port itself, partly also to its proximity to the chief military stations. But it is worse situated even than Bristol in respect of nearness to great industrial centres, and also too much affected by the tide for a very large trade.

Not reflecting in the same way the busy commercial life of the country, yet equally necessary to it, are the naval ports. The chief control of the navy must necessarily be seated where the government of the country is carried on, but the harbours themselves are naturally placed on those coasts o. the island that are nearest to possible enemies. It may be worth while to have some incidental defences to guard the access to the great commercial ports; but it is scarcely possible to combine in one place all the activity of a naval station and the still more absorbing labours of commerce. Fortunately the localities best suited for the former are at a distance from those most employed for the latter. The two great naval bases of Portsmouth and Plymouth occupy the best harbours on the south coast, though their shipbuilding resources are largely supplemented by recourse to private building yards, which are naturally situated in the river-mouths of the iron-producing regions. Chatham, the third, is in the estuary of the Thames. A fourth, on the admirable harbour of Milford Haven, at the south-west corner of Wales, faces the approach to the British seas from the Atlantic. A fifth now exists in the Firth of Forth, to face the North Sea; and a sixth was to be found during the Great War at Scapa Flow. Dover, at the salient angle nearest to the Continent, has been artificially provided with a great fortified harbour, partly as a naval station in time of war, partly as a port of refuge on the most frequented of all maritime highways. The need of other fortresses than those to guard the coasts is happily removed by our insular position.

The military establishments are placed where convenience of all kinds dictates. The chief permanent camp is at Aldershot, between London and Portsmouth, whence the distance is short for embarkation, for intercepting an enemy who may land on the south coast and attempt to march on London, or for defending Portsmouth. A second such camp has recently been formed on Salisbury Plain, the exact locality

no doubt determined by economical reasons, the position otherwise being much like Aldershot. Smaller military stations are planted about the country irrespective of national defence, except as local centres where forces could assemble and be organised. The great factories for supplying arms, ammunition, and other necessaries of war are concentrated, *in time of peace*, mainly near London, in which neighbourhood are also the official head-quarters of the Artillery and Engineers, the branches which have most to do with material.

The ancient towns which grew up as centres of intercourse in primitive times, with or without occupying also sites suitable for primitive defence, have most of them been outstripped in point of wealth and population by more modern industrial towns. The functions of local capitals—no exaggerated estimate of their position till a century ago or less—have been greatly diminished in importance, though they have not altogether ceased, since the construction of railways. Many of them are cathedral cities, besides being the official chief towns of their counties, and in both ways draw to them a considerable amount of business. Some have developed a special branch of industry in addition to their business as agricultural and administrative centres. To enumerate them would be needless. York, Lincoln, Exeter, and Winchester are among the most ancient, the most distinguished in history, the least modified by the industrial revolution. Norwich and Worcester are instances of ancient county capitals and seats of bishoprics which possess large industries of their own.

The seats of the two ancient universities are towns of the same type as the county capitals—ancient, owing their origin to local convenience of site, agricultural centres, but not of the first importance. Oxford owes the great part that it has played in English history primarily to its position, where the Thames becomes a considerable river by the junction of more than one tributary, on the frontier of the ancient kingdoms of Wessex and Mercia, within a short distance of London, when there were reasons for a Parliament not meeting in the capital. Such conditions cannot recur: but they helped to cause the university to grow up there, and it is for the

university that Oxford is now important. The same considerations apply in a less conspicuous degree to Cambridge. The modern universities, which have grown or are growing elsewhere, owe their origin mainly to the need for higher education in the great industrial centres, and it is in such towns therefore that they are found.

An essentially modern type of town is the watering-place, or health resort, as such places are now preferably called. Until railways had made locomotion easy, they could not be frequented : indeed it is only with the facility of gratifying it that the taste for change of air has been developed. The curative properties of mineral waters gave to certain places a local repute, but only one such town in England is extremely ancient. The hot springs of Bath were well known to the Romans, and its position in the valley of the Bristol Avon would have rendered it of some little importance had there been no hot springs. Hence, though not the county town of Somerset, it ranked as a provincial capital along with York and Norwich, while the tendency to combine the pursuit of pleasure with the pursuit of health gave it a reputation in the fashionable world. Railways have made it easier to travel to Marienbad or Vichy than it used to be to reach Bath or Harrogate or Cheltenham, and the result is that the English towns possessing mineral springs have lost their relative importance, though the waters are as valuable as ever, and the towns themselves at least as large.

Places possessing no such specific property, whose attraction is a mild or bracing climate with or without beauties of scenery, are altogether modern. For obvious reasons they are mainly on the sea-shore, and consequently have, many of them, an obscure antiquity as fishing villages. The south coast has some of the largest and most noted. Indeed it is only on the south coast that thoroughly warm and sheltered sites like Torquay or Bournemouth are discoverable. But they exist on every part of the coast ; there are few stretches of ten miles along the shores of England entirely free of a watering-place, and in some localities there is a continuous line of them, hardly separated in fact, though called by different names. Brighton, if no other among them, has

attained the size of a great town, having a population of over 142,000; and this may be reasonably ascribed to its proximity to London. In spite of facilities of travel the more accessible places have an advantage. But for the vast population of Liverpool and the Lancashire cotton towns, Southport would not have risen from obscurity, nor Weston-super-Mare but for Bristol. Scarborough probably owes more of its vogue to the Yorkshire and Durham manufacturing centres than to its natural beauties.

Past history has recorded itself on the face of the country in two classes of buildings for which England is famous—ruined castles and ruined abbeys. The castles are numerous because the Norman conquest occurred when castle building was in full activity, and the Normans found them efficacious in controlling the subject race. Some of them are still preserved: the Tower of London, Windsor, Warwick, are among the most famous buildings of their class in Europe. But the majority are in ruins, and this for historical reasons more or less peculiar to England. The Wars of the Roses left the nobles at the mercy of the crown; the Great Rebellion deprived the kings of their chance of being absolute, and incidentally dismantled a great number of castles. And our insular security gave no occasion for maintaining fortresses as a protection against foreign invaders.

Something of the same kind holds good of the abbeys. England was, compared to most countries, rich and prosperous in the Middle Ages, so that the monastic buildings, though not unduly numerous, were extensive and stately. They were ruined because England adopted the Reformation, and in consequence dissolved the monasteries; they were not destroyed, partly because most of them became private property, partly because the Reformation was carried through gradually, and without any ebullition of popular zeal.

In the same connection it is worth observing that though our cathedrals as a body fall far behind those of France, our parish churches are on the whole superior to those of other countries. There was wealth to build them; there has been little war, and no sanguinary revolution, to destroy them.

And our insular separateness has given us one ecclesiastical style which is all our own. Perpendicular architecture is not the most beautiful of all, but it is dignified and well suited to the climate. A style is not to be despised which has given us Gloucester Cathedral and St. Michael's, Coventry, the finest college chapels in Oxford and Cambridge, and hundreds of parish churches on the same lines.

Geographical influences make themselves perceptible in most aspects of the life of a country, especially if, like England, it has had a very long history without any marked break of continuity. The formation of the House of Commons, which always has been the core of the English constitution, was originally based entirely on geography, though the democratic changes of recent times have tended to obliterate the marks. The majority of the counties were, as has been seen, natural growths; the remainder were artificially created in imitation of them. All had become before the thirteenth century living organisations, though they were also administrative divisions. The boroughs had an even more coherent corporate life. It was natural that Simon de Montfort, and Edward I. improving upon him, when they wanted a great council of the realm, should summon representatives of these organic units, and treat them all alike. Nor indeed were they so unequal in size, with some few exceptions, as to make this method unreasonable or inconvenient, in view of the purposes for which the early Parliaments were summoned. As time went on, the crown found more and more need of influence within the House of Commons, and used for its own ends its discretion as to the boroughs from which representatives should be summoned. New towns rose, old towns decayed; ultimately with the industrial revolution the weight of population shifted from the south to the north. Parliament was all the time growing in power, becoming more and more completely the real governing authority. Hence its original geographical basis tended to be less and less suitable, both because the geographical distribution had shifted, and also because for the new purposes it was no longer fair that the smallest of the ancient units should have equal weight with the largest.

The Reform Act of 1832 made some attempt to repair the injury wrought by time. It disfranchised many boroughs that were totally unworthy of representation, and substituted new ones. But except that it divided some of the larger counties, giving members to each half, and established a certain number of one-member boroughs, it left the ancient theory subsisting. The House of Commons was still mainly composed of representatives of communities with a definite geographical and historical basis, the boroughs being chosen arbitrarily, though no doubt in some accordance with their relative importance, by the supreme authority. The Act of 1867, while making further changes in the same direction, by no means broke entirely with the past. It was only the legislation of 1885 that, by making male suffrage[1] uniform and dividing counties and large towns alike into single-member constituencies, destroyed the ancient system. And even that stopped short of complete demolition; the two-member boroughs still retained are a survival from the thirteenth century. Administrative convenience still prescribes geographical divisions; the ancient boundaries of counties and boroughs were not ignored in delimiting the new constituencies. But it is only by chance that all the members for all the sections of a county or of a large town speak with the same voice.

The vast increase in the population, the industries, the wealth of England since the eighteenth century has produced external effects even more important and far-reaching than the internal changes. To the world in general it signifies but little that the bulk of our population is now located in the towns rather than in the country, in the north instead of in the south. But it signifies greatly that we should have had surplus population for colonising, goods for every market, and ships to convey them, and a vast demand for commodities of foreign production, especially for food. The British empire, as it exists to-day, is largely a result of the industrial revolution, even though it had its beginnings considerably earlier, and could not have grown up unless favoured by conditions which are not industrial.

The conquest of Canada, with its subsequent development,

[1] By the Representation of the People's Act (1918) women, under certain restrictions, were given the vote.

will be treated in its own place; all that need be said of it in connection with the domestic history of England is that the industrial revolution supplied much of the wealth and of the surplus population, which have gone to the building up of the dominion of Canada. The same holds good, more or less, of the colonisation of Australasia, which began about a generation later. The same is even more conspicuously true of later acquisitions still. The desire for new markets for English manufactures gradually led, for instance, to our taking possession of Nigeria, though there was no original intention of going beyond mere commercial enterprise.

The increase of commerce renders necessary a strong navy to protect it, and this again is paid for out of the wealth engendered by commerce. And the existence of a great navy, both for trading and for fighting, renders necessary the occupation of coaling-stations and other places of call; some of these we have possessed for a long time, some are of comparatively recent acquisition. Again, the increase of population involved in the growth of manufactures, and far exceeding what the soil can feed, affords a further inducement for strengthening the navy, lest in any future war we should starve for want of imported food. And this ominous possibility again has suggested the expediency of making special arrangements with our colonies, some of which are among the chief wheat-producing regions of the world, while some of the colonies deem it their true policy to give preference to the products of the mother country. The necessity of protecting the colonies again, in the contingency of war, makes an additional demand on our navy, and to a small extent on our army. Thus the increase in wealth at home, in dominions abroad, in consequent expenditure, in the economic and other ties which bind us to the colonies, are inextricably bound up together. The British empire is an organic whole, all the more complicated because the primary needs of its various parts are not the same, but not necessarily therefore the less strong. It is for the future to show whether hostile forces can injure it, or internal dissensions dislocate it, or whether it will grow with time more firmly coherent through the very freedom of its organisation.

§ 6. SCOTLAND

The most important fact in the structure of Scotland, from the geographical if not from every point of view, is the existence of the deep inlets, opposite each other, of the Firths of Forth and Clyde. The distance across from one estuary to the other is little over thirty miles, and that is a strip of plain, contrasting markedly with the hilly regions to north and south. In fact, if the subsidence of the land which formed the British Islands had been continued only a hundred feet more, the whole isthmus would have been submerged. In that case Scotland as history knows it would never have existed. The northern parts would have formed one or more separate islands, cut off from England as effectually as Ireland, but much smaller and poorer; and the southern part must inevitably have been incorporated with England as soon as Wales, perhaps as soon as Cornwall.

The region north of the Firths may for convenience be all denominated the Highlands, though the term is not quite accurate, either physically or conventionally. The broad valley of the Tay is level enough, and there is also comparatively flat country, though not quite uninterrupted, up the east coast and round to the Moray Firth.[1] Nevertheless the region as a whole is mountainous, affording but a small proportion of cultivable land, and difficult of access until civilisation was far advanced. Hence it afforded a refuge in which the native tribes were free from the Romans, who never professed to carry their dominion north of the Forth, though sundry armies advanced far beyond on punitive or exploring expeditions. Hence also the inhabitants, remote from all outside influences, with little scope for agriculture and no aptitude for the sea, remained in a very backward state both politically and socially.

The people who inhabited the Highlands in Roman times were, as has been said above, Goidelic Celts in language and

[1] There seems to have been some settlement of Angles along this strip of coast, though the amount is disputed. Nor is it clear whether they gradually pushed their way up by land from Lothian, or arrived earlier as invaders by sea.

more or less in race; if there was, as is now believed, any mixture of blood, the pre-Aryan people had blended with the conquering Goidels and adopted their language. The name by which they were known for centuries afterwards was Picti, which is in Latin significant of their habit of painting their bodies. It is probable that the Latin word was a transliteration of their own name for themselves, the significance in Latin being a mere coincidence, but this is not certainly known. The existence in Gaul of an important tribe of Pictavi (the modern Poitou) perhaps weighs a little in favour of this view.

When the Romans left Britain, the Picts had complete possession of all north of the Firths, while the Brythons occupied the country to the south of them. The latter, deserted by their protectors and themselves untrained to arms, suffered much at the hands of their northern neighbours, but were in no sense expelled or even definitely conquered. The coming of the Angles, while it deprived the Brythons of the eastern half of the island south of the Firths, tended on the whole to protect them against the Picts. About the same time, other Goidelic Celts, known as Scots, crossed over the very narrow strip of sea which separates the south-west of Scotland from northern Ireland, and took forcible possession of that part of the Pictish lands which is now Argyllshire and the southern islands; and this obtained the name of Dalriada. Thus at the beginning of the seventh century what is now Scotland was shared between four peoples: (1) the original Picts, (2) their kindred the Scots, (3) the Angles of Northumbria, (4) the Brythons. The two former occupied the Highlands between them; the eastern half of the Lowlands, known as Lothian, was included in the Angle kingdom. The Brython kingdom of Strathclyde occupied the western half of the Lowlands, with a little of the extreme north-west of what is now England, and had its capital at Dunbarton (the name is said to mean the *dun* or hill fort of the Brythons) on the Clyde, Goidels, in some undefined relation to Strathclyde, dwelling in the extreme south-western peninsula.

In the middle of the ninth century, for reasons that were

certainly not geographical, the two Goidel peoples coalesced, and the king of the Scots having become king over the Picts also, the united kingdom soon came to be known as Scotland. Nor was the name considered to mean any more for two or three centuries, in spite of the fact that the king of Scots had added to his dominions both Brythonic Strathclyde and Angle Lothian. After the Norman conquest the Saxon Chronicle speaks of some one as having come out of Scotland into Lothian.

The new Scottish kingdom suffered severely at the hands of the Norsemen, coming both directly from Scandinavia and from their settlements in Ireland. The Norsemen took possession of the far north, and of the western islands, the Scots having apparently even less means of fighting at sea than the contemporary English. The semi-independent position of these island chiefs, who in their remote, almost inaccessible homes were not easy to keep in order, contributed an element of weakness and occasional confusion during several centuries; but they acknowledged in words the royal supremacy, and gradually came under efficient control.

The history of the acquisition by the kings of Scotland of Strathclyde and Lothian is closely connected with the history of the relations between the English and Scottish crowns, and is open to as much dispute as any similar matter in all history. According to the Saxon Chronicle, all the Celtic princes in the island acknowledged Edward, the son of Alfred, as "father and lord," but there is nothing to show what this meant beyond a titular superiority. A few years later all were united against the English king Athelstan, and were defeated by him at the battle of Brunanburh, famous in poetry. Again according to the English accounts, the next English king, Edmund, conquered Strathclyde, and handed it over to the king of Scots to be holden in some vassal capacity not clearly specified. Nevertheless Strathclyde remained virtually independent, and more or less continually hostile to Scotland. About Lothian the obscurity is even greater; it had certainly been an integral portion of Northumbria, and was certainly also invaded repeatedly by the Scots, and in the reign of Cnut the possession of it

finally remained with the king of Scots. But whether it was sheer conquest, which seems improbable against a king so powerful as Cnut, or was a cession on condition of being held as an English earldom, or on other terms implying less subjection, cannot be positively determined. One way or another, Lothian became permanently attached to Scotland, and this is perhaps the most important event in Scottish history before the union with England.

Lothian being considerably more fertile than the Highlands, and having a population more energetic and industrial, the kings found it the most valuable portion of their dominions, and identified themselves with it more and more. Mediæval kingdoms had not always a capital in the modern sense, and it would be hardly more correct to call Dunfermline or Perth the capital of Scotland, because they were the abode of certain kings, than to call Windsor the capital of England. Edinburgh alone can be said ever to have been the real capital: and its name, conferred by Edwin of Northumbria when he founded it as a border fortress, is a perpetual reminder that it belonged to the Angle portion of the country.

The tendency of the Scottish kings to make Lothian of primary importance was strengthened by the Norman conquest in more ways than one. King Malcolm Canmore married Margaret, sister of Edgar Atheling, the last member of the former English royal house, and thereby constituted himself in some sense the champion of the English. His queen's sympathies were naturally in the same direction: and his children were half English in blood. Refugees from England were well received in Lothian, and men who would rather leave their homes than submit to the Norman were not likely to be the least sturdy of the Angles. The character of the Scottish people as exhibited in the modern world, strong in purpose and convictions, shrewd, pushing, and eager for gain, somewhat hard and narrow, belongs essentially to this Angle section of the nation.

The gradual settlement of the southern frontier, along the line of the Cheviot hills, has been dealt with in relation to England. Enough has also been said in the same place of the disputed feudal relations between England and Scotland,

which ended in Edward I. claiming to exercise the fullest feudal supremacy, and in Scotland after a very long struggle getting her complete independence recognised by Edward's grandson. It should be added here that the two centuries during which this question had been at intervals raised, were on the whole a period of peace and consolidation in Scotland, so that the nation met the crisis with something like consciousness of a corporate patriotism. It should also be said that the same disputed relations had helped to bring into Scotland many Norman nobles, who acquired lands and took leading positions in their new country. In fact the rival claimants for the crown, when the contested succession arose of which Edward I. took advantage, were both Normans by origin. Thus even this element was forthcoming to make the Scottish nation parallel to the English in the elements of which it was composed. In both countries alike the backbone of the people was Anglo-Saxon, the comparatively small minority of Normans having been absorbed.

The English language was not, it is true, so nearly predominant in Scotland as in England: nevertheless it had made considerable progress. Throughout what had been Strathclyde and up the eastern side of the island, in the basin of the Tay and round to the Moray Firth, it gradually superseded the Celtic tongues, Gaelic retaining its hold only of the remote parts of the Highlands. In both countries the Danish or Norse element had blended completely, in England with Angles, in Scotland with the Celts of the north [1] and of the islands. In both alike there was a considerable number of Celts, if that word of somewhat ambiguous meaning may be used to denote people speaking a Celtic language, irrespective of the question of their physical characteristics; the proportion in Scotland was, however, larger. The chief difference was that the English Celts were

[1] The prevalence of red or fair hair in the extreme north and north-east of Scotland may be due either to the Norsemen having entirely preponderated, or to the previous inhabitants having been fair-haired. An argument in favour of the former view may be derived from the fact that in Caithness the names, even of the rivers, are mainly Norse, as if there had been practically no inhabitants before them.

Brythonic, while the Celts in Scotland were mainly, though by no means entirely, Goidelic.

Geography, in the most comprehensive sense of the term, thoroughly justifies the policy of Edward I. in seeking to unite England and Scotland into one nation, and this even more from the Scottish than from the English point of view. Both peoples, as has just been shown, contained the same race elements, and both spoke the same language. In political institutions England was in advance of Scotland, immeasurably in advance of the Highlands, though there was nothing to prevent a real union if the conditions under which the two countries were made subject to the same ruler had been propitious. Edward I.'s first idea was to unite the two crowns by the marriage of his young son with the child queen of Scotland.[1] Had this marriage been happily effected and blessed with heirs, the permanent union of the two realms would naturally and easily have followed. And the probable gain to Scotland may be measured by the difference between that country and England when the Reformation came. The Maid of Norway, however, died prematurely, and the resulting troubles naturally led the Scots, after their independence had been established, to regard permanent hostility to England as the visible symbol of patriotism. For more than two centuries Scotland was an ally, almost a dependent of France, attacking England whenever the latter was at enmity with France, and sending her nobles to die on French battlefields. Scotland gained nothing, not even military credit, for the longbow gave the English victory on almost every battlefield; and of course England suffered somewhat, though, for the military reason just given, the loss was not so serious as might have been. The only gainer was France, which obviously was glad to let loose an enemy who could take England in rear. Throughout the period between the establishment of Scottish independence and the union of the crowns, English statesmanship was wiser than

[1] Edward II. turned out badly, it is true, and might have ruined his father's policy in some other way, instead of by losing the decisive battle of Bannockburn. But even Edward II. might have done better if he had not had the worst wife imaginable,

Scottish. Englishmen, except on the border, had no hostile feeling towards Scotland, and the government had every motive, present convenience as well as future permanent advantage, for conciliating the Scots and establishing a party in the country. The hostility of the Scots under all the circumstances was natural, even almost praiseworthy; but none the less Scotland gained enormously when the ancient tradition became inapplicable to the changed condition, through the king of Scots succeeding peaceably to the English crown.

The wasp-like shape of Scotland, with the Lowlands joined to the Highlands only by a strip of plain, rendered it inevitable that much of its military history should centre in this small district lying between north and south. This comes out very clearly in the war of independence. The first important battle, that in which John Balliol was overthrown, was, it is true, fought at Dunbar, about half-way along the strip of level coast-land from the mouth of the Tweed into the Firth of Forth. The others, however, all took place very close together. Stirling is situated on the Forth, some little way above where it widens to an estuary, south of the most direct route towards the Highlands. Close to Stirling, at Cambuskenneth, Wallace defeated the English army of occupation and made himself for a time ruler of Scotland. His chance was given him by the enemy having to cross the bridge over the Forth, which enabled him to attack part while the rest could not come to their assistance. In the next year Wallace was in turn overthrown by Edward at Falkirk, not many miles off in the direction of Edinburgh. When the Scottish cause again became hopeful under the leadership of Robert Bruce, and he was able, thanks to the death of Edward I. and the mismanagement of his son, almost to clear Scotland of the English, it was felt by both sides that so long as Stirling remained in English hands their cause was not lost. Stirling castle was in a very real sense the key to Scotland, and its position on a hill rendered it unassailable by Bruce, who was ill-provided with siege materials in an age when sieges were extremely difficult. No garrison, however, can hold out unless its needs are

supplied, and Edward II. had therefore either to relieve Stirling by force or to lose the last symbol of his dominion over Scotland. The army which he brought up was needlessly large, and therefore hampered itself, so that it was not till the last moment that it reached the neighbourhood of Stirling. The battle of Bannockburn was an attack on Bruce's army posted so as to prevent the English from reaching the town. Thanks to the gross incapacity of the king, which was matched against the competent generalship of Bruce, the attack was disastrously repulsed, and an accidental panic converted failure into total and disgraceful rout. Stirling had to surrender, and the English hold on Scotland was lost with it.

Other illustrations of the permanent importance in history of Stirling and its neighbourhood could easily be given from later times, but it is unnecessary to dwell on them. It is obvious that whenever war is carried on in Scotland much is bound to turn, everything may turn, on command of the narrow gate through which alone land communication between north and south exists. It is obvious also that its importance is likely to be more or less forcibly shown in proportion as the antagonism between north and south, arising from difference of race and social conditions, is more or less active.

Little in Scottish history seems to depend on the detailed geography of the Highland region, not even on the existence of the deep trough nearly cutting it in half, along which has now been made the Caledonian canal. The difficult nature of the country naturally tended to impede communication, and so to leave the Highland tribes longer in their primitive clan organisation than they could have remained in a more accessible part of the island. There was little difference in this respect between one part of the Highlands and another, except in the comparative plain along the east coast. There, where there was a considerable admixture of Angles, towns grew up, and a certain amount of trade. There was situated the metropolitan see of St. Andrews; there arose two of the four Scottish universities. There also are situated all the Scottish ports which have more than local trade, with the

great exception of Glasgow and Greenock. Historically speaking, however, this life on the east coast was connected with the south rather than with the Highlands.

To the period of the Stuart dynasty in Scotland only, belong both the final completion of territorial Scotland by the acquisition of the Orkney and Shetland isles, and the establishment, at least nominally, of the system of regular government implied in the formation of counties. The northern islands had remained under the crown of Norway until, in the year 1469, they were pledged to Scotland as security for the dowry of Margaret, daughter of the king of Norway, who married James III. As her portion was never paid, the islands became the property of the Scottish crown, in accordance with geographical propriety. The counties were formed as areas of legal jurisdiction, after the fashion of the English counties, and the formation of them implies at least the deliberate intention to administer the law systematically, though in practical fact the Stuart kings were seldom strong enough to enforce their will, and the ancient clan organisation remained as effective as ever.

The turbulence of the Scottish nobles under the Stuart kings, and the consequent unrest and disorder, may to a certain extent be attributed to geographical conditions. Those of them who were Highland chieftains were inaccessible to control by the crown: those who belonged to the Cheviot region were almost bound to maintain strong armed forces for the sake of the ever-simmering border warfare. Nor was there, as in England, a more or less influential mercantile element. So feebly organised a state was an easy prey to faction, to personal ambition, to the intrigues of the partisans of France or of England. When after the final conclusion of the Wars of the Roses England began to take a stronger position in Europe, the Tudor kings reverted to the settled policy of trying to gain influence over Scotland. France, on the other hand, clung to her traditional alliance with the traditional enemy of England; and it was largely this influence which defeated Henry VIII.'s first scheme of marrying his daughter Mary, then his only child, to James V. Many years later he did succeed in inducing the Scots to agree to a marriage

between their infant queen Mary and his son Edward. This scheme also broke down, partly through the high-handedness of Protector Somerset, partly through the old jealousies accentuated by the ferment of the Reformation. Thus it was not till Henry's posterity were extinct that the two crowns were united, England peaceably accepting as Elizabeth's successor James VI. of Scotland, great-grandson of Henry's sister.

Difficulties are sure to arise when two kingdoms, independent of each other, are under the same ruler, especially if they are contiguous: and this has perhaps never been better illustrated than in Great Britain during the seventeenth century. Each country had its grievances against the king, but they were far from identical: and the English and Scottish churches were not only different, but mutually exclusive, in the eyes of all but the small handful who had grasped the idea of religious equality. Moreover, the Scots had a hereditary pride in their native sovereign which the most zealous of English cavaliers could not feel. Hence though the Scots were the first to rebel against Charles I., and helped to overthrow his cause in England, they ended by taking up arms against England on his behalf. Their own country had been in the interval the scene of a sharp civil war, in which Montrose's brilliant exploits were largely conditioned by the geography, still more by the social state of the Highlands, which was, as it were, geographical influence at second hand.

The execution of Charles in England led the Scots to proclaim his son, and thus necessarily to challenge England. Cromwell's invasion of Scotland at first produced no results, through the caution of his adversary Leslie in remaining within the hill country of Lothian, where he could not be attacked except at great disadvantage; and it was converted into something like conquest by the same Leslie being induced to abandon his vantage ground and give Cromwell battle at Dunbar. On the one easy and obvious route from England into Scotland, along the level strip of ground from the mouth of the Tweed to the Forth, at the spot where it is narrowest, the decisive encounter took place. It was not, however, the natural case of a Scottish army selecting Dunbar

as the most effective place for withstanding the invader, but almost the reverse. Cromwell, unable to bring Leslie to close quarters, was retreating along the natural line, and Leslie took post on the hills, so that Cromwell could not pass without exposing himself to a ruinous flank attack. The English, then as at most times, were able to use the sea for assisting military operations; and Cromwell would have embarked his troops at Dunbar had not Leslie yielded, as it is always said, to the pressure of the Presbyterian elders, who thought that God had delivered their enemy into their hands. Cromwell thought the same when the Scots came down off the hills, and with better reason; for Leslie's move, as faulty in method as it was rash in idea, enabled Cromwell to win an overwhelming victory. The natural consequences followed: after the next year's desperate venture had been crushed at Worcester, the Scots were at the mercy of England. The statesmen of the Protectorate, ahead of their age in most things, made representatives from Scotland part of each Parliament, thereby for the moment completing the natural union which Edward I. had attempted three centuries and a half before.

The reversal of this measure at the Restoration worked some mischief, even though Scotland accepted the revolution of 1688, and made William III. king instead of James II. When it became necessary to provide a successor to Anne, the Scottish Parliament, thinking that they had specific grievances against England, and resenting the appearance of being merely dependent on the larger kingdom, went so far as to pass a law that on Anne's death her successor in England should not also reign in Scotland. This suicidal folly, however, merely demonstrated to Anne's ministers the absolute necessity of a permanent union, which was with some trouble effected. Scotland made a sacrifice of sentiment, ceasing to exist as a separate political entity, but gained enormously in every other way. The modern prosperity of Scotland dates from the Union of 1707, and is in many ways its direct result.

There was still, however, a period of trouble to be gone through, a great practical reform to be effected, before

Scotland could reap the full benefit of the Union, and both have an intimate connection with the geography. The Highlanders at the beginning of the eighteenth century were still in the same stage of political and social development in which they had lived since history began; secluded in their remote and scarcely accessible mountains, the bulk of the Highlanders had only one idea outside the narrow round of daily life, devotion to the chief of their clan. The king was a mere name to them, the law was unknown in those recesses. The chiefs themselves, of course, were different: some bore great titles, some were statesmen, all had more or less acquaintance with the court and public affairs. And all derived their main influence from their clansmen, from their ability to bring into the field so many hundreds of fighting men. When the marquis of Argyll took a strong part against Charles I., the Campbells were all at his back, not because they had any grievance against the king, but because McCallum More held up his hand. And the Highlanders who followed Montrose, or who rose in arms for either of the pretenders, did so because their chiefs were for the Stuarts, or were against Argyll. The clansmen were, of course, not ideal soldiers: though perfectly brave, they were undisciplined and self-willed, and reluctant to remain long in the field. Their defects went far to ruin the young pretender's chances, though their headlong valour gave him his first astonishing victory. Nevertheless, it may be safely said that he would never have been formidable, if the leading men who espoused his cause had not been heads of Highland clans. Most of those who joined his standard did so not for his sake, but in obedience to the chief, whose authority was the only power that they recognised.

The remedy for the trouble which the Highlanders were capable of causing to the body politic of Great Britain was even more completely geographical than the evil itself. After the rebellion of 1745 had been put down, the government ordered the construction of roads through the Highlands, which destroyed their isolation. The politic measure of enlisting Highland regiments in the regular army was, perhaps, more immediately useful in pacifying the Highlands, by giving

legitimate vent for the hereditary fighting instincts. But the effect of the roads has been permanent and complete: the Highlands are now as orderly and law-abiding as any part of England. The lesson which imperial Rome taught to the world, as to the civilising value of good roads, has never been more successfully put in practice.

The industrial revolution ran its course in Scotland as in England. The beginning of it for Scotland may be dated from 1760, when the Carron ironworks were built near Falkirk, about the time at which the establishment of thorough order in the Highlands had been accomplished. Naturally the countrymen of James Watt were not slow to take advantage of the new conditions. The phrase "industrial revolution" must, however, be used in a somewhat different sense for Scotland. In England it meant a vast growth in the industries and population of regions which had hitherto been comparatively unimportant, and a consequent shifting of the centre of gravity of the whole nation. In Scotland the coal and iron were found in the part of the country already most populous and important, as being best fitted by nature to sustain a large population.

The mineral wealth of Scotland, except the granite quarried in the neighbourhood of Aberdeen, is situated in the central strip of lowland. The coal measures extend along the north shore of the Firth of Forth, and thence across the country into the north of Ayrshire. The iron is mainly in the western part of this region. Thus the modern industrial development centres in the district about Glasgow. That town was already a trading port of some size, being the only one on the western side of Scotland which possesses both a good harbour and open communications inland. Various forms of textile manufacture were introduced and still flourish, especially in Paisley; but these have been overshadowed in Glasgow and its immediate neighbourhood by the vast development of the iron industry. The Clyde is now, perhaps, the most important river in the world for iron shipbuilding, and all sorts of machinery are also manufactured in the same neighbourhood. This could not be carried on unless the Clyde had been artificially deepened: the process

began before the end of the eighteenth century, and has by now quadrupled the original depth of the river. Nevertheless the great ocean steamers find Greenock, at the actual mouth of the Clyde, more convenient: but though altogether separate and some distance off, Greenock, from the historical point of view, is a mere appendage of Glasgow. The population of Glasgow increased tenfold during the nineteenth century, having probably quadrupled itself during the eighteenth. It is now the largest town[1] in the United Kingdom after London, having over a million inhabitants. Indeed, the industrial district of which Glasgow is the focus contains considerably over a million and a half people, or something like a quarter of the whole population of Scotland.

The other Scottish industries, which are mainly textile, are more scattered; but they flourish almost entirely in the lowlands, or on the east coast, which historically belongs to the lowlands. Their growth, as evidenced by increase of population during the nineteenth century, has been very considerable, though falling far short of the extraordinary development of Glasgow. Two towns only, besides Glasgow and Edinburgh, exceed 158,000 inhabitants, and those only slightly. They are Dundee, which besides its textile manufactures is the head-quarters of the whale and seal fisheries, once of much greater relative importance than at present, and has much foreign trade, and Aberdeen, which owes its importance to a combination of several things. Except Paisley and Greenock, which are scarcely independent of Glasgow, there is no other town in Scotland that even approaches 45,000 inhabitants.

It remains to say a few words of Edinburgh, now practically one city with its port Leith, the two having between them a population of nearly 420,000. The Castle hill, as is

[1] As has been observed in relation to the great English towns, the population as given by the census is that contained in the municipal area, whereas it is reasonable, in estimating the practical importance of a town, to include suburbs which are dependent on it. The official Glasgow, however, bears a somewhat higher proportion to the effectual than is the case with either Liverpool or Manchester.

obvious, was what caused Edwin of Northumbria to select it as the site of his border fortress against the Picts. It always remained the chief town of the Angles in Lothian, and acquired a new importance when the Scottish kings began to lean more and more on their Angle subjects. It was only gradually, however, that it became the royal residence, and still later that it grew into a considerable city. In the fifteenth century, when it was already the recognised capital, Berwick almost monopolised the foreign trade of Scotland, which then, like England, exported to Flanders a certain quantity of wool, grown mainly in Lothian. The progress of Scotland in civilisation of all kinds naturally had most effect on the capital, as the centre of administration of every kind. And though the cessation of the separate Scottish Parliament, and the absence of all that a court implies, checked the growth of Edinburgh, it is still for all purposes of government a very important centre.

§ 7. IRELAND

Ireland is much simpler in its structure than the sister island. It has been compared to a dish, with a rim of mountains, and this is so far apt that it is roughly oblong, or rather rhomboidal, in shape, and that the mountains are mainly near the coast. The comparison, however, fails in points which are specially important historically. There is a central plain, but it extends to the coast, both east and west, the openings to the Atlantic being comparatively small, while on the eastern side of the island there is a long range of coast, of which Dublin may be called the centre, which has no hills running along it. South of Dublin, and very near the sea, is the short range of the Wicklow mountains. Otherwise Leinster, the eastern province, is nearly all flat; and Connaught, the western province, is also flat, as compared to Ulster and Munster. The mountains lying rather in groups than in continuous chains, there are many gaps through which roads can pass, and the streams can flow to the sea almost anywhere. Most of them, however, are short; the whole centre of the island is drained by the

Shannon, which rises far in the north, and has a long course of almost imperceptible descent, in which it forms more than one considerable lake. One might naturally expect that it would flow out into the Irish Sea; but it has in fact made a way for itself to the Atlantic.

The subsidence which formed the British Islands as a whole has left its most remarkable traces in the north and south of Ireland. What originally were valleys between the mountains are now long gulfs penetrating deeply into the land. This is most conspicuous at the south-west, where the ridges enclosing three parallel inlets look like the fingers of an outstretched hand. These particular bays, since the prevalent wind from the Atlantic blows straight up them, have been of little value as harbours. One of them indeed, Bantry Bay, was the scene of a French attempt at invasion during the wars of the Revolution, which ended in total failure, very largely through the difficulties produced by the winds and waves. Steam has, of course, made a considerable difference; and Berehaven, inside Bantry Bay, is now used from time to time for a station during naval manœuvres.

Most of the other Irish harbours are more conveniently placed, and having fortunately deep water, are available for the large ships of recent times. Cork and Waterford, on the south-east, and Limerick, in the mouth of the Shannon, are all noteworthy as maritime towns which were built as far up into the land as was possible, in the days when security from piratical attack was important, and have not become useless through comparative shallowness. The same thing holds good in Ulster, where Lough Foyle and Lough Swilly run very deep into the northern coast, and Belfast Lough into the end opposite Scotland. The last named is the seat of the most prosperous of Irish industrial towns, and Londonderry is on Lough Foyle, while Lough Swilly, which has no such town on its banks, is much used by the fleet. In fact it may be said that the existence of these many and deep Irish harbours is of very great value for the protection of the Irish Sea, which is practically inland water belonging to the British Islands as a whole. The northern loughs are admirably suited for stations whence the north channel may

be defended, though, as this opens on to the wide Atlantic, assailants must take a very circuitous course to reach it, and would be very unlikely to try unless they felt sure of being unopposed. And the southern harbours are equally well placed for guarding, along with Plymouth and Milford Haven, the all-important entrance to the English Channel, and those to the Bristol and St. George's Channels even more directly.

The climate of Ireland, it would appear at first sight, ought closely to resemble that of England. The two islands are in the same latitude, and are both acted on by the same warm currents from the Atlantic. In fact, however, the difference between them in point of climate is very great, and is due primarily to the difference in position, though partly also to difference of structure. Ireland receives the first impact of the warm, moisture-laden winds from the west and south-west, so that they convey less rain to central England. And it has not a hill region all along its western side to draw down the rain, leaving a much smaller proportion to reach the interior. Hence the average rainfall of Ireland is very considerably above that of England, and makes the soil unfit for wheat-growing. On the other hand, the temperature is more equable, and the frequent rain is most favourable for pasture, so that Ireland at the present day rears more live stock in proportion to its population than any country in Europe. How far the climate is answerable for the greatest economic misfortune which has ever befallen Ireland is rather a speculative inquiry. Certain it is that the cultivation of the potato, introduced by Sir Walter Ralegh, doubtless with the best motives, and encouraged by the unfavourableness of the soil to grain crops, has been a national misfortune. Requiring little labour, the potato has fostered the worst weakness of the Irish character, a disposition to take things easily and to avoid hard work. Uncertain in its crop, it has caused more than one disastrous famine, and at best it is ill fitted to form the staple food of a people.

The climate, in conjunction with the peculiar conformation of the country, is answerable for another of the weak points of Ireland. The central plain being level and only about 300 feet above the sea, the excessive rainfall cannot readily

drain off. Hence a very large part of its surface is occupied by shallow lakes, or by bog, which is equally unprofitable, except that from some parts of it peat fuel is procurable, compensating partially for the lack of coal. Things are probably worse in this respect than many centuries ago, when there was a considerable amount of forest. The people who cut down the forest doubtless thought that they were clearing the ground for agriculture, but the forces of nature were too strong, and the mischief, if not incurable, might well cost more money and trouble to remedy than the land is worth.

The history of Ireland depends mainly upon its position on the globe. Lying, as it does, on the edge of the Atlantic, with Britain between it and the continent of Europe, it was accessible only across Britain, until the art of navigation had made real progress. And being, as it is, much smaller than Britain, with a worse climate and very little mineral wealth, it had no natural qualifications for being the abode of an independent nation. In the modern world, at any rate, Ireland could hardly subsist if left to itself, and from the necessity of its geographical position it can only be linked with Britain.

Two points in the physical formation of the island are important historically. The central plain, with its broad strip of coast about Dublin, which lies opposite the north-west corner of Wales, afforded every facility for invaders to penetrate into the heart of the country. Secondly, the mountains furnished neither effective natural boundaries, nor valuable protection to prior inhabitants threatened with destruction at the hands of more powerful invaders. Hence would naturally follow what seems in fact to have been the case; the conquerors would subdue the whole country, spreading easily in all directions from the central plain. Until modern times, under the influence of forces totally unlike those operating in primitive ages, there is no trace in Irish history of different and hostile races occupying different parts of the island.

There is no doubt that the same pre-Aryan race, which

supplied the earliest known inhabitants of Britain, occupied Ireland also. Nor is there any doubt that the Goidelic Celts eventually followed, dominated the prior inhabitants, and imposed on them their own language. In Ireland, as in the Highlands, a Goidelic language was spoken when history began, and continued to be spoken virtually everywhere until ousted by English, a process which, in Ireland as in the Highlands, has been carried far, but is by no means yet complete. There are doubtful indications only of a small Brythonic irruption into Ireland. Substantially the Irish are still the same in race as they were in Cæsar's time, subject to certain modifications which will be mentioned below.

The Romans made no attempt to conquer Ireland, which was left to itself for several centuries after the Christian era. If the Irish legends could be regarded as accurate history, the country enjoyed a long period of peace and prosperity. How much truth underlies these high-flown descriptions it is fortunately unnecessary here to inquire. There is little to suggest that the invaders who crossed from northern Ireland to the sister island, to achieve the conquest of the nearest regions held by their kindred the Picts, and to give ultimately their name to all Scotland, had reached any higher level of civilisation than the Picts. It is evident however that the Irish civilisation, whatever its degree, was largely monastic in character, as is indicated by the name "isle of saints" given to the island. Probably, therefore, the advance was made after the conversion of the Irish to Christianity—the date given for St. Patrick is A.D. 432. Of the active vitality of monastic Christianity in Ireland ample illustration is given, not only by the number of ruins still surviving in the country, but also by the missionary successes of St. Columba and his followers. What they achieved in Britain has already been told, and need not be repeated here.

The Norsemen formed settlements on the east coast of Ireland, when in the eighth century they began to infest the whole of the lands bordering on the Irish Sea. They are credited with having burned many monasteries out of hatred to Christianity, besides doing much other material damage, but they made no attempt at conquest. Their power was

Islin
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confined to their own towns, the most important of which were Dublin and Waterford, though they got into their hands much of the small trade of Ireland.

When the English conquest began, the political organisation of the Irish was still merely tribal, though there were, and had long been, confederacies of tribes, roughly corresponding to the four modern provinces, with a fifth added in the shape of Meath, the level centre of the island behind Dublin. The chiefs of these confederations bore the royal title, as apparently had still smaller potentates long before; and the king of Meath was supposed to be supreme over all. Whether there existed any germs of higher political development may be doubted. Substantially Ireland remained in the tribal stage until the seventeenth century; and some at least of the misfortunes of Ireland arose from the English government not realising this fact, and treating Irish chiefs, with their septs, as if they had been English lords and yeomen. The ancient names, however, of the four local divisions still subsist, though Meath has been divided up. Other local names, which, like the analogous names in the Highlands, seem to have had rather a tribal than a strictly territorial meaning, have long ceased to be employed, having been superseded by the administrative division into counties, which was completed under the government of Cromwell.

The English conquest began through Strongbow, earl of Clare, being induced to intervene in a domestic quarrel between Irish kings. His own domains being in South Wales, and his assistance being given in Munster, he crossed over to Waterford, instead of to Dublin, the natural entry for invaders. Henry II., in letting Strongbow go over to Ireland, had in view a real conquest, and he requested the Pope to make him a formal grant of Ireland, which was in no sense the Pope's to give away. It is a curious specimen of the irony of history that the Irish should in later times have clung passionately to the Roman church by way of protest against English sovereignty, which was thus in its origin based upon the Pope's grant.

Dublin became the English centre, and the region under direct English authority was gradually extended. The Pale.

as it was called, seems to have receded in the fifteenth century, though it always included the region round Dublin. At any rate, the nobles of Norman or English origin who had obtained lands in Ireland seem to have identified themselves more and more with the native Irish, thus rather strengthening than weakening the Irish social system. Hence the work of conquest had practically to be begun again under the Tudors. Historical geography is not concerned to discuss the demerits of the unfortunate policy pursued. Ruthless conquest might have succeeded ; a system of trying to win the Irish by showing them the benefits of law and order, though blameless, would probably have been very slow in bearing fruit. A middle course had the faults of both methods. The names of King's County and Queen's County mark the first effective advance, during the reign of Mary, who associated her husband's name with everything. In Elizabeth's time a Spanish landing gave the first indication that Ireland might be used as a basis of attack on England by her enemies. Its total failure, like similar failures in later wars, does not prove that Ireland is incapable of affording such a hostile base ; but it does suggest that the danger is not very serious. Geography certainly affirms that a hostile expedition landed in Ireland would be more or less wasted, unless the whole population were ready to support the invader ; and even in that case it would be far easier for England to fight the enemy and the revolted Irish together than to encounter an invading army landed in Sussex or Essex. The dividing sea, which has obviously had an injurious effect in preventing the thorough union of Ireland to England, would render it at least as difficult to make a hostile descent from Ireland as from the Continent.

In the time of James I. a new departure was taken. A regular colony from London was planted at Derry, in the extreme north of Ireland, which has ever since been known as Londonderry. And a considerable migration from Scotland into the north of Ireland took place, which entirely altered the character of the population. It was the reverse in all respects of the migration, more than a thousand years earlier, of Scots across the same arm of the sea. Then a

Goidelic people had conquered by force part of the lands held by a kindred race, and had amalgamated with them entirely in course of time. In the seventeenth century Angles, very superior in civilisation to the Irish, differing from them in speech and religion, intruded themselves by peaceful means, but have remained practically separate ever since.

The rising in 1641, when the Irish thought to take advantage of the dissensions between Charles I. and the Parliament, loomed larger to the imagination of contemporaries than the facts warranted. Nevertheless that, and Charles' attempts to bring Irish troops to fight for his cause in England, led naturally to the thorough conquest achieved by Cromwell. His measures in deporting many of the Irish to Connaught, and filling their places with his own men, increased the strength of the "English garrison" in Ireland generally, but effected no fundamental change. At the end of the century there was still throughout the country a population Irish in race, and mostly disaffected to England, with a sprinkling of English over them. The exception was in Ulster, a considerable part of which province was filled with Scotch Presbyterians: and it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the historical importance of the exception.

When James II. lost his English throne he continued to be acknowledged in Ireland, and presently betook himself thither, hoping to make Ireland a base for regaining England with French help. This, it may be safely said, could never have been achieved. From the French point of view an invasion of England through Ireland would have been infinitely more difficult than an expedition sent straight across the Channel, even assuming that the necessary preliminary to invasion, superiority to England at sea, had been attained. Moreover many of the Irish, as half a century earlier, wanted complete independence, which meant that while ready to keep James as their king they did not wish to see him recover England. And Louis XIV., well knowing that an Ireland separated from England must needs be dependent on France, as Scotland had been for two or three centuries, doled out aid sparingly. It was not impossible, however, that such a separation should, under the circumstances,

come to pass, and the danger to England would have been serious. Ireland, under the control of France, in that age a perpetual and active enemy, and ruled by a king whom a considerable part of the English people were ready to welcome back, and a much larger number opposed reluctantly, would have been a standing menace. The energies of England must have been concentrated on the task of recovering Ireland, whatever the cost. From all this we were saved by the vigour of the few English and Scotch Protestants in Ulster.

The tendency of modern writers is to lay stress on the natural conditions of climate, race, and everything which constitutes man's environment—an aspect of history which was for very sufficient reasons ignored in previous generations. Race is difficult to define, impossible to delimit accurately, but easy to recognise in action. It would be hard to select an instance in all history where the strong qualities of a ruling race stood out more conspicuously and effectively than in the Ulster of 1689, unless indeed it be the Indian mutiny. The English—the name is correct, for Lowland Scots were as truly Angles as men of Yorkshire or the midlands—were a minority even in Ulster, but a minority large enough to act in concert. And they were in the right frame of mind for carrying to extremes the obstinate temper of a race which dies rather than give way, and is not afraid to face heavy odds. The citizens of Londonderry, and the gentlemen who made Enniskillen their headquarters, prevented James II. from mastering Ireland, and won time for William III. to bring over an army. Then one victory at the Boyne was virtually decisive, and Ireland was before long reduced to submission.

Unfortunately the dreary round of coercion was resumed: the Irish had in many ways brought it on themselves, and neither William III. nor the statesmen who ruled England after him saw their way to any nobler policy. Moreover, the commercial and industrial interests of Ireland were made subservient to the real or supposed interests of English producers: and as Irish trade must needs be mainly with England, for the most obvious geographical reasons, this meant

the sacrifice of Irish industries altogether. A real union, which should put Ireland not only under the same government with England, but also into the same commercial system, was the only possible remedy. The misfortune was that the legislative union, which took effect at the beginning of the nineteenth century, left grievances unredressed. The exclusion of Roman Catholics from the franchise, a matter of little moment in England, meant that the bulk of the population of Ireland were unrepresented for a generation after the Union. The subsequent difficulties in dealing with Ireland are not quite alien to geography. The effects of climate, as for instance in the disastrous potato famine, the antagonism between a small minority of one race, who mostly belong to the governing classes, and a peasant majority of another race, the lack of mineral wealth out of which new industrial conditions might have arisen—all these are matters in which geography has affected the recent history of Ireland. Under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 Ireland was divided into two parts, but this did not meet with the approval of the Republicans of the South, so that fresh arrangements were made in December, 1921, and in January, 1922, and Ireland, which is still an integral part of the British Empire, is now divided into Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State.

Nothing resembling the English industrial revolution could from the nature of the case take place in Ireland. The free trade with Great Britain, which was a necessary part of the Union, was of considerable advantage to Irish agriculture, in which must be specially mentioned flax-growing, for which the moist climate is suitable. And Ireland of course benefited also by the facility of transport resulting from railways. But a land which has no iron or coal really worth the cost of working cannot become a manufacturing country, unless totally new industrial conditions should arise. Belfast, indeed, has succeeded in developing a great business in iron shipbuilding, for which both iron and coal have to be imported ; but this was only possible through exceptional energy overcoming the natural disadvantages. And prosperous as Belfast is, its population does not reach

390,000: it ranks only tenth among the cities of the United Kingdom.

But for Belfast and its neighbouring towns in the little Scotland beyond the Irish Sea, geography would have made Ireland a land of one great city. Dublin by its position opposite the natural route from England, at the opening to the central plain of the island, within fairly easy reach of all parts, naturally tends to concentrate in itself the business, the commerce, the administration of the whole island. Some of the southern towns, notably Cork and Waterford, export a certain amount of agricultural produce, the only wealth which Ireland has by nature. But the total of their trade falls far below that of Dublin. Yet so poor is Ireland, through its climate and lack of minerals, that the population of Dublin, with all its advantages over other towns, does not quite reach 305,000.

§ 8. ISLE OF MAN AND CHANNEL ISLANDS

The Isle of Man is one of those anomalies which would be scarcely possible except in a realm which has grown up gradually during many centuries, and has always avoided breaking unnecessarily with the past. Equidistant, or nearly so, from England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, it has never been a part of either. Its allegiance belongs geographically to none of them, though all may be seen from its mountain centre, the only spot of which this can be said. In point of race and language it is most nearly akin to Ireland. Its institutions came through Scotland, from the Norsemen who long held as conquerors the adjoining islands. Its modern interests connect it entirely with England, since it serves as a health resort for the dense population of Lancashire.

The original inhabitants were, so far as there is any evidence, Goidelic; and the Manx language, which is not yet extinct, is consequently akin to Erse and Gaelic. There is no trace of Brythons or Angles having interfered with Man: but in the ninth century Norse rovers made themselves masters of the island, which was afterwards incorporated, along with the Scotch islands, in the dominions of the king of Norway. From the Norsemen, who seem to have been no more

than a small minority, though dominant, were derived the forms of the Manx Government which are still maintained. A memorial of the connection with the Scotch islands is still preserved in the title of the bishop, though he himself is a suffragan of the province of York. The diocese includes nothing but the one island, but it is called Sodor and Man, the former word being a corruption of Sudrey, the southern half of the vast group of islands which once obeyed the king of Norway.

The Norwegian power in the islands was broken in 1263 by the victory at Largs of Alexander III. of Scotland, and Man passed for a time into his hands, and subsequently fell under the overlordship of England. More than one noble English house were at least titularly lords of Man. The last, and by far the most permanent, the Stanleys, were put in possession by Henry IV. As belonging to the earls of Derby it was mixed up in the English civil war, as readers of *Peveril of the Peak* will remember. In 1736, on the extinction of the elder male line of the Stanleys, Man passed by inheritance through females to the duke of Atholl, from whose representatives the crown purchased it a little later. It has never, however, been incorporated with either of the united kingdoms, and retains a separate and highly anomalous constitutional position. Its affairs come under the ken of the Home Secretary, as if it were a part of England, but no Act of Parliament affects Man, unless it is expressly mentioned. Otherwise it is governed by its own laws and customs, and it has its own ancient legislature. The governor represents the crown: his council of official dignitaries corresponds rather to the council of the Norman kings of England than to the modern House of Lords, and there is an elective lower chamber called the House of Keys. And to keep alive the memory of the Norse origin of the government, no laws take effect, even after the royal assent has been given, until they have been orally proclaimed, in Manx as well as in English, from the traditional Tynwald hill.

The Isle of Man is about as large as Middlesex, with a hilly backbone, rising in one place to over 2,000 feet. The Norse name of its highest point, Snaefell, seems to suggest

that the Goidels, who can hardly have failed to give it a name, were kept in very decided subjection by their Norse conquerors. Douglas, the capital, is the only town which approaches 21,000 inhabitants, but the total population of 60,000 is about as dense as in England, if the great industrial centres be excluded from the calculation.

The Channel Islands are geographically a part of France, from which they are distant thirty miles or less. Historically they form part of the duchy of Normandy, and of course were included in the entire dominions of the dukes after the Norman conquest. It was doubtless due to the naval strength of England, which the early kings of France had nothing to match, small as it was, that the islands did not share the fate of the duchy when Philip II. of France conquered it from John. Naturally enough the French have made several attempts to seize these islands, both in the Hundred Years' war, and also in the war of American independence, but never with more than ephemeral success. As possessions of the crown in proximity to England, yet not included in the realm, they were often of value to the king, especially when he was at variance with the people. They stood up manfully for Charles I. in the civil war ; they served Charles II. for securing prisoners whom he wished to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the English law courts and the English Parliament. It is now, however, fully established that the king's writ runs in the Channel Islands, and also that an Act of Parliament is binding on the Channel Islands if expressly so provided in the Act itself, though not otherwise.

Though the circumstances under which the Channel Islands became dominions of the English crown are very different from those relating to the Isle of Man, there is in other respects a close similarity. In race and language the Channel Islands are not English: the tongue of their Norman ancestors is even more generally spoken than Manx in its native home. They are included in an English diocese, Winchester, as Man is in the province of York. Subject to exceptions made by the overruling authority of Parliament, they are governed by their own laws and customs, which have been little altered

since they were severed from the duchy of Normandy ; and they have their own legislative assemblies, one in Jersey, and one in Guernsey for itself and the lesser islands.

The total area being only seventy-five square miles, the largest of the islands is but small. Still Jersey and Guernsey are considerably larger than the others, and contain most of the inhabitants. The population is dense, falling little short of 91,000 ; and this may easily be accounted for. The soil is fertile, and the climate good ; and the people, being almost exempt from British taxation, have great commercial advantages. Under such conditions it is easy to be loyal and contented: but something may also be attributed to their having been left to themselves. English policy has always tended towards allowing the dominions beyond sea to manage their own affairs, as far as was consistent with the welfare of the whole empire. And the Channel Islands, where first by some centuries this policy was acted on, consciously or unconsciously, form a striking illustration of its success.

Part III

THE STEPPING-STONES

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY

THE detached places belonging to England in many parts of the world, which are here collected under a general heading, were all acquired directly or indirectly for commercial reasons. Some were actual trading settlements, which we established ourselves, or conquered from prior possessors by virtue of superior naval strength. Others were occupied as ports of call, being on the line of great trade routes, and have become more necessary than ever as coaling-stations. Others have been acquired by deliberate political action, the government wanting bases for naval operations, whether for the protection of trade against legitimate enemies or against local piracy, or for the defence of other commercial interests. One of the former stepping-stones, not included here, has lost much of its original value for this purpose, but has developed into the vast domain of south Africa. Most of them, however, have little or no room for such expansion.

Many are for obvious reasons islands, even if close to the shore. Islands are not accessible to hostile attack except by a regular naval expedition, which is a hazardous thing for an enemy who does not command the sea. They are usually healthier than posts on the mainland in the same region, no slight consideration within the tropics, where white men always live at some disadvantage. They are equally convenient as ports of call, assuming that, by importation if not by natural production, they can supply the

needs of passing ships. Practically, however, the nation which wants such a place must take what it can get; and whether by good fortune or good judgement, Great Britain has fared very well.

It is said sometimes that these isolated spots are a source of weakness, and not of strength; we cannot protect them all except by expending on each far more than it is worth. And the alarmists point to West Indian islands lost during the wars of the eighteenth century. They might look a little further and see all, and much more than all, which had been lost, easily regained in the last of those wars, when we were again supreme at sea. It may be admitted that an enemy could, if he thought it worth while, organise an expedition to seize any stepping-stone which was not fortified and garrisoned to stand a fairly long siege. And it may be conceded also that our government might make a mistake, and think a given place less worthy of adequate defence than it really is. But an enemy who threw his energies into expeditions of this sort, like one who devoted himself to *guerre de course,* would be really playing our game; he would only be weakening his fighting strength at the vital point. Nor could he continue to hold them without a permanent superiority at sea. War in the future, however, is to be the rare exception, and peace is to be the rule. In war time these spots are essential as coaling-stations for a fighting fleet. In peace they serve the needs of the commercial navies of all the world.

These stepping-stones are here arranged in a geographical order, which also is in some sense historical. It was on the route to the east that ships had a real need for ports of call. To cross the Atlantic to America was a comparatively short distance, and in that direction there were no isolated spots to occupy, save indeed Bermuda. The islands which mark the first stage of the voyage to the Indies, such as the Canaries, had been occupied by Spain or Portugal before the Cape route was opened. And somehow it never seems to have occurred to the English government in our most aggressive days, to aim at acquiring any of them. Hence our nearest stepping-stone on this line is beyond the equator

and has in fact become of little consequence with the development of steam traffic. On the other, the Mediterranean way to the east, which has always retained something of its mediæval importance, in spite of there not being a continuous sea-passage until recently, the line of English ports begins much nearer home. The two great Mediterranean fortresses, Gibraltar and Malta, were not, it is true, acquired for the protection of trade with the east. But the opening of the Suez Canal having revolutionised ocean commerce, they now form the first two links in a chain of ports which extends to the farthest east.

The direct route for all trade with India, China, Australia, the eastern and southern seas generally, now passing through the Mediterranean, the line of stepping-stones along it is placed first, then those along the ancient but now subordinate route which goes round the Cape of Good Hope. Then follow Ceylon, which must be passed for any access to the Bay of Bengal, with the other places beyond it leading to the edge of the Pacific. Lastly come the few which lie in other quarters. It may at a future time, when the Panama Canal has justified its existence, appear as if the West Indies, and especially Jamaica, ought to be classed as stepping-stones for assisting the vast ocean commerce which will then pass between the Atlantic and the Pacific. To adopt this arrangement now would be untrue to history. The West Indian islands were acquired for their own sake, in days when their produce was of far greater relative importance than at present. They find their place in the historical geography of the empire, as one of the regions in which English colonising and commercial energy has been longest displayed, in which our rising naval superiority was employed to make fresh acquisitions with a persistency which may now be thought to have been shortsighted, but which was in full accord with our interests as understood before the horizon had extended itself indefinitely.

§ 2. GIBRALTAR

The rock of Gibraltar is not actually on the straits which bear its name. A few miles east of the southern point of Spain a bay is formed by a promontory some four miles long, and from half to three-quarters of a mile wide, projecting southwards. The famous rock occupies the southern part of this peninsula, extending more than two miles, and rising steeply on all sides but the west. On this side there is just room for a small town extending along the bay, which has cost much trouble to render fairly salubrious. The formation being limestone, it has not been difficult to excavate galleries for the guns out of the live rock. The fortress, properly so called, is consequently proof against any attack; but the town and dockyard are within reach of modern heavy artillery, not merely from the isthmus where Spanish territory begins, but also from the opposite side of the bay.

Gibraltar was captured by an English fleet in 1704, during the war of the Spanish succession, and was formally ceded to England at the Peace of Utrecht. It was from a military point of view a most valuable acquisition, and one of the few rewards for our great efforts during the war. Naturally it entailed the enmity of Spain, as appeared repeatedly during the eighteenth century. In 1779, when half the world united against England in the war of American independence, combined French and Spanish forces laid siege to Gibraltar by land and sea. The little garrison was reduced to great straits, but twice English squadrons, which the besieging vessels would not face, brought ample relief, and Gibraltar was as formidable as ever when peace was signed more than three years and a half later. Indeed, the successful issue of this siege contributed almost as much as Rodney's naval victory in the West Indies to prove to our enemies that England's sun was not set because we had lost our American colonies.

Gibraltar does not command the straits, in the sense that its guns can fire across. The distance from the south end of the promontory to the nearest point in Africa is about fourteen

miles, whereas the shortest distance across, some miles further west, is little more than half as far. As an impregnable fortress placed so near to the actual straits, however, it commands them in a military sense, and gives England a strong position in the Mediterranean. Its value in war time was very thoroughly exemplified not many years after the famous siege. All through the wars of the French Revolution Great Britain kept a fleet in the western Mediterranean, which in many ways was effective against France. The great victory of the Nile was the most striking blow, but the steady watch on the great French naval harbour of Toulon was perhaps more important. And this certainly could not have been maintained unless we had possessed in Gibraltar a naval base where ships might go to refit, and a centre of intelligence, though the fleet off Toulon had a nearer base where supplies could be accumulated on the friendly island of Sardinia. If a French fleet came out of Toulon unseen, as thanks to the weather happened more than once, it could not pass Gibraltar into the Atlantic without being observed from the fortress, though its guns a century ago had not range sufficient even to trouble an enemy's passage. In the decisive Trafalgar campaign, unless England had held Gibraltar, it is possible that Napoleon's great combination, which was intended to give him temporary command of the English Channel, might have been completed, in which case the invasion of England must have followed. Nelson's judgement and perseverance saved England from this risk, and greatly contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon ; but even Nelson might have been misled but for Gibraltar. We are so familiar with instantaneous communication by wireless telegraphy that we are slow to recognise how priceless was a secure base of information in the days before steam and electricity were in use.

Though the military importance of Gibraltar has been so great in the past, and may perhaps be equally great in the future by the aid of long-range guns and wireless telegraphy, it is by no means without value in peace time. It is a coaling-station and port of call for the countless ships that pass in and out of the Mediterranean ; and as a free port it has not

a little commerce of its own. The town contains less than 18,000 inhabitants besides the garrison, whose main business naturally is the supplying the wants of passing ships. Partly for military reasons, partly because the space is so limited, no foreigners are allowed to settle in Gibraltar without special permission, and thus the town is prevented from growing too large.

Extensive additions to the harbour have recently been completed, and the docks are now considered adequate for naval purposes, being able to accommodate the largest battleships in the British navy. There is not, however, room within it for the enormous number of ships (in 1917, 5,298) who call in passing, many of which take in coal. Thus the commercial accommodation is very defective, and the naval demands are likely rather to increase than to diminish, seeing that the harbour of Malta, owing to the natural formation, is incapable of enlargement. Moreover, the whole western side of the rock is, as has been mentioned above, within reach of artillery from the other side of the bay. Hence the time may come when it will be necessary to face the great expense of constructing an entirely new artificial harbour on the eastern side, which if constructed will be within range from a minute portion of Spanish territory only.

§ 3. MALTA

Malta is a small island to the south of Sicily, so placed as to command the comparatively narrow passage from the eastern to the western Mediterranean, between the west end of Sicily and Cape Bon, near Tunis. The possession of it is essential, if England is to remain a great naval power in the Mediterranean. This has been her settled policy for more than a century; and the cutting of the Suez canal, followed by the occupation of Egypt, render it less than ever likely that this policy will be abandoned.

Malta is about two-thirds of the size of the Isle of Wight, and is thickly inhabited by a people which, apart from the English officials and other residents, is a mixture of many races, as might be expected from its geographical position.

Speaking generally, Malta followed the fortunes of Sicily down to the sixteenth century. That is to say, whoever the primitive population may have been, there were Greek settlers there probably 700 years B.C. When Carthage rose to greatness and began to colonise in Sicily, she occupied Malta also; and when Carthage fell before Rome Malta passed into the possession of the conquerors. Under the Roman empire Malta throve greatly, so much so as to furnish an argument against its having been the Melita where St. Paul was shipwrecked. The whole narrative in the *Acts of the Apostles* implies, it is said, that the inhabitants were what they are there called, "barbarous people." The other evidence, however, favours the common belief, though the fact that a spot near the north end of the island is named St. Paul's Bay proves only the existence of the tradition.

With the rise of the Arab power came another vicissitude: the natives, who deemed themselves oppressed by the eastern empire, rose in 870 and invited in their Moorish neighbours from the mainland of Africa. These in their turn were expelled by the Normans some two centuries later, again with the goodwill of the people, who seem always to have had a will of their own, and a way of expressing it forcibly. Ultimately Malta passed with Sicily under the dominion of the kings of Aragon, who being at a distance allowed them pretty much to govern themselves.

It will readily be understood from this sketch of the history that the population comprises many and diverse elements; and the language known as Maltese is almost equally compound. At bottom it is a dialect of Arabic, the people having apparently adopted the language of their rulers during the Moorish occupation, though they did not abandon Christianity. There is, however, a great admixture of foreign words, Italian naturally predominating. The educated classes speak Italian; and there has been from time to time, under British rule, some agitation in the direction of Italian nationality. To call Malta a part of *Italia irredenta* is, however, historically untrue. It has always since the division of the Roman empire been under alien

government, unless the Norman kings of Sicily can be called Italian. Nor, as has already been stated, is Italian the language of the bulk of the people. From the geographical point of view, all that can be said is that Malta is nearer to Sicily than to Africa. The proximity is not so marked that it obviously belongs to the nearest land : indeed, as a matter of fact, it was in past times disputed whether Malta belonged to Europe or to Africa. Technically it is now held by British law to be in Europe, but only by a statute passed in 1876, and the question was at one juncture of some constitutional importance. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 Mr. Disraeli, then in power in England, brought Indian troops to Malta ; and it was urged that to do this without consent of Parliament was a breach of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Disraeli had only to admit the illegality, and Parliament would have instantly ratified what had from the nature of the case been done without consulting it. He chose however to deny that the act was illegal, and his party majority naturally agreed with him, after a rather confused debate, in which the weight of argument was with the Opposition.

The real historical importance of Malta began in 1530, when the emperor Charles V. gave it to the knights of St. John, who had recently been compelled by the Turks to surrender their former stronghold in Rhodes. In the hands of the knights it became a fortress which repelled more than one siege by the Turks ; but in the eighteenth century, as the power of their old enemies decayed, the order of St. John also became effete. In 1798, when the French fleet conveying Napoleon's army to Egypt appeared before the island, the knights surrendered without striking a blow. The French occupation was however brief ; the battle of the Nile just afterwards shattered French naval power in the Mediterranean, and the inhabitants, who had been oppressed by the knights and had no love for the French, rose and blockaded the garrison. With the assistance of the British fleet they compelled it to capitulate, and placed the island under English protection. Thus it was in our hands when the Peace of Amiens was signed, by which it was stipulated that the knights should be restored. The arrangements for doing

this were far from complete, when Napoleon's persistent aggressions elsewhere led to a renewal of the war, and the British government kept their hold on Malta. Whether they had ever cherished any secret design of keeping it in defiance of the treaty, as Napoleon affirmed, cannot be known; certainly his conduct amply justified theirs. On the fall of Napoleon, when the conditions of a general peace were arranged, Malta was definitely assigned to England, to the great joy of the inhabitants, and has remained peaceably English ever since. Its history since then has been altogether uneventful, except that it furnished during the Crimean war a convenient station for reserve troops which might be wanted at the front, and during the recent war it served as a hospital base.

The chief town, Valletta, derives its name from the grand master of the knights at the time of the great siege in 1565. It has an admirable double harbour, which is strongly fortified, and contains a dockyard for the convenience of the Mediterranean fleet. The only drawback is that nature has fixed the dimensions of the harbour, which is hardly large enough for the needs of its position, seeing that it is not only a naval station, but a port of call for the ever-increasing number of ships that pass through the Suez canal. Whether in face of the vast range of modern naval guns, its defences are adequate, is a question which can only be solved by experience. The theory always has been that Malta, properly garrisoned and supplied, is impregnable, and may therefore be regarded as a support to the fleet and a refuge in case of need, instead of requiring protection from it.

The climate of Malta is not very healthy, and its prosperity mainly depends on its being a port of call for a large proportion of the ships, both passenger and cargo, which pass through the Mediterranean on their way to and from the east. The soil is carefully cultivated, and very productive considering how rocky it is: but the people would fare ill if they were entirely dependent on the resources of the island itself. Such produce as it can export goes largely to London, but the total amount of its trade, including imports of coal

and stores for the supply of ships and for the garrison, does not exceed one-tenth of the transit trade. Thus it has no more close connection with Italy commercially than historically.

Malta is very densely populated in proportion to its size: the estimated civil population of the whole group of islands in 1922 was about 218,000. Hence a certain number of Maltese are to be found in neighbouring countries, chiefly in the seaports.

So important a military station is necessarily governed, to a certain extent, in accordance with the needs of the empire. The council, however, which assists the governor, and has for most purposes legislative authority, is partly elective.

Gozo, an island of about one-quarter of the size of Malta, closely adjoining it on the north-west, is a necessary appendage to Malta, but has no other interest. There are several other islets belonging to the group, some of which have not even names. The total area of land in them all is 117 square miles, of which Malta has more than three-quarters.

§ 4. CYPRUS

Cyprus is the only British possession which was of importance in the times of classical antiquity, the only one which links itself, even ephemerally, with a long-distant era in our own history. Until November, 1914, we held it on lease from the Turkish sultan, and the bulk of its inhabitants were technically his subjects.

The history of Cyprus as a civilised country dates back to a period when the inhabitants of Britain were little better than savages, whose bare existence was unknown to the Greek world. As its geographical position seems almost to require, it has been first a battleground of rival races, and then a dependency of one great empire after another. Both Phœnicians and Greeks settled on its shores, and it was only after the Phœnician power had faded away that it became decidedly Greek. It had, however, no share in the brief

splendour of Greek political life, having fallen under the sway of Persia long before the battle of Marathon. In the more material aspect of Greek civilisation, Cyprus flourished greatly during the century before Alexander the Great, and welcomed his overthrow of the Persian monarchy. When the empire of Alexander broke to pieces after his death, Cyprus fell ultimately to Egypt, and was acquired by Rome as the conqueror and heir of the Ptolemies. If the incidental references in classical authors can be trusted, Cyprus was once teeming with population, and a very garden for fertility. The climatic conditions, which as will be seen are permanent, compel us to regard all this as decidedly exaggerated; but there can be no reasonable doubt that Cyprus, say in the days when St. Paul preached there, was far richer and more thickly inhabited than at present. In particular its copper mines—our name for the metal is derived from the word Cyprus—were a source of considerable wealth, though they were so far exhausted in Roman times that they have never since been worked to any profit.

At the division of the Roman empire Cyprus naturally formed part of the eastern half, and though the Arabs, who plundered or settled, or both, all over the Mediterranean, obtained temporary possession, the island was still in Byzantine hands at the time of the third crusade. When Richard Cœur-de-Lion reached Cyprus on his way to Palestine, a successful rebel against the eastern emperor had himself assumed the imperial title. His treacherous conduct virtually compelled Richard to overthrow him, and take temporary possession of the island: and there Richard was married to his queen Berengaria of Navarre. Richard had apparently never thought of retaining Cyprus for himself, and soon handed it over to Guy of Lusignan, titular king of Jerusalem. The house of Lusignan continued to reign over Cyprus for nearly three centuries, till in 1488 it passed into the power of Venice through the agency of Catharine Cornaro, widow of the last Lusignan, herself of Venetian birth.

In 1570 the Ottoman Turks conquered the island, and soon destroyed nearly every vestige of its former prosperity, as the Turks did elsewhere. Much has been done since the British

occupation began, but the effects of three centuries of neglect and misrule will take a very long time to efface.

Up to 1914 Cyprus stood alone among British possessions, except Wei-hai-Wei in the far east, as to the mode and purpose of its acquisition. It was not a colony nor a trading settlement: it was not even a spot occupied, like Aden, for the convenience and protection of our commerce. It was taken over solely on political grounds, and there have never been wanting persons to deny the soundness of the policy, and the value of Cyprus as a means of furthering it. At the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8, Great Britain agreed by a treaty to defend the sultan against further aggression on certain conditions. One of these, the only one which the sultan carried out, was that he should hand over Cyprus to England, to be held until Russia should give back her conquests made in the recent war. As nothing was less likely than that Russia should do anything of the sort, the transaction virtually amounted to a cession of the island, though the formal suzerainty of the sultan still remained. When Great Britain became involved in the war with Turkey in 1914 the Government thought it necessary for the protection of British interests to annex Cyprus by Order in Council (November 5), a step which abolished the anomalous tenure devised in 1878.

Cyprus is situated in the farthest corner of the eastern Mediterranean, its northern side being about sixty miles from the coast of Asia Minor, its eastern point some forty miles from the nearest place in Syria. The distance to Port Said at the mouth of the Suez canal is 240 miles, so that it is not favourably placed for protecting that important point in case of war. Nor is it a link in the chain of places connecting the entrance of the Mediterranean with the Suez canal. The distance from Malta to Cyprus is rather greater than to Port Said. The only thing which could render Cyprus politically valuable to Great Britain is a first-rate harbour, and that it emphatically does not possess. Its ports are little better than open roadsteads, and the gently sloping shores would render it scarcely possible to construct a good artificial harbour. Moreover, Cyprus is not on the

track of commerce, so that it could never have even a fraction of the importance, as a place of call, which Malta enjoys.

The area of Cyprus is about 3,500 square miles, or nearly half the size of Wales. Along the north side runs a continuous chain of not very high mountains; and a much loftier mountain mass occupies the west and south of the island. Between them, extending right across from sea to sea, is a strip of plain. An island of this formation and size has naturally but short and rapid streams; and neglect during Turkish times has allowed some of these to be choked, forming malarial marshes. Similarly the reckless destruction of trees on the mountain slopes has allowed much of the soil to be washed away from them, an injury which will take some generations to repair.

The worst evil from which Cyprus suffers is drought, and this is due partly to its structure, partly to its proximity to Asia Minor. The northern mountains intercept the rain clouds that succeed in passing the coast range of Mount Taurus, and most of the rain clouds that reach the southern group across the Mediterranean naturally discharge themselves on the same side. Hence the central plain is but ill watered at best, though it was better supplied when the mountain slopes were still clothed with forest. Nevertheless the natural qualities of the soil make this region very productive whenever there is no exceptional drought. Wine, if not the most valuable, is the most plentiful of its products: indeed the wine of Cyprus was famous for its strength throughout classical times.

The chief town of Cyprus, Nicosia, is situated on the central plain, and dates only from the later Middle Ages. The other towns, like those of antiquity, are on the coast. Larnaca and Limassol are on the south, the former representing an early Phœnician town, the latter, which has the best apology for a harbour, the ancient Greek Amathus. Famagusta, the capital during the Middle Ages, which is on the east coast, has fallen into decay. It was built near the site of Salamis, the most noted of the Greek cities, which was, or was supposed to be, a colony from the little island opposite Athens.

The population of Cyprus has risen considerably under British rule, and is now about 311,000. Of these the large majority are Greek Christians, and more or less of Greek race; but about a quarter are Mohammedans.

The government of Cyprus is carried on by a High Commissioner, who has the usual powers of the governor of a crown colony; but two-thirds of his council are elected by the inhabitants, who thus enjoy a certain *modicum* of self-government. The island is divided into three electoral districts, each returning one Mohammedan and three Christian members. Besides the ordinary courts there is a Supreme Court consisting of two English judges.

§ 5. ADEN, ETC.

Aden is situated on the coast of Arabia, about 100 miles east of the Straits of Babelmandeb, the entrance to the Red Sea. From remote antiquity it was a place of considerable trade, being on the chief route by which the luxuries of the east reached the Mediterranean. The discovery of the Cape way to India dealt a severe blow to the prosperity of Aden, from which it did not recover till it passed into British hands. Then the adoption of what used to be known as the overland route to India (crossing Egypt from Alexandria to Suez), followed by the cutting of the Suez canal, made Aden a place of supreme commercial and political importance. It was seized by a force from Bombay in 1839, the local potentate who had contracted to part with it, and against whom the Indian government had various grievances, refusing to fulfil his bargain. Since then additional portions of land have been purchased, partly to secure water-supply, so that the total area is about seventy-five square miles.

The town of Aden is on a little peninsula of volcanic formation, enclosing a bay which affords a commodious harbour. It is now well fortified, and is a coaling-station on the largest scale; indeed it shares with Singapore the significant nickname of "coal-hole of the East." Evidence of the ancient importance of Aden is afforded by the elaborate wroks constructed, it is said as early as A.D. 600, to

compensate for the lack of springs of water. The population is now over 56,000, practically all Arabs except the English garrison. It has of late years become an emporium for the commerce of all southern Arabia, and has in this way a very large trade, independent of its special function as a coaling-station.

Aden has been made by law a part of India, and is under the government of Bombay: it is obviously for the sake of communication with India that it is of so great value to England. Included in the same administration is the small island of Perim, in the mouth of the Straits of Babelmandeb, which was occupied in 1857, and is also legally part of India. The Kuria Muria islands, further to the east along the coast of Arabia, were acquired for the purpose of laying a telegraph cable, and are governed from Aden; they are valuable for guano.

Closely connected with Aden are the British protectorates over Socotra and Somaliland, both of which belong to Africa. The island of Socotra is off Cape Guardafui, and is said to have an area of nearly 1,400 square miles. It is very thickly populated, but of little commercial value. Its importance to England is largely negative; in hostile hands it might become a danger to Aden, and to our eastern trade generally.

British Somaliland lies along the northern shore of the eastern portion of Africa, which terminates in Cape Guardafui. It thus is directly opposite Aden, on the Arabian coast. Its limit on the east is the forty-ninth meridian of east longitude, beyond which is the Italian protectorate. On the west it is bounded by French Somaliland. On the interior it has a frontier with Abyssinia, which was defined by treaty in 1897. The area of the British protectorate is given at 68,000 square miles; but the country, which is inhabited by Mohammedan tribes very little civilised, is imperfectly known. Berbera, on the coast, is the only town of importance.

The tendency of European protectorates over less civilised peoples to grow into effective dominion seems likely to be illustrated in Somaliland, as has been the case many times before in the history of the British empire. The rise of a native chief who through ambition or fanaticism is discontented

with his ambiguous position, and strives to expel the foreigners, leads to violence on his part, followed by military chastisement. It may safely be said that Great Britain has no motive for increasing her responsibilities, by taking over the direct government of Somaliland; but the time may come when the only alternative is to abandon the protectorate, and this our commercial interests in the Red Sea, and our interest for the sake of Egypt in establishing permanent relations with Abyssinia, would seem to forbid.

The protectorate of Somaliland, which is administered by a consul-general, was originally, like Aden, under the government of India, but was transferred to the Foreign Office in 1898, and to the Colonial Office in 1905.

§ 6. ST. HELENA, ETC.

St. Helena is an island more famous than important. Everyone has heard of it as the prison of Napoleon; comparatively few know anything more about it, or have need to know. It lies in the southern Atlantic, in about 16° south latitude, which is not far from the northern limit of British south Africa. It is reckoned as belonging to Africa, but it is 1,200 miles from the African coast, and only 2,000 from the nearest point in Brazil. So tiny a spot could only serve one purpose, unless it had chanced to possess great mineral wealth. It is an obvious place of call for ships, and as it happens to lie in the line of the south-eastern trade winds, it was early discovered by Portuguese navigators returning from the East Indies. For the same reason it is not in the course of sailing ships on their way from Europe to the east, and consequently had only a one-sided value. The Portuguese never settled the island, being content to call at the Cape of Good Hope. Thus when the English East India Company, in the middle of the seventeenth century, wanted a port of call, they found St. Helena unoccupied. A charter of Charles II. gave the company full ownership and jurisdiction, subject to the supremacy of the crown, and so matters stood until 1833, when the island was transferred to the crown. Slavery was introduced there as everywhere outside Europe, but not on a large scale, thanks to there being

no sugar-growing or similar tropical industry. Hence it was abolished without difficulty when the time came.

The only important event in the history of St. Helena is its having been selected as the place where the fallen Napoleon should be imprisoned, and for this purpose no better spot could have been chosen. He had not the self-control to accept the situation with dignity, but incessantly complained of everything in his surroundings; and his partisans did not scruple to persist in the atrocious lie that he was deliberately sent to a pestilential place in order that he might soon die. As a matter of fact, St. Helena is about the healthiest place within the tropics, as the trade wind ever blowing keeps the air always fresh and comparatively cool. The formation is volcanic, and the hills rise to a great height for so small an island—forty-seven square miles, or (say) a third of the size of the Isle of Wight. It has no good harbour, only an open roadstead on the sheltered side of the island; and now that ocean navigation is practically all by steam, comparatively few vessels touch at a place which has no valuable produce of its own. During Napoleon's captivity it had of course a large garrison, but the last imperial troops have now been withdrawn. The population, never large, is steadily dwindling, and is now little over 3,500. St. Helena is used as a coaling-station for the navy, and circumstances can be imagined which would render it extremely valuable, at any rate in the sense that it might be important to the British empire that it should not become a fortified coaling-station in hostile hands. This however is a contingency, and dependent on the course of politics. Its natural prosperity ended with sailing ships.

The still smaller island of Ascension, 760 miles north-west of St. Helena, was occupied in 1815, in order that it might not be used as a base for attempts to rescue Napoleon. It is in the exceptional position of being under the British Admiralty. Like St. Helena, it is volcanic and mountainous, and remarkably healthy; indeed, it is used as a naval sanatorium, as well as being a fortified coaling and victualling station for the fleet. The drawbacks of scarcity of water and absence of any good landing-place are hardly

compensated by Ascension island being a great place for turtle.

The tiny islands of Tristan da Cunha were occupied for the same reason as Ascension. They lie almost in a line from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Horn, about one-third of the way from the former. It is scarcely conceivable that they should now serve any purpose except as a place where vessels damaged in the stormy southern ocean may obtain assistance.

§ 7. MAURITIUS, ETC.

The island of Mauritius is situated about 500 miles east of Madagascar, in latitude 20° south, and is thus directly on the way from the Cape to India. Its name, which is derived from prince Maurice of Nassau, stadtholder of the Netherlands, is rather deceptive, for the Dutch were not the first discoverers, and they made no settlement on the island till more than forty years after conferring the name. The Dutch occupation, moreover, lasted little over half a century: it was the French who gave the island its history, though in their hands it bore the vague name of Ile de France.

The French in Mauritius proved real colonists, making the island their home like the English in Barbados, instead of merely a place for temporary sojourn, as Europeans tend to do in the tropics. It was however much more than a place of trade; it was for a short time the base of operations, so to speak, for French aspirations after dominion in India. If Labourdonnais, the able governor of Mauritius, had succeeded in acting thoroughly in concert with Dupleix, supremacy in India might possibly have fallen to France instead of to England. Dupleix, however, was one of those men who must do things in their own way or not at all; partly through his jealousy Labourdonnais was recalled and disgraced. Nevertheless Mauritius continued to grow in importance, both commercially and as a centre of privateering, and naval enterprise generally, against the rising power of England in the east. So vexatious were these privateers during the wars of the French Revolution that a strong expedition was sent from Bombay, which conquered the island in 1810; and at

the peace after the fall of Napoleon possession of it was confirmed to England.

The population at that date was under 100,000, and consisted almost entirely of French sugar planters and their slaves. The European residents are still mainly of French descent, and the English government has continued to administer French law. Since the English conquest, however, which was soon followed by the abolition of slavery, the conditions have changed enormously. The population has increased fourfold, but by the introduction of a new element. The emancipated slaves, who came mainly from Madagascar, did not multiply like the negroes in the West Indies, but have rather tended to disappear. Their place has been taken by Hindus, introduced to work in the sugar fields, who now form fully two-thirds of the population. Many of them have become small proprietors, and grow sugar on their own account.

The island is so completely given up to the cultivation of sugar that nearly everything has to be imported, so that its prosperity is precarious, depending entirely on the sugar market. Nevertheless, its position in the middle of the Indian Ocean, with the best harbour within many hundred miles, gives it a permanent importance, both for peace and for war. Mauritius is about equidistant from the Cape, Ceylon, and Aden, and is not very much further from West Australia.

The island has an area of about 700 square miles, with a dense population of 376,000, of whom very few are English except the garrison and the officials. It is hilly, save for a strip round the coast, and exceptionally beautiful in scenery, though the forests, which might have been a considerable source of wealth, have been wastefully diminished to make room for sugar. The climate is at best unhealthy, and it has been unfortunate in suffering from epidemics, as well as from hurricanes, but there are worse places. The capital, Port Louis, is a town of over 50,000 inhabitants, on the north-west of the island. Its harbour is good and sheltered, and in it centres nearly all the business.

Mauritius is governed as a crown colony, except that there

are ten elected members in the governor's council. This is what might be expected in an island where the great bulk of the population is not even of European descent, which is, or might be in case of war, a place of considerable military importance.

A good many small islands in the Indian Ocean are for administrative purposes dependent on Mauritius, though most of them are a long way off. Rodriguez, the nearest, is some 350 miles away to the ENE. Like Mauritius, it was first sighted by the Portuguese, was occupied by the French in the eighteenth century, and passed with Mauritius into English hands. The Seychelles islands, lying to the north, about half-way to Cape Guardafui, have also always shared the fate of Mauritius, but in September, 1903, were constituted a separate colony. One of the islands has a good harbour, which may give it importance as a coaling-station, and a good deal of vanilla is produced; but the chief value of Seychelles to England is negative, to ensure its not becoming a base for a hostile navy. The same holds good of the Chagos islands, a group of coral formation between Mauritius and Ceylon, which is also on the line from the Red Sea to Australia. The largest, Diego Garcia, has a spacious harbour, and is used as a coaling-station; otherwise these islands are only valuable as providing coconut-oil.

§ 8. CEYLON.

In geographical position, in ethnical and religious connection, Ceylon is a mere appendage of India. Indeed it is nearly joined to the mainland by the two little islands, with a long reef uniting them, which enclose the Gulf of Manaar, with its famous pearl fisheries. And the name of Adam's Bridge, given to this imperfect natural causeway, suggests that in the long-distant past the bridge may have been complete. Nevertheless, the history of Ceylon has been distinct from that of India since the early migrations, about which little more is known than the fact that they happened. And separate it remains to this day, though under the same sovereign. Ceylon is a crown colony, administered by the Colonial Office,

and is entirely outside the jurisdiction of the government of India.

The other conspicuous fact as to the geographical position of Ceylon tends to account for this separateness. Projecting to the south of the Indian peninsula, it lies on the way by which a vast amount of maritime trade must pass. Every ship going westwards from China, the spice islands, and the Bay of Bengal, every ship going eastwards from Arabia and Persia, and from the Red Sea and beyond—all must pass by Ceylon, and it therefore had every advantage as an emporium. The Indian races who peopled Ceylon have never been themselves maritime; but the island became during the Middle Ages a meeting-place for Chinese from the east and Arab traders from the west. The latter indeed have contributed an element to the population, and brought with them their creed; the famous mountain called Adam's Peak is a holy place for both Mohammedans and Buddhists.

It may perhaps be due to the same geographical fact that Ceylon was known by name to Europe from the time of Alexander the Great; geographers under the Roman empire had a correct general idea of its size and position. It was not, however, until the Portuguese reached India round the Cape of Good Hope that Europeans had any direct dealing with Ceylon, saving the visit of an occasional traveller like Marco Polo.

The bulk of the population of Ceylon are Singhalese, or Sinhalese, a people who migrated thither from northern India in the sixth century B.C., if the date can be trusted. Whether there are any traces of prior inhabitants is doubtful; the degraded Veddah tribes who dwell among the uncleared jungle may or may not be survivals of the primitive race. The Singhalese, who adopted the Buddhist faith, reached a very fair level of civilisation; to them are to be ascribed not only the magnificent Buddhist temples, but also enormous irrigation works, on which the fertility of Ceylon depended. These works, which fell into disuse and decay as the Singhalese power gradually was broken by foreign invaders, have been partially restored since the British occupation.

The other Indian element in the population of Ceylon is

considerably smaller than the Singhalese. Tamils from southern India began to make their way in before the Christian era, and ultimately occupied the northern part of the island, pushing the Singhalese further and further south. The Arabs also had obtained a footing on the coast. Thus the Singhalese monarchy, once powerful and in some sense highly civilised, was but a shadow of its former self when the Portuguese reached Ceylon in 1507.

The conditions were consequently favourable for the Portuguese, who in the course of the sixteenth century became masters of most part of Ceylon, though native princes still maintained their independence at Kandy, in the mountainous interior of the island. The first half of the seventeenth century saw the Dutch, everywhere the inveterate enemies of the Portuguese, oust them entirely from Ceylon, partly by the aid of the native kings of Kandy, who welcomed them as allies against the hated Portuguese. The Dutch shared exactly the fate of their predecessors. Before they had held Ceylon a century and a half they were deprived of it by the English, again to the great satisfaction of the kings of Kandy, who had not found the Dutch better neighbours than the Portuguese.

The only previous connection of England with Ceylon was a temporary occupation of the fine harbour of Trincomalee in 1782. At that date France and Holland had united against England in the war of American independence; and the English seized Trincomalee from one enemy in order to use it as a naval base against the other; for France was then making herself formidable in the Indian seas; but they restored it at the peace. Ceylon was captured by an English expedition in 1795, Holland having become a dependent ally of France after the Revolution, and has remained English ever since. Ceylon on one side of the world and Trinidad on the other were the only conquests which England retained at the Peace of Amiens; and it is in obvious accord with the essentially maritime character of her power that both were islands.

For the third time the king of Kandy found his new European neighbours not to his taste, but twenty years passed

before he was finally deposed, after having forfeited by his savage tyranny the support of his own people. During the interval Indian methods of administration had been found unsuitable, and Ceylon had been brought directly under the English crown. The present form of government, established in 1831, is that of a typical crown colony. The governor is assisted by a council consisting partly of officials, partly of representatives of different races and classes; but the latter are not chosen by popular election. Indeed, the whole circumstances of the colony are such as to render self-government in any shape inapplicable. The law under which Ceylon is governed is substantially the Roman-Dutch law which subsisted at the time of the English conquest; but the ancient native machinery of administration is for many purposes continued. Here, as elsewhere, we have forced the minimum of change upon new subjects, and have reaped our reward in a prosperous and contented population.

Ceylon is shaped very like a pear, with the stalk end at the north just detached from India, and a considerable mountain mass where the core would be. Its area is about 25,000 square miles, or two and a half times the size of Sicily, which it resembles in several respects. Like Sicily, it is quite close to the central peninsula projecting southwards from its continent, and it has mountains near its broader end, though the outline of its shores is very different. Like Sicily, it has been a meeting-place and battle-ground of divers races, while having had close early connection with the adjoining peninsula. Like Sicily also, it has settled down under the same ruler as the neighbouring mainland, though that ruler is not a native sovereign, but the head of a conquering nation at a distance.

Ceylon is so near the equator that but for the mountains it would be unendurably hot for Europeans; but the mountains, the highest of which exceeds 8,000 feet, make all the difference. High up among them is Nuraya Eliya, which serves, like Simla and Ootacamund, as a summer refuge for the government and for the English generally. Among the mountains is also Kandy, long the native capital. Indeed one may look far for a more apt illustration of the way in

which a mountain region may act as a refuge for a beaten race, and preserve it, at least for a while, from total loss of independence. For considerably more than three centuries, while one European nation after another dominated most part of the island, a native prince maintained himself in the mountainous core, and might have continued to do so much longer, had not the cruelties of the last king been so atrocious. On the other hand, the height of the mountains is answerable for the Ceylon streams being rapid in proportion to their necessarily short length, and therefore for the necessity of irrigation works in a great part of the island. It would seem also that the forest-clad hills, arresting and retaining the rain, account for the extraordinary damp of the wet season, which strikes every visitor to Ceylon so forcibly.

Thanks to the inequalities of the surface, Ceylon can produce nearly everything suited to hot climates. Cocoa is grown in the cleared portions of the level north, where a great part of the surface is still primitive jungle and forest. Coffee was the chief crop in the higher regions, but has of late years been superseded by tea. Indeed, the destruction of the coffee plantations thirty or forty years ago, by a disease which attacked the leaves, is the most important event in Ceylon history during the last two generations. Possibly it was a blessing in disguise, for the production of tea in Ceylon is enormously greater than the coffee crop used to be.

The population of Ceylon increased considerably during the nineteenth century, and is now over 4 millions. Of these two-thirds are Singhalese, nearly a million Tamils. The rest, excepting some 10,000 Europeans, and about twice as many descendants of the old Portuguese settlers blended with the native races, are officially called Moormen. These are the representatives of the Arabs who held the trade of Ceylon before the advent of the Portuguese. They are greatly mixed with Tamils, whose language they speak, but are classed apart because they are nearly all Mohammedans.

Ceylon possesses only one great town, Colombo, which has now a population of over 248,000. It is situated on the south-west of the island, the place to which ships from the west would naturally come, and has always been the capital

since European occupation began. Now that its rather defective harbour has been rendered secure by extensive works, Colombo almost monopolises the trade of Ceylon, to the detriment of Galle, close to the southern point of the island, which was long the port of call for passing vessels. The only other place which deserves mention is Trincomalee. This magnificent harbour is in the north-east, as far as possible out of the way of passing trade, and far also from the hill region, where the heat of the climate is moderated. It is consequently of no commercial account, and the naval station has now been practically abandoned, as unnecessary for the protection of the Bay of Bengal.

Dependent on Ceylon is the Maldive archipelago, which is situated about 400 miles to the westward. The Maldives are small coral islands, which extend in a line from north to south over seven degrees of latitude, from just south of the equator to about 7° north. They have acknowledged the supremacy of Ceylon since the beginning of the Dutch occupation; but neither Dutch nor English have interfered with the native inhabitants. The islands are neither healthy nor very fertile, and contain no valuable harbour. Thus, although they lie almost across the route from the Cape of Good Hope to India, they have never tempted Europeans, though they owe to the Arab traders of an earlier age their conversion to Mohammedanism. As being under British protection, they must be reckoned as part of the British empire, but we have no representative among them; we merely accept their homage, and allow them in Ceylon a market for their scanty produce.

§ 9. SINGAPORE

There is no spot in the British empire which is more emphatically a stepping-stone than Singapore: but the other territories which are administratively connected with it have no such character. Historically they are, some of them, appendages of India: over others a protectorate has arisen in the natural way, a civilised power having commercial relations with native peoples and teaching them the advantages of peace and order. At the time when the Straits settle-

ments, as the various British territories on the Malay peninsula are officially named, were erected into a separate colony, Burma, the northern part of the peninsula, had not yet been annexed. Else it is possible that they would have been left under the government of India, which had begun the acquisition. Certainly the varying interests of England in that region are most naturally classified in the same manner as the different parts, politically speaking, of the larger adjacent peninsula: there are direct possessions, vassal native states, and states merely under protection, being otherwise independent.

The Portuguese were the first of European nations to acquire any footing on the Malay peninsula, as in all other parts of the East Indies. So early as 1511 they occupied Malacca, on the western coast, a place which has long been eclipsed by the better-situated Singapore. During the sixteenth century the Portuguese were little disturbed by rival Europeans, but in 1640 Malacca was captured by the Dutch, who were already dominant in the islands, and remained in their hands for nearly two centuries. All through the seventeenth century there was continual rivalry between the Dutch and the English in the East Indies, which continued in a less acute form till the nineteenth. By a sort of natural selection the Dutch ultimately remained masters of the islands, while English enterprise was directed to the mainland of India, where it gradually built up a vast empire. The Dutch, who always aimed at commerce rather than dominion, cared little for anything outside the highly profitable spice trade: the English gradually abandoned all attempt to share it. Similarly at a later date the Dutch disappeared from the mainland of the Malay peninsula. Their settlement of Malacca was losing its trade to the more recent English town of Penang, and the foundation of Singapore was the final blow. In 1825 they gave up Malacca to England, who at the same time agreed to withdraw her few stations in Sumatra.

The English interest in the Malay peninsula only dates from 1786, when the East India Company purchased Penang, an island on the west coast, to which was added a few years

later a strip of the mainland opposite, which bears the name of Wellesley province. It was an obvious step towards acquiring naval control of the Bay of Bengal, and suppressing the piracy to which the Malays had always been addicted. Singapore, on an island at the extreme south of the peninsula, owes its foundation in 1819 to the wisdom of Sir Stamford Raffles, who saw that it had an ideal situation for a great emporium of trade. After the acquisition of Malacca the whole were combined into a single government, and in 1867, after the East India Company had ceased to rule India, the Straits Settlements were separated off from India and made a crown colony, Singapore being the capital. To it has accreted a regular protectorate over Perak and three other native states, which were federated in 1895 for the sake of uniformity in government, and a definite control over Johore, at the southern extremity of the peninsula, as arranged by agreement in 1914. Four other states, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantau, and Trengganu, not included in the federation, are also protected, administered, and controlled by Great Britain under the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909.

The Malays, who are Mohammedan in creed, are by far the most maritime of eastern peoples. As such they form the main population of the East Indian islands, and also of the long peninsula bearing their name, which is obviously easy of access at all points from the sea. They have taken kindly to the peace and order introduced by English control, but not to industrial pursuits. Malaya is so rich in tin as to furnish annually about two-thirds of the total quantity of that metal raised throughout the world, and this is a steady source of wealth to the native states. But the mining is nearly all done by Chinese immigrants, and other labour chiefly by Tamils from the other side of the Bay of Bengal, some of whom have of late taken also to mining.

The entire region controlled from Singapore has an area of about 50,000 square miles, with a total population of about a million and a half. The actual colonies, however, comprise only a thirtieth part of this area, though they furnish a third of the inhabitants, half of them concentrated in Singapore. Throughout the region, at least half of the inhabitants are Chinese, if people who, as a rule, return to their native land when they have earned enough, can be properly styled

inhabitants. They are especially numerous among the trading classes of Singapore itself, and the miners throughout the native states.

The map shows that all trade between China and Japan and India or Europe must pass through the Straits of Malacca; and as a matter of fact the best channel, which is also the shortest, lies close to the mainland, north of the islands which partly fill the space between it and Sumatra. Singapore, therefore, is the one place by which all the trade of the eastern seas must pass, and though it has not a good harbour, in the strict sense of the word, its roads are well protected by the islands to the southward. The wonder is not that it is prosperous, but that it was reserved for English eyes to see its advantages, and English energy to develop its opportunities, less than a century ago. Being on an island, it was easily secured against native attack in the early days, a possibility now long passed away; but it is fully fortified on the seaward side as one of the most important naval and coaling stations of the empire. The extent of its prosperity is best shown by the fact that in 1916 its aggregate trade returns, including inter-settlement trade, amounted to 1,030,600,000 dollars.

§ 10. HONG KONG

Hong Kong is an island of thirty-two square miles, situated in the mouth of the Canton river, and thus enclosing a very fine natural harbour. Many nations had tried to make trading settlements on the coast of China, but Chinese exclusiveness had been too strong, and the Portuguese alone had succeeded. English trade with China was naturally in the hands of the East India Company, and was confined to the port of Canton. Not long after the Company's commercial monopoly came to an end in 1834, troubles arose between England and China which led to war. The Chinese, always suspicious of foreigners, were violent and high-handed; at the same time they declared that the English traders exceeded their rights, especially in the matter of importing opium. The war ended in the cession to England of the island of Hong Kong (August, 1842), and the opening to English commerce of five ports, Shanghai being one, which have always been known as the treaty ports. The result has

been of great benefit to both parties. Since 1842 a great city has sprung up on the island, in which many scores of thousands of Chinese flourish under British rule. A piece of land on the mainland opposite was added in 1861, when China, as the result of another war with England and France, increased the number of treaty ports; and this acquisition has greatly facilitated good government in Hong Kong.

The advantages of Hong Kong as a commercial station are obviously great, as the map shows; it is centrally situated for the whole of the far east, and has accordingly become the centre of a vast trade, amounting to over twenty millions annually. The advantages to Great Britain of possessing such a station for the protection of her commercial interests are equally obvious. That its prosperity is in no way fictitious is evidenced by the steady rise in wealth and population. In 1842 the island had a few thousand scattered inhabitants; now the colony contains over 662,000 people, mainly concentrated in the city of Victoria, all of whom except about 15,000 are Chinese. The whites include representatives of nearly every nation in Europe, besides the English garrison.

Hong Kong is naturally a crown colony in the strictest sense, the governor's council consisting entirely of officials and nominated members. As the headquarters of the China squadron, the harbour has a large dockyard, and is fortified. It was for the purpose of securing the defence of Hong Kong that a considerable portion of further territory was taken over in 1898 on lease from the Chinese Government.

§ 11. WEI-HAI-WEI

Wei-hai-Wei, a comparatively recent addition to the British empire, is situated at the easternmost point of China, just inside the Gulf of Pechili. The jaws which enclose the gulf are formed, on the north by a piece of land projecting southwards from Manchuria, at the end of which is Port Arthur, on the south by a similar projection eastwards from the Chinese province of Shantung. In 1898, after Russia had taken possession of Port Arthur, the British government

obtained from China a lease of Wei-hai-Wei, situated just opposite Port Arthur. Russia having lost Port Arthur through the war with Japan in 1904–5, Wei-hai-Wei is no longer wanted as a base for checking, in case of need, Russian aggressions thence against China; but it serves also as a naval station in the far east for general purposes. Its geographical position from this point of view is excellent, better than that of Kiao-Chau, the port previously obtained by Germany, and lost by her in November, 1914. It can be, however, of very little military value unless it is adequately fortified and garrisoned. Fortifications under modern conditions need to be pushed a long way out from the point to be protected, and the greater the space enclosed, the larger the necessary garrison tends to be. If it is politically desirable to make of Wei-hai-Wei another Aden, or even another Hong Kong, the needful steps must be taken. At present it is a source rather of weakness than of strength; the fleet might protect it, but would thereby lose much of its mobility.

The territory in British occupation comprises, besides the town of Wei-hai-Wei and some small islands, a strip of land ten miles wide along the shore of the bay—285 square miles in all, with a population of about 150,000. The anchorage is good for commercial purposes, but not easy to protect against hostile attack. As is obviously necessary, English jurisdiction is supreme, and the administration is in the hands of a Commissioner; but the Chinese inhabitants are governed so far as possible by their own laws and officials.

No place included within the British empire, in the widest sense which can be given to that term, has so uncertain a future as Wei-hai-Wei. It may develop into another Hong Kong; it may be abandoned by us as not worth the trouble of keeping. And in the latter case it may or may not revert to the possession of China.

§ 12. BERMUDA

Bermuda, almost the earliest acquired of the British dominions beyond the sea, is the only island far from land in the western part of the north Atlantic. It is situated in 32° N., nearly

600 miles from the American coast, its position thus corresponding to that of Madeira on the European side. Its formation is that of the atolls common in the Pacific, a ring of coral reefs surrounding a lagoon. In fact it is the northernmost of all coral islands, and its existence so far north is doubtless due to the warmth of the Atlantic current, which has its origin in the region of the equator. Bermuda deviates considerably from the normal type of these atolls : for less than half of the encircling reef reaches the surface of the ocean, and the small islands which lie close together along the inside of the reef on the southern part of the circumference rise in places much higher than is usual with the ordinary coral islands. The total area of the islands, which are now connected together by a series of bridges, is under twenty square miles, and the estimated population in 1917 was about 20,400, exclusive of the armed forces of the crown.

Bermuda derives its name from a Spaniard who was the first discoverer, but was never inhabited until Sir George Somers was wrecked there in 1609.[1] The islands had previously been avoided as dangerous rocks in a stormy part of the ocean ; but Somers' favourable experience of the climate led to the establishment of a colony there in 1612. The company which held Bermuda under letters patent from James I. was dissolved in 1684, and the islands passed under the authority of the crown ; but the inhabitants had had representative institutions from the first.

Like most of the few colonies then possessed by England, Bermuda was disturbed by the political and religious differences of the Great Rebellion, took the royalist side, and had to submit to the Commonwealth ; otherwise it has only an economic history. Tobacco growing—the first industry—was ultimately abandoned as unremunerative, and the chief trade now consists in supplying early flowers and vegetables for the New York market, as the Scilly islands do for London. It has also become a favourite winter resort for people who desire to escape the severe cold of the Atlantic coast of

[1] Shakespeare is always supposed to have had this shipwreck in mind when he wrote *The Tempest* in 1611.

North America, the winter climate being both warm and equable.

Bermuda lies between the region of the trade winds and the line of the "steam ferry" between England and America, and thus is not upon any important trade route, though things may alter now that the Panama canal is made, for Bermuda lies close to the direct course from the English Channel into the Caribbean Sea. It furnishes a valuable naval station, the only one near the western side of the north Atlantic, and has accordingly been fortified and provided with a dockyard, which was constructed by convict labour between 1810 and 1863.

The islands contain two little towns: St. George's, at the east end, near the entrance to the lagoon, and Hamilton, the seat of government, in the centre. The dockyard is at the extreme western end of the chain of islands.

§ 13. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Falkland islands, the most remote of all British possessions, are situated in the south Atlantic, about 300 miles east of the Straits of Magellan. They were first sighted in 1592 by John Davis, one of the earliest Arctic explorers, but remained uninhabited till the middle of the eighteenth century. At that period interest in the south seas was aroused by the systematic explorations conducted chiefly by British men-of-war, among the commanders of which the names of Anson and Cook are conspicuous. It was considered desirable, for the sake chiefly of the whale fishery, to establish a port of call somewhere within reach of the stormy Cape Horn, and a settlement in the Falkland islands was accordingly planned by the British government. They were, however, met by the remonstrances of Spain, then dominant over most part of South America. The exclusive right to the whole New World, which had been granted to Spain by Pope Alexander VI. very soon after the discovery of America, was still valid in Spanish eyes over everything which had not passed into the effective possession of other nations. Settlements were in fact begun, by the French on

the eastern island, by the English on the western. The former was sold to the Spaniards and soon abandoned by them, and the latter was also abandoned after a short time; and it was not till 1832 that the permanent British occupation began.

There are two large islands, besides a considerable number of small ones, the total area being about 6,500 square miles, or rather greater than Yorkshire. This is exclusive of South Georgia, an island some 800 miles to the eastward, which is still uninhabited, but is reckoned as one of the Falklands. The climate is bleak, and little grows there except grass. Hence the only industry is sheep-farming. The population, which is mainly of Scotch extraction, is naturally very small, little over 2,000, so that the direct commercial value of the colony is very slight. The islands, however, possess several good harbours, and it is much to the advantage of navigation in the stormy neighbouring seas that they should be inhabited. They are admirably suited for a coaling-station, and the total tonnage of vessels entered and cleared in 1916 was over 510,000.

Recently the islands have been prominently before the eyes of the public owing to the brilliant naval action fought there on December 8, 1914, during which Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee sank four of the five ships commanded by Admiral von Spee.

Part IV

THE DAUGHTER NATIONS

THE two great daughter nations, Canada and Australia, have both adopted federal constitutions, which are similar but not identical, and the divergences between them are aptly symbolised by the differences of nomenclature. Canada is a Dominion composed of provinces, and the central government is supreme over all matters not specially reserved to the component parts. Australia is a Commonwealth consisting of states, each of which is independent in all matters not reserved by the constitution to the federal government. In each there is a federal parliament, with a federal ministry responsible to it, and a governor-general nominated by the crown, who, like the king at home, can act only through his ministers. In each parliament there are two houses, constituted more or less on the American principle ; that is to say, there is one in which the whole people is represented in proportion to numbers, and one in which the several components, provinces or states, are represented apart from population. Each component has its own ministry and parliament, ruling its affairs within the limits laid down by the federal constitution. The only difference is that the states of Australia have, by virtue of their greater independence, what the provinces of Canada have not, governors named by the crown.

Canada was the earlier by a generation to form its federation. The Dominion dates from 1867, the Commonwealth was proclaimed on the first day of the twentieth century. In two respects, however, Australia has the lead : each of its

parts has already full self-government, and it is also geographically complete. New Zealand remains outside the Commonwealth, constituting a separate daughter-nation; and geography, at any rate, does not dictate a closer connection. In Canada, on the other hand, there are extensive territories which for climatic reasons are never likely to have inhabitants enough to form regularly constituted provinces. And there is also Newfoundland, like New Zealand, possessing full self-government, but standing aloof from the Dominion. This, however, is due to accidental circumstances: geography most plainly indicates that it is the natural destiny of Newfoundland to unite with Canada. The sentiments of union may have been kindled by the recent war, to which Canada as a whole sent no fewer than 418,980 men.

A. CANADA

I. OUTLINES OF THE GEOGRAPHY AND EARLY HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA

The Dominion of Canada extends across the whole north of America, and has an area of over three and a half million square miles. Its northern boundary is the Arctic ocean, and it nominally includes all the islands which have been mapped out in the painful course of Arctic discovery. On the south it is conterminous with the United States, which it slightly exceeds in nominal area. The frontier is the outcome of treaties made since the independence of the United States, and is nowhere formed by any marked natural feature, except in the region of the great lakes, where it runs through the centre of each lake on the chain, and down the streams that connect them. Indeed, for about half its length the frontier is simply the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude.

The geography of the Dominion of Canada is hardly intelligible without a preliminary glance at the structure of the entire continent of which it forms the northern part. Similarly the history of the acquisition by England of the eastern portion, from which the whole dominion has been developed, is intimately mixed up with the history of the earlier English colonies, which ultimately revolted.

The essential features of the geography of North America are :—(1) the Rocky Mountains, (2) the river Mississippi, (3) the river St. Lawrence. The southern part of the continent, where it narrows on both sides, the Pacific coast curving away to the eastward and the Gulf of Mexico scooping out a vast hollow on the Atlantic side, may for present purposes be ignored. Down the whole length of North America runs a great belt of mountains, comparatively near to the Pacific coast. These can hardly be said to form a single continuous chain, and separate sections bear distinctive names. In sketching the separate geography of western Canada, it will be necessary to discriminate, as would be the case in dealing with the geography of the United States. But for a comprehensive survey of the whole continent they may be treated as one, and bear the generic name of Rocky Mountains. Roughly parallel to the Rockies, and comparatively near to the Atlantic coast, there is the less lofty belt of the Appalachian or Alleghany Mountains. Geologically speaking, this extends from Newfoundland to not very far from the Gulf of Mexico ; but the northern portion is by no means continuous. It is only from about the latitude of New York southwards that the Alleghanies form a definite watershed between the Atlantic coast and the vast Mississippi basin, which occupies the whole centre of the continent.

The southernmost point of the great system of connected lakes, of which the river St. Lawrence forms the outlet, is about west of New York. And so completely is the Appalachian mountain system discontinuous in this region, that a canal has been made from Lake Erie, the lowest but one of the great lakes, into the river Hudson, which flows southwards into the sea at New York. A glance at the map will show that the course of the St. Lawrence is north-eastwards, the lower lakes being considerably to the south of the river's mouth. And as the Atlantic coast trends to the westward from the Gulf of St. Lawrence downwards, there is a roughly rectangular mass of land enclosed between the ocean on the one side and the lakes and their outlet on the other, the upper end of which abuts on the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This area averages about 250 miles across, and is 600 or 700 miles

long. Thus Lakes Erie and Ontario are considerably nearer to the ocean at New York than down the line of their own natural drainage, a fact of considerable commercial importance, all the more so because the St. Lawrence is ice-bound in winter. Historically, it has been of still more importance that there is a straight route up the Hudson, through the two long, narrow lakes George and Champlain, to the St. Lawrence between Quebec and Montreal. The great contest between France and England, on which was staked domination in North America, was fought out in this region, or on the waters enclosing it.

The mouth of the St. Lawrence gives access to the eastern extremity of a vast plain which extends thence to the Rocky Mountains, very gradually rising from the sea-level. The St. Lawrence itself drains but little beyond the great lakes, which lie somewhat east of the centre of the continent. There is, however, scarcely a perceptible watershed between the St. Lawrence basin and the central region, whence the rivers flow to Hudson's Bay or into the Arctic ocean further west. Similarly the sources of the Mississippi and some of its tributaries are divided from the Canadian waters flowing east or north by a mere rise of level. There are in fact no natural barriers anywhere between the Rockies and the Alleghanies or the Atlantic, between the Arctic ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. The case is very like that of the Russian plain, where rivers flow to the Baltic and the White Sea, to the Black Sea and the Caspian, and the traveller finds no natural landmarks to call his attention to the passage from one basin to another. And as in Russia, the geographical conditions favour the development of nations on the largest scale; political frontiers, where they exist, must needs be conventional.

As the relation to one another of the Mississippi and St. Lawrence basins is the essential point to be borne in mind, if we would understand American geography, so is the nature of the rivalry between France and England in the New World the key to its earlier history. Throughout the sixteenth century, though the error of Columbus which gave their name to the West Indies had long been exposed, the idea that a way to the east through America might be found retained

its hold on the imagination of Europe. The Gulf of St. Lawrence, Hudson's Bay, Davis' Straits, were all explored in the hope that they might furnish a passage through to the eastern ocean: and in these operations the Elizabethan seamen had taken a conspicuous part. Such expeditions, however, did not lead to settlements. It was as the spirit of adventure grew less vigorous, and a more prosaic desire for new lands to occupy and make profitable took its place, that England began to overflow into America. Formal possession had indeed been taken of Virginia in 1585. The first attempted colony there had however been a failure: the name of the James river may serve to remind us that the permanent settlement of the colony named after the virgin queen dates from the reign of her successor. From that time onward colonies followed in steady succession, first to the north and then to the south of Virginia, the political and religious troubles in England both stimulating their formation and leading to their being but little controlled from home. New York was taken from the Dutch in the reign of Charles II., but all the rest were original foundations. They were diverse in character and circumstances, but alike in being all more or less self-governing, in being mainly the fruit of private enterprise, and in owing but little to the English government.

French colonisation in America was of a different character from English, different in every respect except that both home governments held the same theories about controlling colonial trade in the interest of the mother country. The Frenchman Cartier had been the first to explore up the St. Lawrence in 1534 and following years, but nothing came of it till early in the seventeenth century. Then the French formed settlements at Quebec and Montreal, already important centres from the native point of view. The colony was not, like New England, a spontaneous growth; it remained dependent on home supplies, not sufficing for its own wants. Of the scanty population no small proportion were adventurers of the roughest kind, who went far afield in search of furs, and sank to the level of the Indians from whom they procured them. Canada was despotically

governed, and was strictly confined to members of the Roman church, whose ecclesiastics were all-powerful. In fact it was a reproduction of monarchical France, as Louis XIV. would have liked to make it: there was not a trace of the self-government, of the religious diversities, amounting in most cases to reasonable religious freedom, which made the English colonies copies of England on a small scale. What the French in Canada had was a definite purpose, not always wisely or consistently pursued by the crown, but never abandoned, of building up a great French empire in the New World. It was symbolised in their giving the title of New France vaguely to all America north of the Gulf of Mexico, except the coast regions definitely held by other nations. Missionaries were pushed out as far as possible among the Indians, devoted men who risked their lives incessantly to make converts, but who unfortunately seldom went beyond formally baptising them, and inspiring reverence for the king of France. Hand in hand with the missionaries went soldiers, establishing garrisons at convenient spots, forming alliances with Indian tribes who were glad to obtain French firearms, and had no objection, when there was war between France and England, to being let loose on New England or New York. One brilliant leader after another, not always understood or well requited at home, gave his life to the task of sketching out New France. Before the end of the seventeenth century the French had not merely extended their supremacy over most part of the lake system, but had crossed to the Mississippi, and begun the process of establishing themselves along its whole valley. Louisiana, which in their mouths meant the whole centre of the continent, was named after Louis XIV.

Much of the history of the eighteenth century has been summarised as a contest between England and France for the possession of North America. The phrase is certainly appropriate in the sense that this proved the prize of the victor, and also that France was consciously striving for it. But it is hardly true that England had any purpose beyond securing what she already possessed, though some of her colonists were more ambitious or more far-sighted. There

were so many elements of antagonism between the English and French colonies that war was sure to break out between them sooner or later. As a matter of fact the aggressive policy of the French forced it on, and the naval preponderance of England gave her ultimate victory. But it can hardly be doubted that the natural growth of the English colonies would in any case have led them to expand westwards, and so have brought them into collision with the French claims. The form which the contest in fact took was dictated almost altogether by the geographical conditions in the region which lay between the English and French settlements where they approached most nearly to one another, that is to say, on the two lowest lakes and on the upper part of the St. Lawrence. There was also a subordinate and detached conflict, less complicated and sooner concluded, over the upper end of that long tract which lies between the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic. It will conduce to clearness if the geography be sketched before dealing with the history.

§ 2. GENERAL GEOGRAPHY OF CANADA

The Dominion of Canada, as it now is, may from the geographical point of view be conveniently divided into four parts.

1. The maritime region on the Atlantic, to which the island of Newfoundland geographically belongs, though it does not yet politically form part of the Dominion.
2. The region of the great lakes, with the valley of the St. Lawrence issuing from them.
3. The central plain, or rather series of plateaux, extending from the west of Lake Superior to the Rocky Mountains.
4. The region west of the Rockies.

None of these correspond closely with the political provinces, nor is there any strongly marked physical boundary except between the third and fourth. They are, however, readily distinguishable in natural characteristics, even though the actual lines of separation can only be drawn arbitrarily

Historically also they stand clearly apart. The first, which passed the earliest into English hands, has a history of its own separate from that of the St. Lawrence basin, though more or less accessory to it. The second furnishes the most eventful chapter in American history, superior in importance even to the secession war that began in 1861: it presents also a marked division of races. The annals of the third contain nothing beyond the records of very recent peaceful progress, the whole region being practically inaccessible except through the second. Nowhere on earth has the *hinterland* principle, of which we have heard much in late years during the "scramble for Africa," received such development as in North America. After England had acknowledged the independence of the United States, the two powers dividing the eastern side of the continent had indefinite room for expansion westwards, and no other nation could possibly interfere after the United States had acquired Louisiana. Naturally a line of latitude served as the frontier between them, and both have gradually covered the whole width of America. As to the fourth region, so long as it could only be reached by sailing ships, it was the remotest corner of the habitable earth. Not only steam navigation, but the opening of routes across the American continent, were essential antecedents to British Columbia being known for its true worth.

The union of all British North America into a political whole was an important step in its own development, and may prove equally important as a landmark in the history of the British empire. The influence of geography upon it is obvious and simple: there are no natural features even suggesting division between the Rocky Mountains and the Atlantic: and it was to the visible advantage of both parties that British Columbia should have access to the Atlantic and Canada to the Pacific. Upon the general nature of the development of Canada geographical conditions have had an equally extensive and uniform bearing. The native races, after the date of the conquest of Canada, became steadily of less and less consequence. There has been virtually no fusion with the European settlers, and the number of the

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red men gradually dwindles. They are now estimated at little more than 100,000 out of a total population of over five millions; and this includes the scanty inhabitants of the extreme north, beyond the limits of civilised occupation. There is sufficient approach to uniformity of climate, and that under conditions on the whole favourable, to make all Canada except the frozen north agricultural, if that word be used in its widest sense. Though there are mining industries, and manufactures as well, they are not as yet worked on a scale comparable in importance with the production of wheat, and cattle, and timber. Hence the tendency is for the population to spread over the land, instead of concentrating itself in great cities. The Commonwealth of Australia has a slightly smaller area than the Dominion of Canada, and about two-thirds of the total population. Yet the two largest cities in Canada have only about half the population of Melbourne or Sydney, and there is only one other city which has even a sixth of their population.

The great lakes, with the St. Lawrence, afford the raw material for the finest system of inland water-communication in the world, needing only to be supplemented by canals to turn the obstacles at certain points. The largest ocean steamers can go up to Montreal, and smaller ones to the head of Lake Superior. How great is the value of these waterways may be estimated from the fact that a larger tonnage passes Sault St. Marie, at the lower end of Lake Superior, than through the Suez canal, this being the outlet for a large part of the wheat region of the United States. At the same time, the geographical conditions are not altogether favourable to Canada. First of all, the St. Lawrence is frozen in winter, which compels passing all Canadian winter trade through the Nova Scotian ports, that communicate with the St. Lawrence basin by a long and circuitous route. Apart from this, the shortest way to the coast from the lakes lies across the State of New York, so that it cannot be used for commerce without passing over foreign territory. Again, the rivers which drain the central region flow not into Lake Superior, but into Hudson's Bay, so that the Canadian wheat area is largely dependent on the railway

for the export of its crops. On the other hand, the conformation of the land made it easy to construct a railway right across to the foot of the Rocky Mountains, and not very difficult to carry it over them. And the second through railway follows a route at varying distances to the north of that of the Canadian Pacific, and crosses the Rockies by an easier pass, having its terminus at Prince Rupert on the Pacific coast.

§ 3. THE MARITIME PROVINCES

The Gulf of St. Lawrence, though on a larger scale, bears a singular resemblance to the Irish Sea. Both are shut off from the ocean by a large island: Newfoundland is, as a matter of fact, about the size of Ireland. Both have a narrow and comparatively unimportant entrance north of the enclosing island, and a wider entrance south of it. Even the Isle of Man has its equivalent in Anticosti. Both are, one would say, intended by nature to be virtually inland seas, that is to say, to have the lands surrounding them the territories of a single power. Great Britain is, of course, not part of a continent, nor has the Irish Sea any such mighty river as the St. Lawrence opening into it: but these points of difference hardly detract from the similarity. Historically their fate has been exactly opposite one of the other. Ireland was the last portion of Europe to be reached by prehistoric, uncivilised man, who when he had occupied it could go no further. Newfoundland was the first portion of North America to be reached by civilised men coming across the Atlantic, and from thence they passed on to explore and conquer beyond the Gulf of St. Lawrence. As it happened, the extraordinarily rich fisheries attracted so far men of all European nations: but two of them only went further. England and France, or rather American settlers from those countries, fought for a century and a half over the command of the gulf. The complete success of the former only just preceded the conquest of Canada, and was an obvious, if not a necessary, condition precedent to that great achievement. And, in fact, the conflict centred round a single portion of the environing lands.

The gulf is closed on the south by a peninsula lying north-east and south-west, joined to the mainland by an isthmus only sixteen miles across. This peninsula, which is some 300 miles long, and averages about 100 miles in width, is now the province of Nova Scotia. The earlier name was Acadia, derived as it would appear from an Indian word, and was given by the French. As has been already mentioned, the French were the first to explore up the St. Lawrence, and a settlement to command the access to its mouth naturally followed.

The royal charters or patents, under which, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European adventurers professed to take possession of new territories in America, were usually couched in the vaguest terms. The settlers actually occupied such spots as they wanted, or were able to seize. If they were strong enough to push out further, they did so: if they could not, if they found themselves checked by the vicinity of some other European settlement, by the strength of the natives, or by natural obstacles, nothing had been lost by making the claim.

The charter given to the first French settlers in Acadia in the first days of the seventeenth century was of this type. It professed to confer on them the whole coast from 40° N. to the St. Lawrence, and to an indefinite extent inland. The adventurers penetrated into the Bay of Fundy, the long, narrow gulf between Nova Scotia and the mainland, and set up a station there which they called Port Royal. The colony did not flourish, but it was never entirely abandoned, so that the patent, by which James I. in 1621 granted the peninsula and part of the adjacent mainland to Sir William Alexander, was a stronger case than usual of giving away what was not his own. The name conferred by the new settlers, who were Scotch rather than English, was destined to survive, but otherwise they achieved little; and in 1632 Charles I. surrendered to France all claim to Acadia. The peninsula is a well-marked physical unit, but otherwise Acadia had no definite limits. In the direction of the St. Lawrence what is now New Brunswick was thickly covered with forests and fully occupied by Indian tribes. Under such conditions

Acadia only communicated with Quebec by sea. Along the coast towards New England there is and can be no frontier marked out by nature. The New Englanders fished and traded towards Newfoundland, the French tried to extend their settlements down the coast, and they inevitably came into collision. Under the Protectorate Acadia was conquered; it was restored to the French by Charles II.; but these high-sounding transactions were little more than nominal. The scanty population, mainly French in origin, were practically left to themselves.

The revolution of 1688 gave the signal for over twenty years of war between France and England, and these were decisive of the fate of Acadia. After sundry vicissitudes Port Royal was taken in 1710, receiving the new name of Annapolis after queen Anne; and by the Treaty of Utrecht, Acadia was finally ceded to England. Some of the French inhabitants—the number after more than a century only amounted to a few thousands—were transferred into Canada. The remainder stayed to encounter the fate which is commemorated in Longfellow's *Evangeline*. Taught by their priests that it was a sin to be loyal subjects to England, they were a standing difficulty and trouble; and ultimately the bulk of them were deported from their homes into other American colonies.

It is probable that no such painful necessity would have arisen, had the Treaty of Utrecht been more thorough. But its terms allowed the French to keep Cape Breton, the island which, separated by a very narrow channel, is a practical continuation north-eastwards of the peninsula of Nova Scotia. A strong naval base somewhere on the Gulf of St. Lawrence was essential to France, if she were to keep her hold on Canada. Accordingly a fortress was constructed at Louisburg, in Cape Breton island, immediately after the Peace of Utrecht: and this became the obvious point to be attacked when, after thirty years, England and France were again at war. The home government had their hands full, with a Jacobite rebellion in Scotland, hostilities on the Continent, disaster in India. But the New Englanders organised an expedition which, aided by a squadron of the royal navy,

captured and held Louisburg, and they were grievously disappointed when peace was made on the terms of the surrender of all conquests on both sides. It was not for long: soon after Pitt came into power during the Seven Years' war he sent an expedition which once more captured Louisburg, whence in the next year the fleet that bore Wolfe's little army for the attack on Quebec started on its eventful mission. In the formal cession of all Canada Cape Breton was naturally included, but Louisburg had been already destroyed. Its place as a naval stronghold has been taken by Halifax, on the ocean shore of Nova Scotia, which is also the chief winter port on the Atlantic belonging to the Dominion of Canada.

Nova Scotia, to which Cape Breton island was naturally appendant, became a separate colony with a constitution of its own. For some twenty years longer it continued to include, as the original Acadia had done, a considerable portion of the lands up the west coast of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In 1784, however, Nova Scotia received its natural frontier at the isthmus, the mainland region becoming a distinct colony under the title of New Brunswick. The only subsequent event in its history is its entrance into the Canadian federation.

Its peninsular position gives Nova Scotia a more equable climate than Canada, but the cold Arctic current down its coast keeps its average temperature lower than might be expected from its latitude, its northern point being nearly parallel with Lyons. In climate and products it corresponds more nearly to the lowlands of Scotland, whence its name was borrowed, than to the south of France. Like the lowlands also, it has rich supplies of coal.

The province of New Brunswick, in its separate capacity, has but a very brief history. Nominally included in the original Acadia, it was very scantily occupied by the French, who did, however, try to push down the coast towards New England. The conflict which finally gave Acadia to England was, as has been seen, fought out in the peninsula. Till the conquest of Canada, the forests which still cover a large part of what is now New Brunswick formed an effectual though

vague barrier, inside which a frontier was eventually fixed. It was the influx of loyalists, after the revolt of the original American colonies, which led to the partition of Acadia. They settled in large numbers in the mainland portion, and finding that the existing representative system of the colony gave them very scanty voice in its affairs, petitioned for separation. This was given to them in 1784 under the name of New Brunswick, with a constitution of their own; and in due course they entered the Dominion of Canada.

The boundary between New Brunswick and the United States on the coast is formed by the mouth of the river St. Croix, which has, in fact, been the dividing line since the seventeenth century, in spite of aggressions on both sides. Further inland there was at the end of the eighteenth century dense forest, devoid of inhabitants, and it was long before any delimitation of the frontier took place. In the interval the New Englanders, more alert or having less room at home, had pushed their way far into the forest region, of which they retained possession under the Ashburton Treaty. This is so far injurious to Canada that the shortest route from Montreal, and even from Quebec, to the ocean ports of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia crosses United States territory. Nothing could have altered the geographical fact that Portland, in the State of Maine, is the nearest harbour to the cities on the St. Lawrence which is available in winter. But if the frontier had been fixed immediately after the recognition of American independence, a little more of the forest lands would have been allotted to Lower Canada, or New Brunswick, or both, at no real cost to the United States, and with a certain convenience to Canada.

The river St. John, which has a long course within the United States before entering New Brunswick, has its mouth on the Atlantic below Nova Scotia. The capital of the province, Fredericton, is on the river, and at its mouth is the one harbour of any importance, also called St. John. As Canada grows in wealth and population, the through trade will tend more and more towards the development of St. John's and Halifax, as being open all the year round. At present, however, neither of them has a population exceeding 60,000.

It is difficult to assign any reason, geographical or other, why Prince Edward Island, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence off the coast of New Brunswick, should have ever been constituted a separate colony. This, however, was done in 1798, its name being derived from Edward, duke of Kent, the father of queen Victoria. It is about the size of the county of Norfolk, and is entirely agricultural. Its early history was the same as that of its neighbours: it was taken possession of by the French, but very little inhabited; it was conquered in the Seven Years' war, received its separate constitution, and entered the Dominion of Canada, in which it enjoys the distinction of being incomparably the smallest element, and at the same time the most densely populated, the fact being that it has practically no lands incapable of cultivation.

§ 4. QUEBEC AND ONTARIO

The first French settlement on the St. Lawrence was at Quebec, to which they soon added Montreal. Both places are marked out by nature as sites of towns, Quebec as an almost ideal hill-fortress, Montreal rather as an emporium of trade. Both were already important towns, if that phrase may be used to denote centres of Indian life. And they remain to this day the only towns of the first class in the modern province of Quebec.

Canada was originally a name of very vague signification, like many other names conferred by early European settlers in America. It is perhaps sufficiently defined by saying that Lower Canada, the region still mainly inhabited by people of French descent and speech, now officially known as the province of Quebec, was the immediate basin of the St. Lawrence from below the lakes to its mouth. Similarly the modern province of Ontario, formerly called Upper Canada, is the country around the northern shores of the great lakes. Over it the French extended their influence, but they did not colonise, even in the meagre way in which Lower Canada was colonised.

The French possessions cannot be said to have had a

frontier on the north. The settled lands extended but a little way from the river, and faded away into the forest, scarcely inhabited even by Indians. At no great distance are the Laurentian heights, a plateau rather than a chain of hills, sweeping round the south end of Hudson's Bay, which are partly bare, chiefly covered with spruce forest. The modern province of Quebec is made to touch Hudson's Bay, and has a frontier line towards Labrador marked off by the course of certain streams; but for practical purposes the Laurentian plateau is, as described by an American geographer of to-day, an irredeemable wilderness. This by no means implies that it is worthless. The forests are, and can with the requisite care be made to continue, a considerable source of wealth: but it does mean that no small proportion of the soil of the province is deemed incapable of sustaining an agricultural population.

The boundary between Quebec and Ontario, as now settled, runs up the river Ottawa, which joins the St. Lawrence a little above Montreal, and thence northwards to the south point of Hudson's Bay; and though there was, from the nature of the case, no formal frontier during the French period, the present boundary fairly marks the line beyond which the French had only, to use the modern phrase, a sphere of influence. Nor does the present province of Ontario extend far westwards beyond the limits within which French power made itself effectually felt. They were, however, by no means content with mere supremacy: the English conquest of Canada cut short an interesting experiment—what sort of community could have been formed out of red men under French control, more or less imbued with French ideas.

The geographical formation of the lake region counted for much in determining the method of the French advance. It will be seen on the map that the southern shore of Lake Superior, the northern shore of Lake Huron, and the Ottawa river form a nearly continuous line running east and west. Lake Superior discharges itself at its south-eastern corner by a short stream flowing into the north-western corner of Lake Huron; and just below is the narrow strait joining

Lakes Huron and Michigan, which are in fact parts of the same sheet of water. Lake Huron has its outlet at the extreme south point, whence the Detroit river flows some eighty miles further south into Lake Erie. Then the line of Lakes Erie and Ontario is about north-eastwards, and is continued in the St. Lawrence, which flows out of the latter. Thus there is a triangle of land south of the Ottawa, the western side of which, some 350 miles, is formed by Lake Huron and its outflow river, and the south-eastern side by Lakes Erie and Ontario. The command of this triangle, which is the core of the modern province of Ontario, if not of the whole Dominion of Canada, would give the French control, both military and commercial, of the whole lake region, as against the English colonies to the south and south-east. The strategic points are obviously at the junctions between the various lakes: and all of these, including those west of Lake Huron that were beyond English reach, were occupied by French stations, which were at once military forts, trading posts, and centres of missionary labour. These were by no means all: they had stations at sundry points round Lake Superior also, but these were of no historical importance, except in so far as they served to strengthen the chain uniting Canada and Louisiana. From the western end of Lake Superior the distance is but short to the head-waters of the Mississippi. From the south of Lake Michigan, where Chicago now stands, the distance is even less to a tributary of the same river. The shortest line of all is the Ohio river, which rises south of Lake Erie, and drains the whole western face of the Alleghanies. As the English colonies occupied the country east of that chain, it was obvious to them that the establishment of the French in strength along the line of the Ohio would deprive them of any room for further expansion. The New Englanders had long realised that the French were their determined and dangerous enemies, and therefore were for war before it should be too late. The English government was more or less blind to the importance of the matter, and gave the colonies but slight support until William Pitt came into office, when the Seven Years' war gave a favourable oppor-

tunity. Thanks to his judgement, and to his skill in selecting men, the tables were turned on the French by Wolfe's capture of Quebec.

On the south side of the St. Lawrence the hills, which are geologically a continuation of the Appalachian system, come fairly near to the river. For a considerable distance along these runs the frontier between Canada and the United States, as finally determined by the Ashburton Treaty of 1841 : and at the north-eastern end they lie between Quebec and New Brunswick. In the French period, however, the time had not yet come for frontiers. Along the Atlantic there were the English colonies, the lands actually occupied not extending very far inland, but their traders more or less active in seeking to obtain the fur traffic of the interior, and for that reason to make their way to the lakes. Along the St. Lawrence the French were in equally complete possession, and their sovereignty was in some sense acknowledged, though their posts were widely scattered, throughout the lake region. What really separated the rival European peoples was the Indians. It would be irrelevant to go into details respecting the various native tribes, most of whom have vanished before white civilisation, for which few of them exhibited any capacity beyond learning to use firearms. The English tended to let them alone, as savages whose hostility was an unavoidable evil : the French were zealous, and on the whole skilful, in cultivating friendly relations with them. Like all such savages, they were divided by deadly feuds ; and some of the tribes were friendly to the English, not because they had any reason to love them, but because they hated rival tribes who were under French influence. Fortunately for New York and New England, it was the most highly organised and formidable of the Indians, the so-called Five Nations, dwelling in the region stretching eastwards from Lake Erie, who were led by hostility to the tribes most devoted to France into alliance with the English. They were few compared to the subject allies of France, but they were on the whole better led, and they occupied the most important position geographically. It is hardly too much to say that if these tribes also had succumbed to French

influence, the northern English colonies might have been destroyed.

If the Appalachian mountain system had been continuous throughout its length, the course of American history might have been very different. The existence of gaps through it in the *hinterland* of New York and New England furnishes the geographical key to the whole conflict between France and England in the New World. At New York the Hudson river flows due southwards into the Atlantic. About 150 miles above its mouth the Hudson receives a tributary from the west, the Mohawk, which rises not far from Lake Ontario and passes through the territory then held by the Five Nations, known to the French as the Iroquois. It was naturally at Oswego, the nearest point on the lake to the source of the Mohawk, that the English colonists in search of the fur trade planted a settlement. The Hudson is scarcely navigable above the junction of the Mohawk, which has been utilised in modern times for the canal from Lake Erie to New York; but its course is exactly in the same direction as below for some fifty miles further. Here it is within a short distance of the southern end of a long, narrow lake, lying north and south between two groups of forest-clad mountains. This lake drains northwards into a similar lake, whence the Richelieu river flows into the St. Lawrence below Montreal, still in the same straight line, the total distance from New York to the St. Lawrence being nearly 400 miles. The names of the two lakes serve to indicate the history connected with them. The northern one is called after Champlain, the man who deserves to be regarded as the founder of French Canada. The southern one was named Lake George, a century after Champlain's time, in honour of the Hanoverian king. The fort between the two lakes, Ticonderoga, was essentially a French place, though the English held it for a time. In fact, if a limit is to be drawn between the rival nations, the English can hardly be said to have held anything further than the south end of Lake George.

It is not to be supposed that the line above described was the only one by which hostilities were possible. The New

Englanders to the eastward of it suffered severely from Indian attacks, more or less prompted or encouraged by the French; and in that quarter there were no friendly Indians to protect or retaliate. But the conditions were such that the Hudson line was far more important for the ultimate result. In that direction only the English could assume the offensive in war, thanks to the Iroquois alliance: in that direction only they could reach the lucrative trade of the lakes. In that direction also the French could gain most by success; and it was they who were mainly the aggressors, until the last phase of the contest.

It is needless to follow the details of the long conflict, of which the geographical conditions have been indicated. The English principle, as it is now regarded, of allowing colonies a maximum of self-government, was abundantly exemplified, partly to the detriment of the colonists who lacked support, partly to their advantage in that they often acted on their own responsibility when the home government could not have aided them.

The Peace of Utrecht, which destroyed French domination in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, made France all the more enterprising in the interior of North America. It was the definite design to master the course of the Ohio which, more than any other cause, brought on the Seven Years' war. In the beginning the French, under the leadership of Montcalm, won considerable advantage. Readers of Fenimore Cooper, if any persons are still wise enough to read him, will remember how his best romance is based on the French capture, in 1757, of Fort William Henry, at the south point of Lake George. This may be called the high-water mark of French success, though in the next year they lost ground but little. And the decisive campaign of 1759 still dealt with the same country. The English commander-in-chief advanced towards the St. Lawrence *viâ* Lake Champlain, sending a detachment up the Mohawk river and so to Niagara, while Wolfe, with a separate expedition, went up by water to Quebec. Wolfe struck the decisive blow, and his death in the moment of victory added dramatic interest to the event; but the co-operation of Amherst was as essential to his

success, if not as obviously so, as the co-operation of the Prussians to Wellington's victory at Waterloo. The French commander divined which was the really formidable attack, but he was none the less compelled to detach troops to meet Amherst's advance, and was consequently not too strong for Wolfe to assail.

The victory of Quebec, small as were the numbers engaged, was one of the most important events in modern history. It rendered possible the establishment of the United States: it founded in effect the British empire. It is worth noting that Wolfe's success, like the continuance of the empire, was based entirely on naval power. Having command of the water, Wolfe could attack when and where he pleased, and the French were powerless to make counter strokes. He could try every point in his enemy's defences until he found the vulnerable spot. England in 1759 was very far from the complete naval supremacy of half a century later, but she none the less owes to her navy the conquest of Canada.

The province of Quebec is the only region in the world where a French colony, in the strict sense of the word, has taken root and flourished. Nearly a century and a half after the English conquest, the population, which has increased from seventy or eighty thousand to over a million and a half, is still almost entirely French in blood and speech except in the only large city, which is almost equally divided. They are, however, what they were at the era of the conquest, French of the *ancien régime* in most elements of their social life, especially in devotion to the Roman Catholic church, though they have the political institutions of modern democracy. Montreal, the highest point on the St. Lawrence reached by great ocean steamers, and consequently the commercial centre, is now four times as large as Quebec, the ancient capital. Outside these two cities the population is mainly agricultural, the thickly peopled area not extending far from the great river.

The province of Ontario is a colony entirely English, the beginnings of its effective settlement dating from the influx of loyalists out of the revolted American colonies. Though having an area only two-thirds as great, it far surpasses

Quebec in population, having now over two millions of inhabitants, or two-fifths of the entire Dominion; and its chief town, Toronto, is about as large as Montreal. The southern part of the province, the triangle between the river Ottawa and the lakes, is by far the most thickly inhabited, and contains several considerable towns, mostly on or close to Lake Ontario. The most important of these is Ottawa, the federal capital, in the choice of which queen Victoria is said to have taken a keen interest. When the Dominion was constituted, it was natural that a new capital should be established, after the example set in the United States, and that it should be somewhere intermediate to the two provinces which then were enormously more important than any other part of British North America. The place ultimately chosen happened to be on the Ontario side of the boundary river. It is now, besides being the administrative centre, the chief seat of the Canadian timber trade.

The northern part of Ontario, like the adjacent region in Quebec, is filled by the forest-covered Laurentian plateau, which almost touches Lake Huron. Like Quebec also, Ontario extends to Hudson's Bay, and contains the chief of the settlements on its shores, though these can never be of much commercial value on a sea ice-bound during more than half the year, and too shallow for ships of great size.

Lake Superior extends so far to the north that the Canadian Pacific Railway, in leaving Montreal, is necessarily taken up the line of the Ottawa and thence north-westwards in order to round the lake. Thus it nowhere approaches the real centre of the life of Ontario, which, however, is adequately supplied with railways in addition to its great waterway.

§ 5. CENTRAL CANADA.

The original Canada forms but a small part of the region now called by that name, and such history as the remainder has had until recent times rests on a different geographical basis from the St. Lawrence. Hudson's Bay, the vast inlet from the Arctic Ocean, which at its southern extremity reaches to within 300 miles of Lake Superior, was dis-

covered, and in some sense explored, by Englishmen in the second decade of the seventeenth century, in the repeated efforts to find a north-west passage. Gradually it became clear that no practicable route to the Indies existed in that quarter; and the bleak shores of Hudson's Bay offered no temptation to ordinary settlers, even if they had been reasonably accessible. For forty years no English expedition went thither, and no other nation seems to have given it a thought. But the profits of the fur trade were great enough to make it worth while to break through the monopoly which the French enjoyed through their possession of the St. Lawrence, and the few summer months during which the entrance to Hudson's Bay was not closed by ice gave time enough for realising them. In 1668 an English expedition, more or less under prince Rupert's auspices, reached Hudson's Bay once more, and fortified a trading station at its southern end. As a result of this Charles II. granted in 1670 to the Hudson's Bay company one of the most momentous charters ever drawn up. It conferred on the company, of which prince Rupert was the first governor, all lands and seas accessible through Hudson's Straits, with a monopoly of trade, and directed that its territories should be reckoned a British colony and be known as Rupert's Land.

Within the next dozen years considerable progress was made in establishing factories, but then the French appeared on the scene. The Canadians had apparently long known that the fur trade might be extended into that region, but no Frenchmen seem actually to have reached the shores of Hudson's Bay by land till after 1670. Not unnaturally they regarded the English as intruders on their domain, and made great efforts to oust them. As often has happened in America, the rival colonists fought whether the mother countries were at peace or not. But the English on Hudson's Bay were too few and too isolated to hold their own without effective support from home, as the New Englanders could do. The Peace of Ryswick, 1697, resigned Hudson's Bay to France; but the victories of Marlborough had their effect even in this remote region, and by the Peace of Utrecht the whole of the Hudson's Bay territories were given back to

England, without any of the reservations which crippled the effect of the same treaty on the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Exactly two centuries after the date of their first charter, the Hudson's Bay company surrendered their territories to the Dominion of Canada, while retaining their trading organisation. In the interval they had extended their operations over the whole country as far as the Rocky Mountains, and to a certain degree beyond them. The time was not ripe for colonisation, though the earl of Selkirk had established between 1812 and 1820 his colony of Highlanders on the Red river, which served as a nucleus for the now flourishing province of Manitoba. The company had managed the natives well, and had encouraged geographical exploration, thus laying useful foundations for a new state of things. The rapidity with which progress has since been made may perhaps best be shown by saying that in 1870, when the Hudson's Bay company ceased to be a territorial power, it was still a difficult and adventurous journey to cross the continent within British territory. The Canadian Pacific railway is, however, now a true north-west passage, giving speedy access from England to the far east.

In the enormous extent of territory (some two million square miles) which in 1870 was added to the Dominion of Canada, are regions of very diverse value, from the richest wheat lands upon earth to the totally uninhabitable islands of the polar sea. Manitoba became at once a province of the Dominion, and has since grown rapidly in wealth and population. It corresponds very roughly to the first of the three steps of gradual ascent from the level of the great lakes to the Rocky Mountains, and is perfectly flat, with a smaller lake system of its own that drains out into Hudson's Bay by the Nelson river. A great part of North America was in the last glacial epoch covered with ice, which in the absence of great mountain chains levelled the surface, and deposited thick layers of rich soil. In Manitoba the power of the ice was at its maximum, and practically its whole land surface is admirable wheat land. It is calculated that in central Canada (not of course all in Manitoba) there are half a million square miles of land capable of producing

excellent wheat crops, and that only a small part is as yet under cultivation. It will be seen how vast are the possibilities of increased population.

Administrative divisions made so late as 1870, within the dominions of a single power, were naturally laid out by lines of latitude and longitude, except where unmistakable natural features presented themselves. Manitoba just touches Ontario, an already settled province, and has part of its northern frontier determined by its largest lake : otherwise its boundaries are altogether mathematical. Its capital, Winnipeg, is situated at the southern end of the lake, and has already become the third city in the Dominion.

The entrance of Manitoba into the confederation was followed by a rebellion headed by Louis Riel, of mixed French and Indian blood. The only difficulty in quelling it arose from the nature of the country over which an expedition had to convey its supplies. There were, or may have been, other influences at work, besides the reluctance of wild hunters to come under civilised authority. But one obvious moral may be drawn from it : the English, who throughout their American history have kept the red men at arm's length, have been wiser than the French, who were less reluctant to intermarry with the Indians and to adopt Indian habits.

The region between Manitoba and the Rockies, covering the other two steps of gradual ascent towards the mountains, and hitherto divided into four territories, was organised in 1905 as two new provinces of the Dominion, Saskatchewan adjoining Manitoba, and Alberta to the west of it. Both provinces extend from north latitude 49° to 60°, and they are divided by the 110th meridian. Saskatchewan is about twice as large as the British Islands, Alberta slightly smaller ; but the northern half of both, the former territory of Athabaska, is scarcely inhabited and not likely to tempt settlers. Immigrants have been pouring into the country during the last few years, and the population of the two provinces is now nearly half a million, or about one to the square mile. All the southern part of both provinces is drained by the Saskatchewan river, which flows into Lake Winnipeg. Alberta

is too high above the sea for corn to grow freely, though special methods of cultivation have recently been introduced, which go far towards overcoming this difficulty. But its climate, at any rate in the southern part, is less severe than might be expected in the centre of a continent, with no mountain barrier to protect it from the icy winds of the pole. The warm *chinook* winds, blowing over depressions in the Rockies from the Pacific, break up the continuity of the winter's cold, so that live stock need not be housed all the winter through.

The various territories, enormous as is their area, are of very little value for human habitation, though after the discovery of the Klondyke goldfields one may hesitate to call them worthless. There is Ungava, on the east of Hudson's Bay, the whole of Labrador except the coast strip, which is attached to Newfoundland. Close down on Quebec, from which it is separated by a nominal frontier, there are stunted woods, and a few fur animals: but practically its quarter of a million of square miles can support no other inhabitants than a few Eskimos. There is Keewatin between the west shore of Hudson's Bay and the meridian of 100° W., twice as large as Ungava and of much the same character. There is Mackenzie, called after the most daring explorer during the *régime* of the Hudson's Bay company, possessing waterways on which there never can be commerce, and extending to the Arctic Ocean. And finally there is Franklin, the name appropriately chosen for the archipelago of frozen islands, among which Sir John Franklin's expedition perished. It is but a name, and statistical books abstain from even conjecturing its extent; but so far as one can judge from the map, it adds another half-million of square miles to the formal surface of the British empire. It is not territory which the most envious rivals can ever grudge to us, and the names written on the map, if not quite all of our nation, are all of our race and speech.

§ 6. BRITISH COLUMBIA

The mainland of British Columbia lies between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, between the 49th and 60th parallels of north latitude. To this must be added the great island of Vancouver, which lies close to the coast off the southern end, and others lying further to the north. For some reason of convenience the scarcely explored region east of the Rockies, but west of the 120th meridian, has been assigned to British Columbia: while its continuation north of the 60th parallel has been constituted a separate territory, under the name of Yukon. The length measured along the coast is about 900 miles; but nearly the whole coast is covered with islands, with channels inside them, and seamed with deep fiords, indicating, as on the west of Scotland, that there has been a comparatively recent subsidence of the whole region. Such a coast is naturally rich in harbours, the only important ones at present being on or adjacent to Vancouver's island. About the northern half of the coast, however, a controversy arose, through the unfortunate habit which prevailed till lately among civilised nations, of attempting to define boundaries by treaty without accurate knowledge of the geography. British Columbia at the north-west corner touches Alaska, formerly Russian territory, but bought from Russia by the United States. The inland boundary dividing Alaska from Yukon is simple enough, being the 140th meridian. But the Russians were also entitled, by a treaty of 1825 with England, to the islands along the coast for some distance further south, and to a strip of the mainland very badly defined: and these rights afterwards accrued to the United States. The matter only became important of late years, through the discovery of gold in Yukon. The Klondyke goldfield is undoubtedly, though not far, on the British side of the frontier, but it was only accessible over Canadian soil by a very long and laborious journey, according to the American interpretation of the treaty of 1825. After many failures at negotiation the matter was in 1903 argued before a joint commission. Its award so far adopted the Canadian view, that it fixed the southern termination of the disputed region so that the

islands in front of Port Simpson, originally destined to be the terminus of the second trans-Continental railway, belong to British Columbia. As regards the delimitation of the strip of mainland, the commission decided substantially in favour of the American contention. It is a serious loss to Canada, all the more vexatious because it is not much gain to the United States. If national susceptibilities did not make it very difficult for nations to act as private individuals would act in a similar case, common sense would dictate a business arrangement. British Columbia is deprived of about half her seaboard through a right accruing to her neighbour quite fairly, but more or less accidentally. It is a pity if two friendly nations cannot agree on a settlement whereby the States should give up for a proper equivalent what is of so much value to Canada and of comparatively little use to the Americans.

The distance from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific averages about 300 miles, and there is a much lower range or succession of ranges along the coast. Much of the intervening country is mountainous, and more or less covered with forest. Wherever clearings have been made the soil is fertile, and the climate, though rainy, is mild. In fact British Columbia contrasts sharply in most respects with Alberta, its neighbour province beyond the great chain. It is as yet very thinly peopled, the cost of clearing away the forest deterring settlers; but there is perhaps no region in the British empire which has so great undeveloped possibilities. The population is at present largely concentrated in the south end of Vancouver's island, where are the twin towns of New Westminster and Vancouver on the mainland, and Victoria, the capital of the province, on the island opposite. The harbour of Esquimalt, adjoining Victoria, is fortified as a naval station; and the responsibility for maintaining and defending it has recently been taken over by the Dominion.

The northern Pacific being at the greatest possible distance by sea from western Europe, it is not much more than a century since the first settlement was made in British Columbia. The Spaniards had some slight knowledge of its existence. Captain Cook learned a little more on his voyage to Behring's

Straits. But it was only in 1790 that the English captain Vancouver explored in earnest, and took formal possession, just anticipating the Americans. The English claim on the score of discovery was valid according to the accepted international usage, which regarded as adequate title to any lands not yet known to civilisation the mere act of taking possession, provided that it was followed within a reasonable time by more substantial occupation. It is of course easy to construe such action as mere robbery of the helpless natives: but it is at any rate more reasonable than the claim put forward by Spain that all the Pacific coast of America was hers by virtue of Spaniards having been the first to sight the Pacific. This claim Pitt induced Spain to withdraw, and the country was admitted to be technically English, though there were hardly any settlers for another half-century. Meanwhile the Hudson's Bay company, whose charter contained no territorial limits to the westward, for the very simple reason that there was then no knowledge, extended its operations beyond the Rocky Mountains. Mackenzie, their most persevering explorer, crossed the chain in the last days of the eighteenth century, by the pass which it is now proposed to utilise for a second railway from ocean to ocean across Canada. Still there were only a few fur-trading posts, until about 1855 gold was discovered. By that time gold-digging was no novelty, and had become a widespread passion. The best of the Californian goldfields had indeed been more or less exhausted, though in Australia the fever was at its height. The first gold found in British Columbia proved to be in no great quantity, but it served to attract thousands to the country, and to render a regularly organised colonial government necessary. In 1870, as has been already mentioned, the Hudson's Bay company was bought out, and in the next year British Columbia joined the Dominion of Canada, on condition that a railway was undertaken across the continent. Since then gold and other metals have been found in many localities, chiefly in the south; and other industries have grown up, which will increase as the country is made more and more accessible by railways. Lines of steamers now run from Vancouver both to Japan and to

Australasia, greatly curtailing the journey to the former, and affording an "all-British" route to our great colonies in the southern hemisphere. Politicians talk somewhat vaguely about the benefit of the latter in certain contingencies; but at the very least, in peace or in war, these facilities of communication must be advantageous in many ways, even though the Isthmus of Panama has been pierced, and heavy traffic may take that route for the sake of avoiding transhipment.

§ 7. THE DOMINION

The landmarks in Canadian history since the British conquest are:—

1. The constitution of 1791.
2. The American war of 1812–14.
3. The establishment of complete self-government.
4. The formation of the Dominion.

All have some little connection with the geography.

1. In 1791 the two provinces which are now known as Quebec and Ontario were given separate organisation. The former was mainly French in population, with French institutions of the *ancien régime* established among them. The latter was altogether English, and still very thinly peopled. The English government was wise enough to see the expediency of separating them, and of continuing to the French their own laws. This policy has worked, and continues to work, well in other parts of the empire: but in Canada it was singularly opportune. With the Revolution which transformed everything in France the Canadians had no sympathy, and their loyalty was transferred from the nation of their origin, which had destroyed the institutions they cherished, to the alien nation which protected them in the enjoyment of all that they held dear.

2. The war of 1812 was, as nearly all enlightened Americans would now admit, a blunder on their part. They had a legitimate grievance against both sides in the great European struggle; and England, as infinitely stronger at sea than Napoleon, was the power with which they came most into collision. They ought to have been able to see both that

Napoleon had forced England into the measures interfering with neutral commerce, and also that his triumph would mean the enslavement of the world. But the memories of their own war of independence were too strong, when England had been the enemy and France had fought against England. It was supposed by many that Canada would be an easy and willing prey, but the result was far otherwise. The Canadians, with the very trifling help which under the circumstances England could afford, defended themselves not unsuccessfully, and their dislike of their neighbours was naturally increased. The fighting was inevitably over the ground of the earlier wars, when Canada was French and the States English, and has no points of geographical interest.

3. The establishment of responsible self-government put an end to the rebellious spirit which, though its actual outbreak had not been in any military sense formidable, boded ill for the peace of the colony. It was a momentous new departure, and the British empire has since been worked successfully on the same lines. It is obviously impossible to determine, for lack of other instances worked by other nations, which of the principles involved has most contributed to the result, or how far the geographical novelty, of rapid and easy communication across vast distances, has been an essential condition.

4. The formation of the Dominion of Canada was the natural outcome of the geographical conditions. All parts of British North America had an interest in confederation, none in standing aloof—the one exception, Newfoundland, being mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the French fishing rights. There was a time when it was supposed to be the manifest destiny of Canada to be absorbed into the United States. It would certainly seem as if the organisation of all Canada into a national whole has gone far to make that contingency no longer possible.

§ 8. NEWFOUNDLAND

The earliest colony of England is, appropriately enough, an island—the large island of Newfoundland, which closes

the mouth of the St. Lawrence. It is appropriate also that the first place discovered in North America, if we ignore the voyages of the Norsemen which led to nothing, should have been discovered by an English expedition, though under an Italian commander. It was in 1497 that John Cabot first sighted the point[1] which he named Primavista; and the headland, though the name was subsequently altered to Bonavista, still reminds us of the nationality of the man who first led Englishmen to the New World.

The value of the Newfoundland cod fishery was soon perceived, and men of all nations resorted thither during the summer to share in the gain. No permanent settlement was made, but the shores were covered all through the fishing season with sailors drying their fish, or mending their tackle, and traders who came to supply their wants. In such a crowd elements of disorder will never be wanting, and it was with the general goodwill that Sir Humphrey Gilbert took formal possession in 1583, and set up some kind of government in the name of queen Elizabeth. It was appropriate, again, that the foundation-stone of England's colonial empire should have been laid by the noblest of the Elizabethan seamen, and should have been the crowning act of his blameless life, for Gilbert was lost at sea on the return voyage.

A colony was founded in Newfoundland during the reign of James I., but it was slow in developing. The English merchants, who were making fortunes out of the fishery, had no desire to see their gains curtailed by the interference of inhabitants of the island; and the sailors of other nations had obviously no interest in the matter, beyond obtaining the food which they required. Hence little more was done than to make permanent what had been annual, the settlement on the coast of people engaged in ministering to the wants of the fishermen. No attempt was made to discover the natural resources of the island for agriculture or mining. The scanty native inhabitants were left to themselves, and indeed count for nothing in the history of the colony, which was

[1] It is not certain whether the first land sighted by Cabot was here or on Prince Edward Island; but it is here at any rate that the name survives.

practically limited to the south-eastern corner of the great island, nearest to the scene of the fisheries.

English sovereignty over Newfoundland was never formally questioned, though the French made more than one attempt during the seventeenth century to obtain possession of it by force. France had been the first European power to make a serious effort to found a dominion in North America; and Newfoundland would have been an important acquisition, as completing her control of the St. Lawrence. To England on the other hand, as her colonies grew on the mainland to the southward, Newfoundland was of increasing value as a naval base. As the upshot of the various wars against Louis XIV., England remained by the terms of the Peace of Utrecht undisputed owner of Newfoundland. She, however, by the same treaty conceded formally to the French fishermen the use of the shore for the purpose of drying their fish, the concession being limited to the west coast and a small portion of the north. France at the same time was confirmed in her ownership of the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, off the south coast.

As this arrangement left to England the possession of the excellent harbour of St. John, the only other reason besides the fisheries for which Newfoundland was then deemed valuable, it seemed reasonable enough at the time. No one could then foresee the day when England would be mistress of everything round the Gulf of St. Lawrence except these fragments. The grievous mistake was made half a century later, when the Seven Years' war came to an end. During the war, in which England had conquered all the French possessions in the north of America, the French fishermen had of course ceased to use the Newfoundland shore. It would have certainly been possible in settling the terms of peace to arrange that France should abandon all claims on Newfoundland. Instead of this, the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, themselves not very precise, were formally renewed, to the very serious detriment of Newfoundland ever since, for the blunder was repeated after the fall of Napoleon, when England was in a still more commanding position. The people of Newfoundland were debarred from making

good use of half their own coasts, and as time went on tried, by refusing to allow the fishermen to procure bait, to make their privilege of little value to the French. The latter on their side claimed to do things not expressly allowed by the treaty, though not expressly forbidden. The interpretation of an ambiguous treaty is notoriously a fruitful source of dispute, and it was only by a compromise renewed from year to year that serious trouble was avoided. It is no wonder that Newfoundland, which received complete self-government in 1855, should always have been sore at no redress being found for a grievance arising from the past mistakes of the British government, or that she should have remained outside the Canadian federation so long as the grievance subsisted. And this feeling was all the stronger because what injured Newfoundland was becoming of less and less use to the French. There is no doubt that France had formerly a political interest in the cod fisheries, as a nursery for seamen: but opinion even in France is now divided as to their value for this purpose, under the changed conditions of modern naval warfare.

Happily it proved possible to arrange with France for the removal of this and other possible sources of quarrel between the two nations. By an agreement concluded in April, 1904, the French surrendered all exclusive rights over the Newfoundland shores, though they retain the privilege of fishing in territorial waters, and of landing to dry their fish, while individuals who might prove to have lost by the change were to receive compensation. That so sensible a compromise was not sooner effected is an illustration of the difficulty that nations find in settling matters which as between private persons would be decided in a law court.

The Straits of Belleisle, which separate Newfoundland from Labrador, are only twelve miles wide, the other entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence being five times as broad. Hence it was natural that Newfoundland should long ago have assumed jurisdiction over that desolate coast, where there are hardly any inhabitants, about one to every thirty square miles. Since then the interior of Labrador has become formally part of Canada, and it may be assumed that whenever

Newfoundland enters the federation, the present formal division of a barren and useless province will be dropped.

Newfoundland is rather larger than Ireland, and like it has no small part of the interior covered with lakes and marsh. It is difficult to estimate the agricultural value of the soil, as it has been little cultivated. Indeed, the population outside the small peninsula of Avalon at the south-east corner scarcely exceeds two to the square mile. Much of the country is still covered with forest, supplying, as is natural, timber of the same kinds as in Canada. There are considerable stores of both iron and coal, but the mines are as yet undeveloped. All other industries are in fact dwarfed by the fisheries, in which a very large part of the population is employed. The great submarine plateau known as the banks of Newfoundland, which extends for many miles to the south-east of the island, is by far the richest ground for cod fishing in the world. The annual export of fish from Newfoundland exceeds a million sterling, independently of the produce of the French fishery which passes through St. Pierre.

The geographical position of Newfoundland has one conspicuous advantage—it is considerably nearer to Europe than any other shore in the New World. Hence the first Atlantic cable was laid to it, and the first attempts to establish communication across the Atlantic by wireless telegraphy were also made there. There is, however, a great corresponding disadvantage: it is so far north[1] that icebergs drift in the vicinity in numbers great enough to be dangerous, and the fogs impede navigation. These fogs are due to the meeting of the cold Arctic current down the coast of Labrador with the warm current, popularly known as the Gulf Stream, up the coast of the United States. This evil is, of course, irremediable, and will probably always prevent the realisation of a plan which has been dreamed of ever since Newfound-

[1] The British Islands are so favoured in respect of climate that we are apt to forget how differently other parts of the world fare which are in the same latitude. The Gulf of St. Lawrence, which is partly ice-bound in winter, and the whole of Newfoundland except the narrow northern peninsula adjoining Labrador, are south of 50° N., which is the latitude of the Lizard, the southernmost point of England.

land began to construct railways, of making its capital the terminus for the shortest possible voyage across the Atlantic, passengers being conveyed to the west coast by train, and thence over the virtually inland waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

Whether Newfoundland will become comparatively rich and populous, now that the French difficulty has been satisfactorily adjusted, depends on many things, mainly on how fast the world fills up. The climate, thanks to the enveloping ocean, is less severe than that of great part of Canada. The original inhabitants have long been extinct, so that the population is virtually all Anglo-Saxon. There are plenty of excellent harbours, though the capital, St. John, is the only one which has at present any trade. There is mineral wealth, and there is a large area of cultivable land, which though not exceptionally fertile is capable of sustaining a considerable population. Should the vast regions in Africa which are now being opened to enterprise prove to contain any great amount of "white man's country," settlers may perhaps be slow in seeking the rather cold welcome which the soil of Newfoundland can give.

B. AUSTRALASIA

§ 1. GEOGRAPHY OF AUSTRALIA

Australia is an island of nearly three million square miles, lying in the southern ocean some distance to the south-east of India. In shape it somewhat resembles a truncated heart, with the narrow end uppermost. It is included between 11° and 39° of south latitude; that is to say, between a half and a third of its area is within the tropics, and its southern extremity is nearly in the same latitude as the Cape of Good Hope. Thus its position brings it within the scope of the south-eastern trade winds, and there is no mass of land near Australia to affect their operation, as the great mass of the

Asiatic continent does for the trade winds north of the equator. The trade winds do not on the average easily part with their moisture, since they are blowing from a colder to a warmer region, and therefore Australia receives less rain than an island, even one of so great dimensions, would be likely to receive in most parts of the globe. Its physical structure tends rather to aggravate than to diminish this natural liability to drought. For mountains extend in a tolerably continuous chain along the east side, from the south-eastern extremity nearly to the north-eastern. This range is very diverse in height, rising to over 7,000 feet in the south, and sinking to mere hills in the north; but it is never more than about fifty miles from the coast, usually much nearer, and it forms an unbroken watershed. On the eastern side it is mostly steep, on the western the land slopes away very gently. Thus the prevalent winds, blowing more or less from the eastward, water very adequately the coast strip, which is generally rich and fertile, though the character of its produce naturally varies with the latitude. Enough moisture passes over the mountain crest to make the regions to the west of them, which are watered by the best rivers that Australia can show, admirable pasturage, so long as the water-supply holds out. Under ordinary conditions the rivers become in summer a mere succession of pools, and fail almost entirely if the season is a dry one, which not infrequently happens. Even on the watered side of the dividing ridge drought is not uncommon; in fact, it was the pressure of drought which caused the first explorers to cross the chain in search of new pastures. During a recent series of dry years many attempts have been made to obtain water by sinking artesian wells; but the supply thus procurable is hardly sufficient to be worth the cost, and the prospect of watering any large extent of the country by artificial means seems not very hopeful. At best the water-supply cannot extend very far west of the dividing range: more than half of Australia is doomed to remain desert, unless some scarcely conceivable change of the natural conditions should take place. In spite of all, however, Australia possesses a very large area of pasture, maintaining some seventy millions of

sheep and eight or nine millions of horned cattle. Naturally wool, with other animal products, form the staple export of Australia taken as a whole, though the circumstances of the several colonies vary considerably.

The river system of Australia is very easily described. All the streams of the western side of the dividing range, from some distance north of the capital of Queensland downwards, unite to form a single river, the Murray, which reaches the sea on the south near Adelaide. The Darling, which with its tributaries drains southern Queensland and a great part of New South Wales, has considerably the longest course. The Murray itself forms during most of its length the frontier between New South Wales and Victoria. Of course there are other rivers, but they are of very little account. On the east they are necessarily very short: on the south there are none at all west of the Murray: on the north and west a certain number of streams reach the coast, but, as is inevitable, they are but small. Some of those which exist on the pastoral slopes west of the dividing range are lost in the desert space of the interior. In all Australia there is no river that is of much value for navigation, though by way of compensation there are a fair number of deep inlets from the sea, which form admirable harbours. Nature has provided emphatically that permanent habitation and culture by civilised man shall nowhere extend very far inland—far, that is to say, in proportion to the size of the entire island.

Australia is not poor in minerals, but one among them has had an overwhelming influence on its history. It was the discovery of gold in the south-eastern corner in the year 1848 which gave the first violent impulse to colonisation. Men rushed thither from all quarters to share in the gold, which lay near the surface and was easily won in the places where it was first found. Some grew rich and carried away their wealth, some perished: but many stayed in the country, where a vast demand for food and other necessaries and comforts of life had suddenly sprung up. Melbourne, the natural port of the gold region, developed in a few years from a cluster of wooden shanties on a wharf where little trade came, into one of the greatest cities south of the

equator. Gold was afterwards found in other localities, but not in profusion comparable to the richness of the first surprise. Gold mining became a permanent industry of all the eastern colonies, and helped the growth of population, which was partly due to other causes. Only within the last fifteen years has it been discovered that West Australia, the vast region which was regarded as almost worthless outside the coast strip, is full of goldfields. The effects of this on Australia in general, and on the western colony in particular, have yet to be developed.

Australia nowadays is usually spoken of as a continent, as though the title of island were beneath its dignity. So far as size goes it does not fall very far behind Europe, but it is a real island nevertheless, compact in shape and quite separate. An Atlantic liner in no great number of days could circumnavigate Australia, which is more than could be done for any other continent, except indeed Africa by means of the artificial Suez canal. Politically it has always, since occupation by civilised men began, had the insular advantage of unity: only one sovereign has ever been acknowledged in Australia. Its climate indeed is not what is usually reckoned insular, much of the surface being permanently desert on account of drought: but this is largely due to its position on the globe.

The remoteness of Australia from Europe made it long before anything beyond its bare existence was known, even to the maritime nations. The Portuguese, who had the eastern seas very much to themselves for many years after their discovery of the Cape route to India, had a general knowledge that a great land existed to the south of those East India islands where their main business lay. And in 1606 the Spaniard Torres (Portugal was then under the crown of Spain) discovered and gave his name to the straits which separate the northern corner of Australia from New Guinea: though this particular discovery, which might have led to much, remained inoperative. It was the Dutch, the rivals, and ultimately the supplanters, of the Portuguese in the east, who first began the exploration of Australia. They worked gradually along the north and west coasts, and were the first

to ascertain that the ocean lay along the south of it at no extreme distance, but they did no more. The Dutch were intent on trade, not on colonisation: and there was no trade to be had with a country inhabited by the merest savages, possessing no conspicuous wealth, vegetable or mineral. Moreover, the coasts of Australia are not attractive except on the east and at the southern corner: and by some fatality it was these portions which the Dutch never went near. The parts which they did explore were little better than the coasts of western Africa. Round the Gulf of Carpentaria are mangrove swamps: on the north-west there are long stretches of cliffs like those which were the despair of the first Portuguese explorers when they began to push down the coast of Africa, with intervals of barren, waterless beach. When they rounded the south-western corner it was no better: along the great bay, which is known as the Australian Bight, there were high cliffs with scarcely a break for hundreds of miles, without a single river mouth. Why exploration was not carried further does not clearly appear. The Dutchman Tasman sighted in 1642 the island which now bears his name, and also New Zealand, but he did not discover their fertility. Probably his employers were satisfied that there were no spice islands in the southern ocean, and concentrated their energies on those which they already possessed. Nor indeed had Holland men to spare for colonists, as the history of their occupation of the Cape of Good Hope amply shows.[1] A few names on the coasts remain to remind us that the Dutch had the first chance in Australia—for instance Cape Leeuwin, at the south-west corner. But the appellation which they once gave to the whole vast island, New Holland, is now entirely forgotten.

§ 2. COLONISATION OF AUSTRALIA

It was Captain Cook, the greatest of the English eighteenth-century maritime explorers, to whom the colonisation of Australia is virtually due. He was the first

[1] See page 268.

to investigate the east coast from one end to the other, and it was largely on the strength of his reports that the British government resolved to establish penal settlements there. The Australian colonies, taken as a whole, suffered from there being a large convict element in their early population; and perhaps the effects have not altogether disappeared, though the practice of transportation has long been discontinued. Modern sentiment on the subject accords with the colonists' dislike to having the refuse of the home population forced on them; a nation is bound, it is felt, to deal with its criminals at home, without turning them on to a country on the other side of the world. It does not, however, follow that the original policy was either unjust or unwise. At the end of the eighteenth century public opinion in England was growing adverse to the severity of the existing criminal law, with the result that juries were slow to convict for crimes legally involving capital punishment. Another generation had yet to pass before the law was put on its present footing; but meanwhile the death penalty was often commuted, and the question of how to dispose of criminals assumed greater urgency. Humanity might well approve, if it did not prompt, the idea of planting them in a totally new land, in a healthy climate not too unlike their own, where they might have the chance of beginning life afresh after their sentence had expired. Nor was the policy unsuccessful: a very considerable number of the discharged criminals fulfilled these hopes, and became worthy members of the new communities. It was however equally natural that as the Australian colonies grew, and the proportion of inhabitants who had no taint of criminal origin increased, their feeling against the system should become stronger, and ultimately irresistible. What had been originally reasonable, even laudable, was so no longer; and the home government was to blame for not sooner recognising that circumstances had changed.

Captain Cook, whose Australian explorations began in 1770, gave the name of New South Wales to the eastern coast, though not attempting to define where it began or ended. And this name was preserved when in 1788 the British government sent the first expedition to establish

a penal settlement. The first beginnings were made at Botany Bay, and the name happened to strike the popular imagination, so that it became a recognised euphemism for transportation. As a matter of fact, however, Botany Bay was very soon abandoned for the more convenient station of Sydney, on the magnificent harbour of Port Jackson: Sydney thus became the capital of what in a very few years began to grow as a free colony. The convicts were assigned as servants during their term of penal servitude to the free settlers, and thus the immediate difficulty of lack of labour was surmounted, though at the cost, as already stated, of the released convicts, who could not but be known as such, forming no small fraction of the population.

It does not appear that the British government, in establishing their colony of New South Wales, made any declaration of their intention, in so doing, of taking formal possession of the whole or any defined portion of Australia. At any rate Napoleon, soon after he obtained supreme power in France, planned an expedition which should explore the southern side of Australia with a view to taking possession. Though England and France were then at war, the French vessels had a friendly reception at Sydney, as being professedly engaged in peaceful scientific work. Suspicion was, however, soon aroused as to the real intentions of the French, and the British government ordered the immediate occupation of Tasmania, which had not long been known to be a separate island, and the planting of a colony on the great inlet of Port Phillip. The French explored the south coast much more thoroughly than had ever been done before, being allowed the use of the materials recently collected by English sailors, and some of the names which they gave still survive: but the expedition had no resources for actually establishing a colony, even if the English would have allowed it. The battle of Trafalgar soon afterwards annihilated Napoleon's maritime power, and no other nation ever attempted to dispute with England the possession of Australia. But evidence of what Napoleon had planned survives in the shape of the narrative of the exploring expedition, published in 1807.

In the map[1] appended to it the whole of the coast from the southern point of Australia westwards to beyond the present boundary of South Australia figures as *Terre Napoléon*, with other names to match. No one will imagine that Napoleon was exceeding his rights in planning a French colony in Australia, though no one will defend the treacherousness of the method. But it was certainly fortunate for Australia that hostile colonies were not planted side by side on its shores: fortunate also, as we may fairly think, that it was the maritime and colonising power which remained in possession. France, with its population exhausted in Napoleon's wars, would have been incapable for two generations, even if it had ever been capable, of providing citizens for the *terra australis*.

From about the date of the first English settlement in New South Wales, exploration of the coasts was carried on steadily, with Sydney as a base of operations. Captain Cook had worked northwards from Cape Howe at the south-eastern corner of Australia, where now the frontier between New South Wales and Victoria comes down to the sea. Naturally therefore Bass and Flinders, who did the best part of the work in the last decade of the eighteenth century, turned their attention in the opposite direction. It was they who first thoroughly explored the extreme south point, and the seas around Tasmania, and found their way into the great inlet of Port Phillip further west. Thus when the French expedition sent by Napoleon, as already mentioned, appeared on the scene, the New South Wales government knew what places should be first occupied, and made no mistakes. It was not, however, till ten years later that anything was known beyond the mere coast. The Blue Mountains, as the portion of the dividing range behind Sydney is called, are remarkably steep and rugged on their eastern face, and repeated attempts to cross them failed. Under the stimulus of virtual necessity, when an exceptional drought threatened the destruction of the live stock on the

[1] Mr. Holland Rose has reproduced this map in his *Life of Napoleon*

coast strip, some explorers succeeded in crossing the Blue Mountains in 1813. They were rewarded by the discovery of the great pasture tract which very gradually sinks away to the westward. At first sight it may well have appeared as if the supply of land was unlimited: nor indeed is it even yet as fully peopled as would be feasible. The centre of Australia was at that date utterly unexplored, though the size was known through survey of the coasts. The tacit assumption that the central region would prove similar to what extends a long way westwards from the mountain range was perfectly natural, though it proved fallacious. Simultaneously with the first overflow across the dividing range other explorations were made in what have proved the most fertile regions, notably around Port Phillip, where the settlement which had been attempted in 1803 was revived in earnest, and from the Murray river westwards through the best part of what is now South Australia. When lands so excellent had been found within a comparatively small area, it was not unnatural that a belief should grow up that the great island continent was a land of almost unlimited promise. Both in New South Wales —the separation from it of one colony after another had not yet begun, was indeed largely a result of the discoveries—and in England pains were taken for assisting emigration, and the population began to grow in earnest. This increase was greatly helped by the discovery of gold, as already stated; but even before this the preponderance of free settlers had become great enough to bring about the termination of the practice of transportation.

Meanwhile systematic exploration had been carried steadily on, and it may be said that between 1840 and 1860 a fair general knowledge was obtained of the character of the country as a whole. The annals of geographical discovery contain few records of more laborious or more painful journeys than those of the Englishmen who first penetrated the central Australian desert. One cannot help feeling that a large part of their sufferings might have been spared, if the expeditions had been planned to overcome the difficulties which were in fact encountered, and which cost not a few lives. Such knowledge they could not, however, from the

nature of the case, possess: and perhaps the vague hopes which were doomed to disappointment led to the earlier expeditions starting with less elaborate organisation than is reasonable and usual for average journeys of exploration. The general result was to show that a considerable proportion of Australia is uninhabitable, much of the country wholly so, other parts affording room for scanty settlements, but giving no promise of supporting even a moderate population. Hence for a good many years the Australian colonies ceased to encourage immigration. They have however recently become alive to the expediency of increasing the white population; and it may be expected that when terms have been arranged between the Commonwealth and the several states, each of which controls its own lands, a comprehensive policy for this purpose will be adopted.

The most important element in Australian political history, ever since the colonies received self-government, has been the land question. In a settlement like the first that was made in New South Wales, primarily for the reception of convicts, with the unknown all about it in an island of vast dimensions, it was natural that the land should be acquired by settlers on very easy terms. It was inevitable also that as the free colonists increased, yet were still too scanty to furnish much revenue out of taxation, the idea of raising a revenue out of the public lands should arise. A discussion of the problems which presented themselves, as various interests arose, would be relevant for economic rather than for geographical history. Suffice it to say that the conclusions reached are in accordance with the democracy naturally prevailing in a new country peopled by Englishmen.

Democratic and more or less socialistic principles have also determined the mode in which Australia is dealing with another set of questions. Geographical conditions long ago compelled the Australian colonies to face the difficult problems which arise when different races, greatly divergent in habits and civilisation, are dwelling in the same country. Thanks however to geography, they have arisen in a form not very acute, and seem likely to be satisfactorily solved. Australia

is, as a matter of fact, a white man's country. It is calculated that all but about five per cent. of its inhabitants are either colonists born or immigrants from Great Britain: and the small white remainder, many of whom are of Teutonic origin, are practically absorbed easily and rapidly. The aboriginal blacks have never shown any aptitude for civilisation. They simply die out before the white man, and are now comparatively few in number: in Tasmania indeed they are entirely extinct. There is not, and now never can be, any half-bred race, arising from intermixture between the original natives and the white new-comers. They count for no more than the redskins in North America: in fact they count for less, since the red men played a very important part, as enemies and as allies, in the early history of the United States and of Canada.

The colour problem in America has arisen through the importation of negro slaves, brought to cultivate crops which under the climatic conditions white men could not or would not work at. And analogous, though by no means identical difficulties have threatened Australia, partly for the same reason, partly because of its geographical position. Australia is within easy reach of the southern shores of Asia, and the Chinese, though not sufficiently maritime to have discovered for themselves, are ready to take advantage of settlements made in new lands by the more adventurous white men. They are industrious and willing to work for small pay, which makes employers welcome their advent wherever labour is scarce. But in most other respects they are undesirable members of a community, and their one great merit becomes a defect in the eyes of those whose chances of employment they curtail, and whose scale of remuneration they lower by competition. The United States have taken strong measures to prevent the Chinese from flooding the Pacific coasts, and the Australian colonies have done the like. They are now democratic communities, where the views of the working classes have great political weight, and legislation accordingly tends to assume a socialistic aspect. The most zealous opponent of socialism would, however, agree in thinking that in a country inhabited by white European

Christians, the fewer Chinese the better. Laws were at first framed to minimise the admission of Chinese as such, when the danger from them seemed serious. But natives of India also made their way to Australia, though fewer in numbers and interfering less with the labour market. The exclusion laws have now taken a different form, largely under influence from home, and are so formed as to check the entrance of undesirable immigrants, whatever their race.[1]

The difficulty of tropical cultivation, which is felt in the northern part of Australia, practically in north Queensland only, would doubtless have been solved by the importation of slave labour, if Australia had been colonised a century or so earlier. Even as it was, with laws and public opinion strongly condemning slavery, abuses arose with the introduction of black labourers from the Pacific islands, who were not only technically free, but were engaged to work only for a limited term of years, with a right to be re-conveyed to their homes. These abuses were minimised by more and more stringent regulations; and a considerable sugar industry grew up. Recently the working classes of Queensland, being politically preponderant, have sought to exclude all black labour, as injurious to their own prospects, though they have shown no readiness themselves to undertake all the tasks involved in sugar growing. Whether white men can really do the work in tropical heat is a question not yet conclusively answered: good judges say that they can, but the amount of experience is small. The new Commonwealth of Australia, however, took the question up in the first session of the federal Parliament, and passed a law whereby all importation of black labour ceased in the year 1904, while those already in the country were deported to their homes in 1906–7, except such as obtained definite permission to stay. Meanwhile the sugar growers are

[1] The above has been written about Australia only, but it applies to New Zealand also, with slight modifications. The Maories are a very superior race to the Australian blacks, but they are equally apart from the whites, and to say the least, they do not increase in numbers. And New Zealand, lying further off in the ocean, was rather less exposed to Chinese immigration.

helped towards organising white labour, which must be much more expensive, by the imposition of heavy protective duties on all imported sugar. It remains to be seen whether the sugar industry will be killed, and the prospects of northern Queensland almost ruined, or whether white labourers, free from the presence and competition of black men, will carry it on successfully. If the latter should happen, there will be reason for reconsidering many of the current opinions as to what the white races can do in the tropics. The grave doubt however presents itself, not whether they can, but whether they will. Such work, even if not destructive to health, must needs be trying: it remains to be seen whether white men in sufficient numbers can be induced to undertake it, so long as they can find other and less exhausting occupation elsewhere.

§3. THE STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH

The map of Australia shows at a glance how very recent the settlement of the country has been. The boundaries between the several colonies are, with one exception, lines of latitude or longitude; that is to say, they can be determined unerringly by proper scientific observation. As a matter of fact there are hardly any natural features which could serve as adequate frontiers, as if nature had intended Australia to be one politically, so that difficulties about frontier could never lead to war. It is also characteristic of a thoroughly modern country, whose politics would contemplate war as only a rare exception, that the capitals of all the separate states are maritime. Europe would regard their sites as very ill fitted for the purpose, not central, and dangerously exposed to hostile attack. Australia lies so far from Europe that a naval attack on its shores, exceeding the scale of a mere raid, is scarcely feasible; and against a mere raid the great harbours of Sydney and Melbourne are easily protected.

New South Wales.—The name which was conferred by Captain Cook on the coast region that he was the first to explore had for many years an entirely vague signification. The British government, which at first thought of it mainly as a convict settlement, was naturally content with a single

head quarters, whence branch establishments might be directed when such should be formed. Nor was there at first any sufficient population to suggest the idea of separate colonies, or sufficient geographical knowledge as to the capabilities of Australia as a whole. Gradually the scene changed: the independent colonists grew in number and importance, new settlements were founded under new ideas, above all the progress of exploration showed how large were the regions open to settlement. When the colony of South Australia was constituted, a boundary was for the first time set to New South Wales; the 141st meridian became its western frontier. Then followed the separation of its southern portion beyond the river Murray, which became the colony of Victoria. Finally the whole of the north, beyond the 29th parallel, was divided off under the name of Queensland.

What is left to New South Wales, the southern half of eastern Australia down to the south-eastern corner, has an area of 310,000 square miles, or about as large as France and Italy together. Two-thirds of this are well watered and well fitted for occupation, pastoral or agricultural; the remainder suffers too much from drought. The staple product of the country is wool, which is exported to the average value of about £10,000,000 annually. New South Wales is also very rich in minerals, possessing all the important metals except iron, which accordingly forms one of the largest items of import from the mother country. Of the population, estimated in 1922 at 2,172,000, one-third is concentrated in the capital, Sydney, which possesses a magnificent harbour, and does a very large proportion of the whole trade. Indeed there is no other town, except the coal port of Newcastle, which approaches 30,000. The best section of the original colony was doubtless lost when Victoria was cut off; but New South Wales, in spite of a much hotter climate, has still the capacity for very great advance both in wealth and in population.

Victoria.—Port Phillip, the great inlet which forms the harbour of Melbourne, and is thus the core of the colony of Victoria, was occupied hastily in 1803, when the English

authorities at Sydney thought it expedient to anticipate a possible French attempt at establishing a footing in Australia. The penal settlement was, however, very soon removed, and no effectual steps were taken towards forming a new colony till about 1835, by which time sufficient survey had been made to disclose the value of the land. Immigration rapidly set in, and the gold discoveries of a dozen to fifteen years later greatly accelerated the process. In 1851 the population had nearly reached 80,000, but it trebled itself in the next three years, and nearly doubled itself again by 1857. It was separated from New South Wales in 1850, and received a constitution three years later.

Victoria has an area almost exactly that of Great Britain, being thus very much the smallest division of Australia. Its inferiority in size is, however, richly compensated by its superiority in climate. Nearly all its territory is fertile; and though wool and the other products of live stock are its chief exports, it produces also both corn and wine. With these advantages it is not wonderful that Victoria should be the most densely populated, and on the whole the most prosperous, section of Australia. After the feverish agitation had subsided which was caused by the first rush to the goldfields, Victoria settled down to a career of steady progress. State-aided immigration ended in 1874, and the great bulk of the population, which exceeds 1,590,000, is now of native birth. Of this number Melbourne, the capital, contains about 816,000, being almost equal to Sydney in size.

South Australia.—It was not until 1834 that a company was formed for colonising South Australia, though previous explorations had ascertained the value of at least the coast region. At that date the tide was turning against the continuance of transportation; and thus South Australia has never had any convict element in its population. As originally constituted, the colony was to extend from the ocean to the 26th parallel of south latitude, and to be bounded west and east by the 132nd and 141st meridians, the latter forming its frontier towards New South Wales, from which neither Victoria nor Queensland had as yet been severed;

and these limits comprise all the really fertile land of which South Australia can boast. The colony was subsequently extended westwards to the 129th meridian, and in 1863 what had been known as the north territory, from the 29th parallel northwards to the sea, was also added. As Queensland had in the interval been constituted, the eastern limit of this northern part is the 138th meridian. The historical sequence of events thus explains the singular appearance of the map, where South Australia has a sharp corner running into Queensland. It cannot be said, however, that it signifies much to either colony which is the nominal owner of the strip between 138° and 141° east.

The best part of South Australia lies about the two deep gulfs, on the easternmost of which stands the capital. Its name, derived from Adelaide, the consort of king William IV., gives approximately the date of its foundation, which was the beginning of the colony itself. Adelaide has 170,000 inhabitants, not far short of half the total population of the colony, and is the only considerable town within its limits. Alone among the components of the Australian Commonwealth, South Australia produces no gold: its wealth is practically all agricultural, and is confined to the region already spoken of, which is by no means small, being perhaps as large as Scotland. The remainder of the original colony is more or less desert. To the west along the coast of the Great Australian Bight, and from thence almost across to the ocean on the north, no softer word will suffice. And the northern half of it, say from the 30th to the 26th parallel, is scarcely better; it is a region of bare hills and salt lakes, that swallow up the feeble rivers which flow out of the western edge of the great pastoral district.

Northern Territory.—This district occupies the centre of the Australian continent. It had been added to South Australia in 1863 and remained part of that state until December 31, 1910. But on January 1, 1911, its administration was taken over by the Commonwealth. There are less than 4,000 inhabitants to about 500,000 square miles.

Queensland.—An additional penal settlement was established on Moreton Bay, near to the present capital of Queens-

land, but it was only maintained till 1842, after which free settlers were invited into the country. Sufficient progress was made to justify separation from New South Wales in 1859, when the new colony, under the title of Queensland, received a self-governing constitution.

Queensland is bounded on the west by the 138th meridian of east longitude, while on the south the 29th parallel of south latitude forms most part of its frontier towards New South Wales. It thus occupies the whole north-eastern corner of Australia, rather more than half its territory being within the tropics. Of its total extent, about 670,000 square miles, a very large portion is still uncleared. Though, like all parts of Australia, Queensland possesses valuable minerals, its chief wealth consists in sheep and cattle. In the southern part of the colony vast uplands stretch away westwards from the dividing range, the heat natural to the latitude being somewhat tempered by elevation above the sea. There were, according to the returns for 1916, over fifteen million sheep and more than four million horned cattle in Queensland, nearly the whole of them in this region. In the tropical north sugar can be grown with considerable success, if labour is available.

The population of Queensland is a little over 778,000, of whom a quarter are settled in Brisbane, the capital. There are however several other towns, chiefly on the coast, of moderate size, and this may be attributed partly at least to a geographical peculiarity. Along the coast of Queensland, from Cape York at the extreme north nearly to the latitude of Brisbane, runs the Great Barrier Reef, a coral formation which effectually protects the strip of sea within it. Thus the harbours, though not very large or deep, are safe, and the natural convenience, especially in a large and thinly peopled country, of conveying produce to the nearest suitable place on the coast, and thence by sea, is not overruled by any lack of ports.

A community which has existed for less than two generations is not likely to have much history. It has run its course, like the other Australian colonies, very democratically, and of late with a decided socialistic bias. It is tropical Queensland alone which has raised for the Commonwealth the problem of imported coloured labour, as has been already

mentioned, though the cognate difficulty, as to the voluntary immigration of Chinese and other non-European people, affects it rather less than some of the others.

West Australia.—Western Australia consists of all the land west of the 129th meridian of east longitude, and comprises nearly a million square miles, or about one-third of the whole of Australia. It has a fertile and very healthy strip on the west coast, extending a little way round Cape Leeuwin, the south-western corner of the island. Perth, the capital, is near the middle of this strip, and including Fremantle had, in 1921, an estimated population of 155,000. It is the only town worth mentioning in the colony except Albany, which is fortified as an imperial coaling-station. There is also a habitable, though not very valuable, strip on the north-west coast; but the bulk of the territory of West Australia is more or less desert. Indeed, some parts of it have scarcely been explored, though the great mineral wealth of other districts will doubtless tend to accelerate the exploration of the remainder, in the hope that it may prove equally auriferous. The general character of the country may be inferred from the fact that less than one three-thousandth part of its soil is under cultivation, and more than half of this is grass. These figures no doubt convey too unfavourable an impression. The total population in 1922 was over 343,000, and of these a considerable proportion were engaged in mining. Doubtless there is much land still unoccupied which is really cultivable, but not worth the trouble until the pressure of population, there and generally on the earth's surface, becomes much more severe. And there is also a very large amount of forest land yielding timber worth exporting, which would be practically rendered worthless if the timber were cleared, largely through lack of water.

The colonisation of West Australia, under the title of Swan River, was begun in 1829, but it found little favour for half a century, in spite of efforts to attract emigrants, and of the questionable policy of inviting the home government to supply the labour market with convicts after the rest of Australia had got rid of them. The census of 1881 showed a population of less than 30,000. Since then, however, West

Australia has grown more than tenfold, largely in consequence of the recent discoveries of extensive goldfields, besides other minerals. It was only in 1893 that West Australia reached the limit of population at which it had been arranged by previous legislation that complete self-government should begin. Since then it has become a component part of the Commonwealth of Australia, by far the least important section of the continent in population and commerce, but the largest in area, and probably that in which the possibilities of future increase are greatest, considered in proportion to the present state of things.

Tasmania.—The island of Tasmania lies due south of the southernmost point of Australia, and is about 150 miles distant. No better illustration can be given of the slight and perfunctory nature of the early exploration round Australia than the fact that only in the year 1798 was Tasmania discovered to be a separate island. There are two or three smaller islands to mask the intervening channel, now known as Bass's Straits from the discoverer of 1798. The island is tolerably mountainous: and one can imagine how the earlier navigators, sailing south-eastwards along the Australian coast and giving the shore a wide berth, as prudent mariners would naturally do in the not very placid southern ocean, might see the high land ahead of them, and steer out to sea, taking for granted that it was a continuation of the mainland. Tasman, who gave it in 1642 the name of Van Diemen's Land, after his sweetheart as it is always said, did not even land on the island, and in fact sailed away into the ocean after rounding the southern point, to make the further discovery of New Zealand and treat it after the same fashion.

Tasmania, which is nearly as large as Scotland, enjoys a delightful climate, much fertile soil, with considerable mineral wealth. Indeed it has been called the southern garden of Eden, not without, as has been said, the presence of the serpent: for Tasmania is, or was, infested by a larger proportion of poisonous snakes even than Australia. Its hills rise to over 5,000 feet, so that on the slopes it can produce almost anything which is not actually tropical. Much of its surface is still clothed with forests of valuable timber,

the population never having grown large enough to require that they should be cleared. Whether the ground would be more valuable under cultivation is a question which the future may answer, but at present there is no great demand for land.

Tasmania has not flourished as a colony, in spite of its great natural advantages: and this is mainly to be attributed to geography. Its position makes it an appendage to Australia, rather than self-sufficing. It furnishes to Australia a delightful health-resort, the climate being for obvious reasons more temperate. And its trade is also very largely localised: Melbourne serves as an emporium alike for Tasmanian produce and for Tasmanian purchase of imports. Naturally it has become a member of the Australian federation, having had in fact the longest independent existence of any of the colonies as now constituted. It began its existence as a dependency of New South Wales, as already mentioned, being especially intended to afford an additional penal settlement. In 1825 it was constituted a separate colony, and continued to receive convicts till 1853, somewhat later than the others. Doubtless its geographical separateness, and its not sharing in the sudden attraction of the gold discoveries, tended to postpone the date at which the cessation of transportation became urgently desirable. In due course Tasmania received a self-governing constitution, the statute establishing it dating from 1855. At the same time the original name of Van Diemen's Land was superseded by Tasmania, at the wish of the inhabitants, who therein showed a greater feeling for euphony and for geographical propriety than has been usual among colonists, at any rate in the southern hemisphere.

The process of disintegration, highly desirable in its time, which gradually divided Australia into five colonies, all self-governing, and all entirely independent of each other, has recently been reversed. Statesmen have long seen that a federation of these communities would be to their common advantage, but it took time to adjust their views, sharply discordant on more than one important point. The difficulties

were surmounted in time for the proclamation, on the first day of the twentieth century, of the Commonwealth of Australia, with a federal ministry and Parliament besides, and for certain purposes above, those of the constituent states, which are the five divisions of Australia and Tasmania. It was appropriate that the event which ensures the unity of an Australian nation, should the ties with the mother country ever be broken, should be the last event in the long reign of queen Victoria. When it began, Australia had but a few score thousand inhabitants, and the greater part of it was still *terra incognita:* when it ended, most of the country had been surveyed, and the population had increased to between three and four millions. By 1921 the population had reached 5,640,000. More than 330,000 Australians came overseas to fight for the British Empire during the recent war.

§ 4. NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand is, as many of its people like to think, the England of the southern hemisphere. The resemblance is not exact, but is sufficiently close to be worth working out in detail. Both consist of two large islands, with a number of small ones: the southern island of New Zealand is almost exactly of the size of England and Wales, the north island considerably larger than Ireland. Both extend over many degrees of latitude, the British Islands over more than ten, New Zealand over nearly twelve, which implies a great diversity of climate between the north end of the group and the south. Both have thoroughly insular climates, New Zealand having no land mass within many hundred miles, the British Islands abutting on the ocean on the side whence the prevailing winds blow. New Zealand is considerably nearer to the equator: its highest latitude is less than the lowest latitude in England. This difference is sufficient to give New Zealand a greater certainty of its harvests ripening, though the crops grown in the two countries are substantially the same. The advantage which New Zealand enjoys in point of climate is perhaps best shown by saying that the mean winter temperature is 48°, which implies that frost is rare, and that the summer average is only 63°.

Great as is the resemblance in general conditions, the

differences in structure are very marked. In the New Zealand group the smaller island is to the north, not to the west, of the larger. Both islands are long and narrow in shape, so that their coast looks east or west: neither of the islands has any length of south coast like England. The mountains in both groups run on the western side: but those in New Zealand are very much loftier, the highest portion having extensive glaciers and peaks over 12,000 feet in height. This snow-clad range is in the main island, but the same formation seems to extend some way up the northern island also. From the presence of these mountains two important consequences follow. Their slopes, which are largely forest-clad, tend to retain the moisture, thereby greatly diminishing the chances either of drought or of sudden flood. And the rivers, which from the shape of the country are with one exception short, are numerous and supply ample water power, which may one day be of enormous industrial importance. The value of the forests is great, the indigenous trees of the southern hemisphere having many of them fine and hard wood: and there is no fear, now that New Zealand is fairly well peopled and intelligently governed, of the forests being cleared recklessly. But the climate would probably save the slopes denuded of trees from becoming barren wastes of stones, as happens in worse-watered regions.

It is calculated that about two-thirds of the entire surface of New Zealand is suitable for agriculture or for pasture, chiefly for the latter. There are said to be over twenty-six millions of sheep in the country: hence it is not wonderful that New Zealand exports about £12,000,000 worth of wool and £8,000,000 of meat, besides other animal products. It grows also a considerable quantity of corn, enough to export not a little: but in this respect it cannot compare with other lands included in the British empire, notably central Canada. Like Australia, New Zealand has a good supply of gold, and also nearly coal enough for home consumption. Iron, in the form of ironsand in Taranaki and as brown hæmatite at Parapara, has recently been found, and should add considerably to the mineral wealth of the country.

The population of New Zealand is over 1,320,000, almost equally divided between the two islands, the twentieth of that

number being native Maories; and there is obviously ample room for great further increase. The Maories, who are mainly in the northern island, are tending rather to diminish than to increase in number. Though far higher in the scale than any other natives of the southern hemisphere, and having among them many individuals who rise to a high level of education and intelligence, they seem unable, as a race, to assimilate civilisation. Like the red men of North America, though at a slower rate, thanks to their higher capacities, the Maories are apparently destined at no very distant date to disappear entirely.

New Zealand is in one respect very unlike the Australian colonies. In all of them the capital is enormously larger and more important than any other town. In New Zealand there are four towns which may be classed together as averaging with their suburbs over 90,000 inhabitants each; and of these Wellington, the administrative capital, is not the largest, though its position at the extreme south end of the north island makes it the most convenient. Historical circumstances account for the rise of several fairly equal towns, each of which was the nucleus of what may be called an independent settlement: but the geographical conditions also tended to produce the same result. The long, narrow shape of the islands, and the mountain backbone of the larger, were obviously unfavourable to any one, or even two, places becoming commercial centres for the whole. Thus nothing has led in New Zealand to the growth of a huge town overshadowing all others, and probably this is to the advantage of the colony.

Though Tasman saw and named New Zealand, it was Captain Cook who was the real explorer, more than a century later. He visited the island several times, beginning in 1769, took formal possession in the name of Great Britain, and introduced sundry animals, New Zealand having down to that time had no quadrupeds. It was long, however, before Cook's formal act was followed by any effective occupation, though fortunately no other nation stepped in to establish a colony, and to claim, as international usage would justify, that this availed to override the formal pretensions

which England had not backed by any overt act. In fact the missionaries, who began their work early in the nineteenth century without any state protection, had converted a large part of the Maori population to Christianity before anything further was done. Other visitors to New Zealand were of a different character: reckless adventurers took part in the trade which sprang up, assisted the natives in their wars, and supplied them with firearms. What was gained in one way was lost in others: it became increasingly desirable that law and order should be imposed by a higher power.

England, however, was in no hurry to intervene: there was an idea that we had colonies enough already. Nor did the white settlers desire effective annexation: adventurers and missionaries alike were reluctant to come under the strong hand of a real government. The knowledge that a plan was on foot for a French colony in New Zealand converted at any rate the missionaries, who dreaded the rivalry of Roman Catholics in their special field. The real impulse, however, which created another England beyond the equator came from theorists at home, among whom Gibbon Wakefield was the moving spirit. His leading idea was that a new colony should be fully organised from the first, instead of leaving individuals to acquire land and settle as they pleased. His theories were open to many objections, and very difficult to carry out in practice: but communities formed on his model were in fact established, and became the nucleus of more than one of the chief towns in New Zealand.

The first English governor was appointed in 1840, but five-and-twenty years had to elapse before the whole country began to be peaceful and prosperous. Speculators tried to obtain large areas of land from the natives at nominal prices, and the Maori chiefs were reluctant to fulfil even fair bargains. The chiefs had formally recognised British sovereignty in 1840, but were by no means ready to surrender their practical independence. The new colonists made the mistake of trying to settle in the north island, instead of in the southern one, where there were hardly any inhabitants. This was remedied after a time: but meanwhile there were serious

grounds of quarrel with the natives, with faults apparently on all sides. Ultimately the Maories rose in arms, and the formation of the country gave them great advantages. They had learned the art of constructing stockades, for which in a hilly country with much forest very advantageous positions could easily be found. The Maories were brave and well armed : the movement and provisioning of troops over such ground was very difficult. It was no wonder that it took ten years to overcome their resistance. Since 1869 the Maories have been peaceful subjects, individuals among them taking an active part in public affairs ; but they remain apart, and tend to decrease.

In 1852 the company which had made most of the earlier settlements, more or less on Wakefield's lines, was bought out, and shortly afterwards New Zealand received a constitution of the fully self-governing type. Its subsequent history is remarkable from the point of view of political and social experiment, but has only been affected by geography in one respect. New Zealand is 1,200 miles from Australia, and this sufficiently explains its refusal to enter into federal relations with the Australian colonies. The fact that it received in 1907 the title of Dominion may be taken as an indication that it will remain separate. By geographical position New Zealand is meant to stand alone, and its size and climate ought to suffice to make it in time a large and strong nation, which will probably be more thoroughly English in race, and in all that race means, than any other of the daughter nations.

During the twelve months previous to the outbreak of war in 1914 New Zealand was passing through one of the most satisfactory periods in its history. The construction of new railways and other public works was being actively promoted. New Zealand's co-operation in the war was marked by great enthusiasm, and before November, 1918, 99,000 New Zealanders had come overseas.

§ 5. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Nothing could well be more unlike Australia, physically or politically, than most of the other British possessions in the southern ocean. Australia is so large that it is frequently

called a continent; they are small islets in a vast expanse of sea. Australia has on the whole a dry climate, and is in large part entirely waterless: they draw more than sufficient moisture from the waste of waters on which they are but specks. Australia is English in race, self-governed, going beyond England in the development of democracy: they are the abodes of natives, different in race and language, but all low in the scale of civilisation, with a sprinkling of English traders and administrators. Yet it is chiefly because Australia is as an antipodean England that we have interest in accepting the responsibility for these many little communities of semi-savages. England, for the sake of Australia, is far more closely concerned than any other European nation with the affairs of the endless archipelago which dots the Pacific. And the nearer these islands are to Australia, the greater is obviously her interest in them, at any rate negatively—interest that they should not be occupied by possibly hostile powers.

It is thus in connection with Australia that historical geography finds it natural to discuss the other British dominions in the Pacific. They are doubtless as far as it is possible to be from the conditions, geographical or racial, under which they can become self-governing colonies. But it is possible that in the future, perhaps distant, when Australia shall have entered into closer political relations with New Zealand, the two in conjunction or by partition may take over the administration of the whole, as more than one colony has already done with small component parts of the widely scattered multitude of islands for which Great Britain has assumed responsibility.

It will be seen from the map that the Pacific islands under British control enclose an area of ocean to the east of Australia and north of New Zealand. The Solomon islands lie immediately to the east of New Guinea: beyond them, actually on the equator, are the Gilbert islands, north of Fiji, and the Ellice islands between. The Tonga group, taken over in 1900 as the result of an agreement by which we relinquished our joint interest in the Samoan group with Germany and the United States, is also near Fiji. The only islands

within this ring held by any foreign power are New Caledonia and its neighbours, belonging to France; and these it would be obviously to the interest of Australia to acquire, if an exchange or other friendly arrangement could be made with France. For the French government long ago made of New Caledonia a penal settlement, reserved for the worst of its criminals. And it is to the shores of New South Wales and Queensland that these convicts, escaped or in rare cases released, inevitably resort, to become a nuisance and a danger. France has, however, ceased to send out fresh convicts, though those already transported have not been withdrawn. Presumably, therefore, New Caledonia will before long cease to be a penal settlement, and there will then be only the geographical reason for Australia desiring to obtain it.

The clearest evidence that these Pacific islands have been included in the empire for the sake of Australia and New Zealand is that they have, with very few exceptions, only been taken over within the last generation or less; that is to say, since Australia has grown to importance. Norfolk island, which was once the British New Caledonia, though transportation thither has long ceased, is administered by New South Wales. The Cook islands and others have been annexed to New Zealand; most of them are at a considerable distance, but in the absence of any other land this is reasonable and convenient. Pitcairn's island is noted as the scene of one of the most singular episodes on record. At the end of the eighteenth century the mutineers of the *Bounty*, having turned adrift their captain and those who remained faithful to him, deliberately settled on this uninhabited isle. They procured native wives from other Pacific islands, and built up a community, orderly and well behaved, under rules of their own devising. The moving spirit of the whole scheme, Fletcher Christian, must have been a man of extraordinary gifts and force of character. The British government, when the whole story was known, did not think it necessary to punish the mutineers, and let the very anomalous settlement alone. Ultimately the soil of Pitcairn's island proved unable to provide subsistence for all, and they

were removed in 1856 to Norfolk island, which had been cleared of convicts.

Fiji.—Considerably the most important group is the Fiji islands, which were annexed at the request of the native inhabitants in 1874, the island of Rotumah, which lies not far off to the northward, being added in 1880. They are situated nearly on the 180th meridian, but within the tropics, that is to say, north of New Zealand, but more than a thousand miles off. The Fiji group have collectively an area of about 7,000 square miles, three-quarters of which are made up by two islands. Of the remainder, said to exceed 200 in number, the majority are too small to be inhabited. Of the whole population of nearly 157,000 only 3,880 are white. Naturally Fiji is a crown colony, and is governed very largely through native chiefs in accordance with their own system. The governor is also commissioner for the other Pacific islands, which are protected rather than administered by England. The Fiji islands supply a considerable quantity of the usual produce of tropical islands, coconuts in particular; and sugar plantations have been established, and form the most important industry. No small part of the labour is furnished by natives of India, who, as in Mauritius and Trinidad, seem to thrive and increase, taking kindly to the climate. On the other hand, the natives do not grow in numbers, although the decrease of the population, which at one time went on at an appalling rate, has recently been checked.

Papua.—The only exception to the thoroughly insular character of the minor British dominions in this region of the earth is found in New Guinea. That immense island, the largest on the globe after Australia itself, is only separated from the northern extremity of Queensland by the narrow Torres straits, and it extends far eastwards, shutting in on the north the ocean which lies off the east coast of Australia. The western half has long been Dutch: on the northern shore of the eastern half Germany had made some settlements, and the English had done the like on the southern shore, though with no purpose beyond trade. Considering the geography, it was natural that the Australian

colonies, and especially Queensland, should wish to see English interests in New Guinea defined and ensured. Accordingly formal possession was taken in 1887 of the southern coast, the boundaries being fixed by an elaborate convention with Germany. The British portion of New Guinea is estimated at 90,000 square miles, or a trifle larger than Great Britain. Much of it is very mountainous ; in fact it was the scene, thirty or forty years ago, of a marvellous traveller's tale about a mountain 32,000 feet in height, which is considerably over double the true figure. Hence, like Jamaica, it ought to prove capable of growing, at one elevation or another, almost every tropical or semi-tropical product. And as it is reported to be healthy, for the tropics, its capabilities for the future are bounded only by the extent to which the inhabitants may prove amenable to industrial influences.

In a land where there is not one white man to every thousand natives the administration cannot go much further than keeping the peace and encouraging industry. Seeing how directly interested the colonies on the east side of Australia were in a British occupation of this part of New Guinea, it was reasonable that they should at least help to pay the cost of administration. When the Australian colonies entered into federal union, this responsibility was taken over by the government of the Commonwealth. On the 1st September, 1906, a proclamation was issued by the Governor-General of Australia, declaring British New Guinea a territory of the Commonwealth, under the name of "Papua."

At the Peace Conference in 1919 it was fully recognised that it was impossible to have one part of a colony under one administration and the next part under another. It was therefore determined that the German portion of New Guinea (70,000 square miles) should be placed under the administration of the Australian Commonwealth, to which were also added the German islands of the Bismarck Archipelago and of the Solomon Group. The mandate was actually received in 1921, and from this time the Commonwealth has undertaken "a sacred trust of civilisation," and is responsible for the well-being and development of the peoples over whom it exercises tutelage.

Part V

THE DEPENDENCIES

A. INDIA

§ 1. GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE

INDIA, though on a much larger scale, bears in many respects a striking resemblance to Italy. It is the central peninsula projecting southwards from the continent to which it belongs. It is enclosed on the north by the highest mountains of the continent. It has a wide plain under the mountains which is extraordinarily fertile. Its peninsular portion is separated from the northern plain by a mountain barrier, and is more or less hilly all over. It has been, through a long history, a geographical expression having no political unity to correspond. It has become a political whole, though with limits not coinciding very closely with the physical boundaries. In spite of its mountain defences, it has been invaded through the passes by many various peoples, before and during recorded history, and its inhabitants are consequently by no means alike in race. In two respects only is India conspicuously unlike Italy: its people speak many languages and profess several creeds, and it owns allegiance to a foreign power which reaches it over sea.

Like Italy again, India can be easily defined if one is content with a loose popular definition. The Himalayas form, speaking generally, the northern boundary of geographical India, and the Suleiman mountains the north-western; but the two chains do not meet. Both run up towards the "roof of the world," as the Pamir region is often called, and in

those dreary highlands it is difficult to say that any lines are drawn by nature as the obvious frontiers of India. The geographical facts of this hill region which are important as bearing on the history of India are, however, easily stated.

From the point of view of the British empire, India is very different from what physical geography would suggest. The many vassal native states are, of course, included definitely in the empire. Besides these, there are within the physical limits given above two separate states, Nepal and Bhotan, which, though formally independent, are within the purview of the empire. And outside the physical limits there is much which is in more or less close political connection with it. Burma, on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, is definitely part of British India. Of Baluchistan, on the north-western frontier, part is in British occupation, and all is under our protection. Finally, Afghanistan, outside the Suleiman mountains, is regarded as within the British sphere of influence, and its ruler receives a subsidy. Nor has any geographical element had more bearing on the past history of India than the nature of the frontier between it and Afghanistan.

India for purposes of description naturally divides itself into three portions—the peninsula, the hill region round the north, and the plain between the first two. To these must be added Burma, which is geographically outside India, and the unimportant islands in the adjoining seas. The peninsula has fairly complete natural boundaries. No clearly marked lines can be drawn between the plain and the hills, as the outer ranges and spurs gradually sink to the level of the plain. But the general contrast between them is very distinct, historically as well as physically.

1. The southern portion of India is a triangular table-land, which may conveniently be called by its ancient name, the Deccan. The Vindhya mountains, running across India about in the line of the tropic of Cancer, form the northern escarpment of this plateau. Rising in places to above 4,000 feet and covered with forest, they were in ancient times a real barrier between the Deccan and the low-lying plain of the Ganges and its affluents. They do not, however, nearly reach the sea at either end, nor are they thoroughly

continuous, and under English rule they have been pierced by roads and railways. Down the western, or Malabar coast, comparatively near to the sea and unbroken till within a short distance of the southern point of India, is the chain known as the western Ghats. The strip of low-lying coast land outside the range of the Ghats was, until recent times, rather isolated from the rest of India: but it was there that the first European trading stations were formed, as from its position was natural. On the eastern side of the peninsula, known as the Coromandel coast, there is no such continuous chain: but the detached hills which on that side buttress the central plateau are usually known collectively as the eastern Ghats. The River Narbada, which drains the southern face of the Vindhyas, and the Tapti a little further south, flow close together into the Indian Ocean just north of the western Ghats. But all the rest of the Deccan is drained into the Bay of Bengal, chiefly by the three rivers Mahanadi, Kistna and Godaveri. Most part of the Deccan is a thousand feet or more above the sea; but this is only one of the reasons why its climate is less hot than that of northern India.

The chain of the western Ghats rises to its highest at the south end, known as the Nilghiri hills, high up among which is Ootacamund, the summer capital of Madras. Between them and the hills that run down to Cape Comorin is a wide gap, which considerably affects the climate of the south of India. Though there are many coast towns on both sides of the Deccan, including Goa, south of Bombay, which is still a Portuguese possession, and Pondicherri, near Madras, which is French, there is only one really good harbour in the whole of its two thousand miles of coast—that which is enclosed by the island of Bombay.

2. The Himalayas may be reckoned to begin five or six hundred miles north-east of Calcutta. The chain runs for a long distance westwards and then gradually curves to the north, its direction when it approaches the Pamirs being nearly north and south. Thus its shape is not unlike that of a scimitar with the curved side towards India, having a total length reckoned at sixteen hundred miles.

Lofty and continuous as are the Himalayas, they do not,

like the Alps in Europe, form a main watershed of the continent. They are an outlying mass, more or less parallel to the chain that bounds the arid plateau of Tibet, which is the real watershed, and is believed, though there have been no opportunities for proper measurement, to contain peaks that overtop the highest summits of the Himalayas. On the northern side of the range, about the centre of it, rise two great rivers that flow in opposite directions, draining its northern face. The Brahmaputra flowing east makes its way round the eastern end[1] of the Himalayas, and doubling back on the southern side of them, unites its delta with that of the Ganges, the great river that, with its tributaries, drains the southern face of the chain, over a length extending somewhat further westwards than the source of the Brahmaputra. The Indus begins by flowing north-westward, and presently forces a passage through or round—it is difficult to say where the chain terminates—the opposite end of the Himalayas, and emerges on the plain with a southerly direction. Some way down it is joined by its great tributary, the Sutlej, which also rises on the north side of the Himalayas very near the Indus, but breaks through the mountains immediately. The Sutlej flows south-westwards to the Indus, gathering up in its course all the rivers which cross the plain of the Punjab (five rivers), of which it forms the south-eastern frontier.

It is difficult to fix any definite limits to the Himalayan region, as has been already said. The two independent states of Nepal and Bhotan are included within it, and so is the vassal state of Kashmir, with the lofty valleys stretching north of it towards the Pamirs. Perhaps Assam also ought to be included, since its broad valley is closed in on the south as well as on the north by mountain country.

The Himalayas are so lofty and continuous that they are practically impassable, at any rate from the historical point of view, though a small amount of traffic is carried across them at more than one point. Things are very different on

[1] The river cuts through the mountain system, which is continued further eastwards between Burma and China; but the name Himalayas is not applied to these mountains, which are not very lofty.

the north-western frontier, where, though the mountain barrier is lofty in parts, there are several reasonably easy entrances into India. The name of the Suleiman mountains, which is commonly given to the whole, properly applies only to the central part: but the passes which have most influenced the past history of India are at the two extremities of this chain. The Bolan pass, at the southern end, leads into Baluchistan; it is waterless for a long distance, no slight drawback to its commercial or military usefulness. There is now however a railway through it, and another by a contiguous route further north, for the sake of communication with the British post of Quetta on the far side of the mountains. At the northern end is the famed Khaibar pass, which has been through all time the chief land route into India. Strictly speaking, it is not a pass at all, being merely a short cut across the neck of a great loop which the Kabul river makes in descending out of Afghanistan to join the Indus, the defile in which the river flows being practically impassable. The Khaibar is fairly easy as mountain routes go, though capable of effective defence by men skilled in mountain warfare. As a matter of fact, however, the hill tribes have usually made no opposition to invaders of India: and Afghanistan, which lies beyond, is readily accessible out of central Asia. No better proof can be given how little of an obstacle the Khaibar really is than the fact that the Afghan dynasties have commonly extended their power more or less far over the plain of the Indus. Now, for the first time in history, the Indian side of the Khaibar is firmly held by a great power, which exerts influence in Afghanistan, but has refrained from attempting to establish direct dominion there.

There are politicians who consider the great wall of the Suleimans, with its continuations north and south, to be an unsatisfactory frontier for India, and would have our empire extended to the Hindu Kush. They forget that the Hindu Kush comes to an end, and that Afghanistan is accessible with no serious obstacles on its western side. They forget, also, that an enemy bent on attacking India could ask for nothing more favourable than to be met half-way, at a great distance from our resources, and could be set no task more

formidable than to force an exit from the mountains on to the plain of the Indus, at the end of a march through such a country as Afghanistan.

3. The boundaries of the third great division of India, the northern plain, can only be stated in a general way, as has been already said. The lower slopes of the mountains fall away into the plain in some quarters very gradually, in others with some abruptness. The difference, however, especially between the northern hill country and the plain, is very strongly marked. The plain, especially on the eastern side, is extremely fertile and densely populated, while the slopes are from the bottom clothed with forest more or less completely. Perhaps it may be said that the hill region ends with the forest, though this must not be taken to mean that the plain is bare of trees.

The two great alluvial basins of the Ganges and Indus are separated by a merely nominal watershed. Indeed a subsidence of the land of less than a thousand feet would make the Deccan an island, and a very much slighter depression would convert it into a peninsula, connected with the mainland of Asia by a comparatively narrow isthmus. Both rivers carry down vast quantities of silt and mud,[1] especially the Ganges, which has the assistance of the Brahmaputra, and drains a region of heavy rainfall. This both serves to fertilise, and must also have greatly increased the area of the deltas since the first dawn of history. Indeed, but for the fertilising value of the river floods, the Indus region would be almost desert, for the climatic conditions are in other respects unfavourable, and differ in a marked degree from those of the Ganges basin.

As might be expected under such conditions, the two ends of the Indian plain are not well provided with harbours. The delta of the Ganges is intersected by many channels which are more or less troublesome to navigate, though ships of considerable size can reach Calcutta. The mouth of the Indus has no harbour worthy of the name, but there

[1] It is calculated that the Ganges and Brahmaputra deposit 40,000,000 cubic feet annually, a quantity which would suffice to close the Straits of Dover with a bank several feet thick.

is the port of Karachi to the west of it, which serves for nearly all the maritime commerce of north-western India, since the opening of the Suez canal has made it the nearest Indian port to Europe.

The climate of India has exercised an important influence on its history, though it would be scarcely relevant to historical geography to describe the conditions which determine the climate, beyond saying that the great wall of the Himalayas is mainly responsible. It both prevents any cooling winds from reaching India from the north, and condenses the moisture brought by the winds from the southern ocean. The isothermal lines in any physical atlas will show the central plain as nearly the hottest region on the globe; and the average rainfall at the foot of the eastern Himalayas is considerably the highest anywhere recorded.

The extraordinary fertility of the Ganges basin has always tended towards making the population dense, distributed over the whole country instead of concentrating in towns, engaged in peaceful agricultural pursuits, and consequently ill able to defend themselves against aggression. Moreover the open character of the country facilitated the movements of invaders, and supplied but few natural strongholds. This is less true of the Deccan, but even there the same general conditions apply. Throughout India the bulk of the people have for many centuries been peaceful and quiet, ready to submit to any reasonably good rule, so numerous that they must necessarily be poor. The English domination, with its repression of all violence and greater care for the lives of its subjects, has obviously tended to stimulate the increase of the population. Hence famines, which from the uncertainty of the rainfall in some regions are always possible, probably affect larger numbers than ever, though the vast improvement in means of communication goes far towards remedying the evil when famines occur.

The most marked action of the climate, however, in modern times has been in rendering it virtually impossible for the present rulers to colonise the country. The governing classes can hardly bring up their children in India, even

by the most lavish use of the hill stations. A certain number of Englishmen take native wives, but their progeny are neither an important nor a satisfactory element in the population. Substantially the Englishman goes to India to do his life's work, and leaves it when he has earned his pension or gained a competency, if indeed the climate does not disable him prematurely. On the other hand, the extension of railways and telegraphs of late years has greatly diminished other difficulties. The government of India can now be quartered at Simla during many months of the year, thus minimising the strain on health: and individuals who need change can get it with far greater ease and speed, either up in the hills or by returning for a while to England.

§ 2. THE PEOPLES OF INDIA

India is, in both area and population, roughly equivalent to Europe without Russia, and is quite as far from being homogeneous in race or language. Through early Sanskrit literature something is known of the history of India for some three thousand years, or for half as long again as about anything in Europe outside the Mediterranean basin. It is historically certain that the Aryans, penetrating into India from the north-west out of central Asia about 1000 B.C., found dark-skinned people inhabiting the peninsula, and yellow men in the hill regions of the north. The Aryans came in as conquerors over probably the whole, as more or less complete occupiers of the Ganges basin at least, much as in Britain the Teutons dominated nearly the whole island, while exclusively occupying only the south-east. Of the prior inhabitants, it is assumed that the yellow Mongolians had come in at the north-east corner; but whether the dark people were of one race or many can only be conjectured. The languages spoken are apparently too diverse to be all of one original stock, but inferences based on language are for obvious reasons uncertain. Study of the present Hindu religion seems to show that it combines the ancient Aryan Brahmanism with ideas and rites derived from more than one other source, and the modern caste system is infinitely more

complex than that of the original Aryans. It is, however, scarcely possible to discriminate certainly between changes arising in the mere lapse of three thousand years and the effects of original divergence of race.

There have been many invasions of India by foreign conquerors since that of the Aryans, but there has been no such influx of a whole people, though foreigners have penetrated in numbers sufficient to make an appreciable element in the population. Most of the conquerors have been Mohammedans, and their creed has spread considerably among the Indian peoples, largely out of revolt against the tyranny of caste. All, until the recent times in which European powers based on the sea began to acquire authority in India, have come across the north-western frontier, chiefly by the Khaibar pass. Never apparently was there any attempt to prevent the invaders from entering: thus the experience of the past throws no light whatever on the question whether the frontier is good or bad for defence under modern conditions, when a civilised army would resist invasion. The first Mohammedan conqueror, Mahmud of Ghazni, about 1000 A.D., had the centre of his dominions in Afghanistan, and added to them a large section of northern India. Later conquerors had their head quarters still further off, and extended their rule to varying distances. It was not till the sixteenth century that a Mohammedan dynasty was founded which was essentially Indian. The Moghul emperors had their capital in Delhi, and extended their sway in some sense over the whole country, the peninsula as well as the northern plain.

India has never known any form of government but despotism, tempered perhaps by influences of caste or creed, but still essentially personal. Hence dynasties have tended to be ephemeral: a kingdom founded by the ruthless energy of some soldier, whether foreign intruder or native, decays rapidly when it falls into weak hands. A change of dynasty meant no change of system: the new ruler was as likely to be alien to the bulk of his subjects as the old one: he might be a little more or less oppressive, but the main current of daily life went on as before. The Mohammedans have never been more than a small fraction of the whole popula-

tion, yet that did not prevent the establishment of many Mohammedan powers, though it probably facilitated their overthrow.

There are two partial exceptions to this general rule, as to the personal basis and the ephemeral duration of Indian kingdoms, the Moghul empire and the Maratha power. The former rose to great prosperity in the sixteenth century, chiefly through sultan Akbar, the exact contemporary of queen Elizabeth, who is commonly spoken of as the model oriental despot. His dominion was a reality over all northern India, having Delhi for its capital; and the fortunate loss of their provinces outside the Suleiman mountains made the Moghul emperors identify themselves completely with India. In the time of Aurangzib, Akbar's descendant, who had an equally long reign just a century later, the sovereignty of the Moghuls was recognised throughout the Deccan also. Aurangzib however was a bigot, in marked contrast to Akbar; and it was largely Hindu reaction against Mohammedan tyranny that caused the rise of the Maratha power, which began to threaten during Aurangzib's reign. The Moghul empire was further weakened in the first half of the eighteenth century by invasions from the north-west, notably that of Nadir Shah, but the dynasty continued its nominal reign until more than halfway through the nineteenth century. It suited the Marathas to rule in the name of the emperor at Delhi, and the East India Company continued to do the same after the overthrow of the Marathas. Indeed, so great was the prestige of the Moghuls that in the mutiny of 1857, although they had been mere puppets for the greater part of a century, the rebels, Hindu and Mohammedan alike, professed loyalty to the aged emperor.

The rise of the Maratha power may in some sense be called a national and popular movement. Sivaji, its founder, had his head quarters on the eastern slope of the Ghats, not far south of Bombay. He appealed successfully to his Hindu countrymen against Mohammedan rule, and obtained great advantage from playing off against one another the Moghul emperor Aurangzib and the Mohammedan states of the

Deccan which he was eager to subjugate. In other respects, however, the Maratha power was altogether oriental, dependent on the personal qualities of the princes. Sivaji's own dominions were within the Deccan, but the extension of the Marathas after his time was northwards, so that most of their territories were north of the Vindhya hills.

Sivaji's degenerate descendants sank early in the eighteenth century to a position like that of the latest Merovingian kings in France, being virtually superseded by their chief minister, the Peshwa, whose office became hereditary. The map will show how extensive was the region dominated about 1740 by what is called the Maratha confederacy, though that term must not be supposed to have any precise meaning. There were five powerful states, the ruler of each being known by his family name or title—the Peshwa at Poona, Sindhia at Gwalior, Holkar at Indore, the Bhonsla at Nagpur, and the Gaekwar at Baroda. All the others recognised some kind of suzerainty in the Peshwa; and they on the whole acted in concert against the Mohammedans, and extended their raids far and wide. The "Maratha ditch" still exists to testify how the English at Calcutta thought it necessary to fortify the town against probable attack by the Maratha horsemen. The Moghul empire was virtually in their hands for a time, until in 1761 they sustained a crushing defeat at Paniput, not far from Delhi, at the hands of Afghan invaders. From about that date the Peshwa began to decline, but the northern princes Sindhia and Holkar gained what the Peshwa lost. The Moghul emperors soon became again their puppets, and remained so until the decisive war in which the English broke down the Maratha power.

§ 3. THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

The growth of the British empire in India is a phenomenon unique in history. On the last day of the sixteenth century was dated Elizabeth's charter constituting a company for the purpose of trading to the East Indies. Its privileges were modified later, a rival company was set up

and ultimately absorbed, its monopoly was before the end withdrawn. But it continued to exist for over two centuries and a half, and in the course of that time had become, by the force of circumstances and on the whole against the wishes of its directors, a great imperial power. It governed directly the major part of geographical India, and was paramount throughout the whole. It had a large army, partly English, but chiefly native. Its influence extended far beyond India: it was the company, not the English government, that had relations with Persia and China, and sent expeditions to seize Mauritius and Ceylon. As was reasonable, if not necessary, the home government, from the time when Clive's achievements made the East India Company a great power, asserted more and more control over its proceedings. Though nominally all was still in the hands of the company, practically the policy of the governors-general, if devised by themselves, was subject to the approval of the English government, and friction occasionally arose in consequence. The assumption by the crown of direct sovereignty over India, for which the mutiny of 1857 gave the signal, was little more than the formal recognition of a *fait accompli*. Nevertheless, the independence of the company was for more than a century a very real thing, and a very fortunate thing. It is hardly conceivable that much trade could have been developed in the east, during the constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century, if commercial enterprise had been undertaken or even directly controlled by the state. The English method of leaving as much as possible to private enterprise, as contrasted with the French method of keeping all in government leading-strings, proved successful in India as well as in North America.

The first English factory was established at Surat, not very far from Bombay, and others followed: but the Malabar coast is so much isolated by the western Ghats, that these were dwarfed in importance by Madras. It was here, however, that the first acquisition of territory, as distinguished from trading settlement, was made. Bombay was handed over to Charles II. as part of the dowry of his Portuguese queen, and was by him granted to the East India

Company in 1668. The only good harbour on the whole Malabar coast was no slight gain to the company, especially as they were there no longer mere settlers on sufferance. Bombay became the head quarters of the company on that side of India, and gradually developed into the capital of a presidency. It was not, however, until the *pax Britannica* had been established throughout India, and roads were made to facilitate communication inland, that Bombay became a great port. It was not till the cutting of the Suez canal had made it to an important degree nearer to Europe for all trade purposes, and railways had connected it with northern India, that it began to surpass even Calcutta in its commerce.

Trading settlements on the Coromandel coast followed very soon after the first venture at Surat. The year 1639 was the date of the occupation of Madras, but beginnings had been made earlier. On this side there is no isolated coast strip, and access is easy to the heart of the Deccan; thus relations with the native states inevitably grew up. In this neighbourhood, also, the French established themselves, their chief station being at Pondicherri, which they still retain; but the rivalry between English and French in this region did not assume an acute form till the next century.

About the same time the East India Company began its operations at the mouth of the Ganges. Here, again, were French and Dutch trading ports in close proximity, but these were never real political rivals. Difficulties with the native rulers impeded the progress of these settlements, which, though they were taken from under the government of Madras before the end of the seventeenth century, remained of inferior importance. Calcutta, the present capital, was only occupied after the abandonment of places further up into the delta; but it has been the seat of government ever since 1696, first of the trading stations, then of Bengal, ultimately of all India.

The chain of events which decided the destinies of India had its origin in the neighbourhood of Madras, now comparatively unimportant, for personal, not geographical, reasons. Though the result was to make England supreme, it began in hostility to her. Dupleix, the French governor of

Pondicherri, was a man of far-reaching ambition and keen insight. He discerned the prospect that if any European power could get the field to itself, it might, in the distracted condition of Indian politics, acquire preponderant influence in the Deccan first, and ultimately throughout India. The necessary first step for him was to oust the East India Company, which so far had no desire except to trade in peace. It was also under Dupleix's government, though he was personally no soldier, that sepoys, native troops disciplined and officered by Europeans, first showed their immense superiority to purely native forces. Both English and French had, almost of necessity, and with the consent of the native princes whose tenants they were, a few European soldiers to protect their settlements; and to these they added native levies, who were naturally trained in the same way. It was when Dupleix began the active development of his ambitious schemes that the first collision took place between his troops and a vastly more numerous native army. The result proved that sepoys under European officers could equal the best soldiers of Europe in steadiness as well as in courage. Thus England owes to her determined enemy the disclosure of this *arcanum imperii,* of which she has made effective use ever since.

When war broke out between England and France in 1744, Dupleix thought that his time had come. The Nawab of the Carnatic, of whom Madras and Pondicherri alike were tenants, at first forbade any warfare within his dominions, as he had then full right to do. A little later, however, he acquiesced in Dupleix's attacking Madras, on the understanding that it should be given over to himself. The English forces were very small compared to the French, and Madras soon fell. Dupleix did not keep his promise, and the Nawab sent an army to take Madras by force. The French commander there boldly held his ground, and thus set the first example of defying in arms the admitted sovereign; but the effective blow was struck in the open field by a force despatched from Pondicherri to reinforce Madras. The commander, a Swiss named Paradis, with less than a thousand men, only a third of them French, found himself face to

face with ten times his numbers. He might have escaped with some loss, but he had the nerve to see that a bold attack was his best chance, and he was rewarded with complete victory. The effect was enormous: Madras had to be restored to the English soon afterwards on peace being made in Europe, but Dupleix had none the less won commanding influence throughout southern India.

Taking advantage of disputed successions and other differences among the native princes, Dupleix before long saw nearly every throne in the Deccan filled by a ruler whom he favoured. The English in Madras were drawn into the quarrels, but they remained almost powerless, their previous ill-success against the French having given the impression that they could not fight. When the opportunity came, Clive's military genius turned the balance the other way. He was as able a statesman as Dupleix, and a born general also: and from the date of his first successes the tide ran steadily in favour of the English. Within ten years they were predominant throughout the Deccan, except in Mysore, where a new power had arisen under Haidar Ali. Clive and the men of his school were doubtless favoured by fortune: the French soldiers pitted against them happened to be, with one exception, inferior men, the native commanders incapable or treacherous. Still they fully deserved their success. They inspired their soldiers with unbounded confidence, and their oriental opponents with almost superstitious dread of their courage and skill. They never recoiled before odds, or admitted the possibility of giving way, and therefore every contest was half won at the outset: *possunt, quia posse videntur.*

Geography is little concerned with the contest in the Deccan, except as regards the exact locality of engagements, which could only be treated by going into great military detail. It has even less to do with the gradual growth of British supremacy in the plain of north India. Clive's successes near Madras had apparently given the East India Company a taste for rule, and a sense of power to acquire it. When in 1756 the Nawab of Bengal made an unprovoked attack on Calcutta, the company promptly took up the

challenge. Clive's great victory at Plassy quickly led to Bengal, with the neighbouring provinces of Bahar and Orissa, passing under British government. And as in the Ganges valley the authority of the feeble Moghul emperor at Delhi was somewhat more real, the practical independence of rulers who were nominally his vassals less complete, than beyond the Vindhya mountains, the effect of the victory of Plassy extended more widely. It is not without reason that Plassy is commonly spoken of as the day on which our Indian empire was founded, though the battle would never have been fought but for Clive's previous exploits at and near Arcot. Progress was all the easier because, though many individual Frenchmen were in the service of the Indian princes, France as a separate Indian power had practically ceased to exist. The Bengal government, though its own subjects were well treated, was for a time both oppressive and corrupt in its dealings with native princes, in spite of Clive's efforts at reform. But the foundations of the present excellent administrative system were firmly laid by Warren Hastings, under whom the direct rule of the company was greatly extended. His appointment as governor-general in 1774 marks at once the first step taken by the British Parliament towards superseding the company, and also the definite primacy given to Bengal. Warren Hastings in his general policy was not blameless : he was little more scrupulous as to means than the Indian rulers with whom he had to cope, though his aims were not selfish. But to him more than to any one other man belongs the credit of establishing a system of just and orderly government, a system which makes the English rule in India deserve to last.

The whole of the Deccan was not brought under English domination by the successes of Clive's time. There remained independent of the company two Mohammedan states, Mysore in the south and the Nizam's principality further north, and also the Maratha confederacy, which extended far over the Ganges basin. Haidar Ali, sultan of Mysore, one of the ablest of the many military adventurers who have founded Indian dynasties, made a determined effort to destroy Madras, when the war of American independence

gave a prospect of French aid, and was not repelled without difficulty. His incompetent successor Tipu, pursuing his father's policy without a tithe of his father's ability, almost forced the English to destroy him. The capital of Mysore was taken in 1798, and Tipu killed in the storming: and a curtailed Mysore was given back to the representative of the Hindu dynasty supplanted by Haidar.

Lord Wellesley, now governor-general, had come out with a deliberate intention of rendering English power paramount throughout such part of India as we were then concerned with, so that Tipu's hostility only furthered his views. Nor did he experience any difficulty in inducing the Nizam to accept the position of a dependent ally. If the Maratha princes had been equally peaceable, Wellesley would, as it seems, have been content. But they were turbulent and aggressive, and insatiable plunderers. Wellesley realised that there could be no peace or security in India while the Maratha power remained unbroken, and set himself to overthrow it.

The military energies of the Marathas were unimpaired, but politically they were going through the process of decay familiar in India. The Peshwa, their acknowledged chief, had been gradually losing power, as above mentioned, and was in danger of being altogether supplanted by his titular vassal Sindhia, or possibly by Holkar, the two being rivals. This gave Wellesley the power of interfering in Maratha affairs as the patron of the Peshwa, the legitimate ruler. Fortunately the Maratha confederacy was no more a reality than the Holy Roman empire in its last stage. Sindhia and the Bhonsla took up arms, while Holkar stood aloof, just as Prussia two or three years later stood aloof while Napoleon was crushing Austria at Ulm and Austerlitz, only to be even more decisively beaten on challenging the conqueror next year.

The campaign against Sindhia and his ally was twofold, General Lake defeating the Marathas near Delhi and taking the Moghul emperor out of their hands, while Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards duke of Wellington, fought them in the Deccan. Wellesley's victory at Assye was a typical one,

exemplifying most of the causes which have given us the mastery of India. He had a small but well-equipped army, partly English and partly sepoy, armed and drilled alike, fighting side by side under the same officers. He had also a body of the Nizam's cavalry, who were, as he was informed, not trustworthy. He treated them as if they were, though taking care to make his own troops, of whom there could be no doubt, bear the brunt of the fighting. He attacked many times his numbers, for fear lest Sindhia should retreat and escape him, rather than wait for another English force which was co-operating with him at some distance. The Marathas were brave enough, and much of Sindhia's infantry had been trained by Frenchmen, but they were none the less decisively defeated. European officers in the service of an oriental despot, with such authority as his caprice allows them, are of little avail against the disciplined coherence of an army altogether led by Europeans, with a tradition of never counting odds.

Lord Wellesley's policy was in the strictest sense imperial. Though he made some annexations of direct territory, he let alone all native princes who would honestly accept the situation, and be vassals of the paramount English power. And his policy has been followed ever since, with results on the whole satisfactory. Where native dynasties have died out altogether their territories have been annexed, the British government being so far from eager to take advantage of such chances, that it has repeatedly allowed adopted sons to succeed. And when misgovernment has become intolerable, native princes have been deposed; for it has always been held that the paramount power owed a duty of protection to the subjects of its vassals. For the one reason or the other, direct English rule has during the last century been extended over more of the India which Wellesley dealt with, notably over the important province of Oudh: but the chief advance has been made outside that region, which may be roughly defined as the Deccan and the Ganges valley.

Before the beginning of the great advance to the north-west, which has gradually added to the British empire the whole Indus basin, two small wars occurred which settled

the northern frontier. As the result of one of these Assam was annexed, in other words, the lower basin of the Brahmaputra. Assam has proved to be well suited for the cultivation of tea, though its wet climate—the average daily rainfall is nearly equivalent to a month's rainfall in the Thames valley—makes it no pleasant abode for Europeans. The other war was provoked by the incessant plunderings of the Gurkhas of Nepal, and ended in a manner as permanently satisfactory as perhaps any such war ever waged. Nepal retained its independence, and has since served as a buffer between British India and the ever-jealous Tibetans. At the same time it ceded finally a large strip of hill country, previously more or less disputed and unsettled, which has proved of immense value. In it have arisen Simla, Mussoorie, and other hill stations, which reduce to a minimum the climatic difficulty of governing India. Moreover, Gurkha soldiers have been, and still are, a most valuable element in our native army.

The broad district of Rajputana is, from more than one point of view, the very core and centre of India. Physically it contains the watershed between the Indus and Ganges basins, which runs from the Deccan to the Himalayas. Historically it is peopled by the representatives of the great warrior caste of the original Aryans. It is on the whole not fertile—indeed, part of it is almost desert—as the western Ghats draw the rain from the moisture-laden winds before they reach it. And it is cut up into a number of small native states, now content and loyal under the British supremacy. As was natural from its proximity to Delhi, Rajputana was included in the Moghul empire, but its people, with their strong Hindu caste feeling, were alienated by the Mohammedan intolerance of later emperors, notably of Aurangzib. To the decline of the Moghul power Rajput revolt contributed not a little; but when the English superseded the Marathas as the real rulers in the name of the Moghuls, the Rajput chiefs accepted our protection. As however the desert region lies on the western side, this inclusion of Rajputana within the sphere of the East India Company did not imply any perceptible advance towards the Indus.

The first Maratha war, by making the English power preponderant at Delhi, brought it into contact with the Sikhs, then just beginning to rise into a formidable state under their one great ruler, Runjit Singh. The Sikhs were originally a religious sect, revolting against some of the tenets of Hinduism, and especially against the caste system, which had been welded into a community by the persecution of the Moghul emperors. To this Runjit Singh added the force of military discipline; and he not only extended his dominions beyond the Punjab proper, but gave to his army an organisation which rendered it a formidable antagonist even to the English power. War with the Sikhs was doubtless inevitable sooner or later, when they were no longer controlled by a strong and prudent ruler; but so long as Runjit Singh lived he kept them peaceful and friendly neighbours. British troops had crossed the Indus, and had been engaged in a long war beyond the proper frontier of India, before there were any hostilities with the Sikhs.

During the eighteenth century history had repeated itself in Afghanistan. There had arisen a new and vigorous dynasty which had, like some of its predecessors, invaded northern India and plundered Delhi, but had not attempted to establish any permanent dominion east of the Indus. In 1826 Dost Mohammed, head of a rival tribe, ousted the last representatives of the Durani dynasty. He was an able and ambitious man, though hardly a match for Runjit Singh. The Indian government, under Lord Auckland who became governor-general in 1837, had a reasonable desire to open trade up the Indus valley, and a somewhat vague and altogether premature dread of Russia reaching India. Common sense would have dictated supporting Dost Mohammed, mediating, if necessary, between him and Runjit Singh; and a young English officer casually on the spot had in fact saved Herat, the western frontier fortress of Afghanistan, from the attack of a Persian army assisted by Russians. Lord Auckland, however, formed a foolish and unjustifiable plan for deposing Dost Mohammed in favour of one of the fugitive Durani princes, who would, as he hoped, be more subservient. His expedition, which had to be sent round by the

Bolan pass, since the way to the Khaibar lay across the Punjab, expelled Dost Mohammed; but this temporary success was followed by the murder of the English envoy at Kabul and the annihilation of the English garrison. It was not very difficult to take vengeance, but the whole business ended in Dost Mohammed's resuming his throne, while the Afghans had very naturally imbibed strong feelings of dislike and suspicion towards England.

The death of Runjit Singh during the Afghan war left the Sikh state without any real ruler. The army got out of hand, and insisted on attacking the English. The campaign was short but severe: four considerable actions were fought in a few weeks, in which the Sikhs, though deprived of their European officers, fought extremely well—indeed they owed final defeat very largely to the folly or treachery of their leaders. England did not displace the Sikh government, recognising Runjit's young son as nominal Raja. In a few years the Sikhs tried their luck again, to be much more decisively beaten. This time the Punjab was annexed, and under the wise management of the Lawrences was soon content with its fate. The mistake committed after the first war, of selling Kashmir to one of Runjit Singh's former officers, who had in the period of confusion made himself virtually independent on the north of the Punjab, could not with fairness be retrieved. The only evil result, however, has been a long delay in bringing good government to an extraordinarily beautiful region.

Before the first Sikh war, the region of the lower Indus, called Sind after the great river, had been conquered by a single battle, that recalled in its brilliant audacity Plassy and Assye. It is difficult to justify the conquest, as the Amirs of Sind had given no real ground of offence; but it was an undoubted benefit as establishing order, and opening the basin of the Indus to peaceful commerce passing through the port of Karachi. Thus when the Punjab was annexed the whole of the Indus region, from where the river emerges from the mountains, had come under the company, mainly under its direct rule, though one or two native states were left standing.

The history of the mutiny of 1857 is only related to the geography as all military operations must be, less indeed than is the case with most wars. It illustrates afresh the total lack of unity in India. It was the Bengal army, mainly consisting of Hindus belonging to the highest castes, that mutinied: the low caste Madras and Bombay armies remained faithful. Most of the vassal princes deemed it their duty, or their interest,—it was for most of them both—to maintain their allegiance. The Sikhs, very recently conquered and deeply impressed by the personal influence of a few great Englishmen, were too little in sympathy with either Mohammedans or orthodox Hindus to rebel for their benefit, and did in fact render most valuable service. The plan for a simultaneous rising all over northern India was too imperfect to operate as a thorough surprise, but was real enough to prevent concerted action. Small bodies of Englishmen held their ground where they were, or made their way to some other garrison, according to circumstances. It was rather from sentiment than from geography that the conflict, in its first dangerous stage, centred about Delhi, the ancient Moghul capital, and Lucknow, the chief city of the latest annexation, Oudh. At Delhi a small English army, based on the Punjab, occupied a ridge overlooking the city, which contained two or three times its number of rebel soldiery, until strong enough to take it by assault, and it may safely be said that the Punjab made all the difference: but for assistance from that quarter no English force could have held on to Delhi, and the rebellion must have taken much longer to subdue. At Lucknow a small garrison stood a three months' siege from a large rebel army, before Outram and Havelock could cut their way through, and had to maintain the position for two months longer before complete relief came.

§ 4. INDIA UNDER THE BRITISH CROWN

The mutiny led to the final extinction of the Moghul dynasty, to the supersession of the East India Company by the direct authority of the crown, and some years later to

the assumption by queen Victoria of the title empress of India. There is no word of its class which has been so misused as "emperor," and it would be impossible at the present time to attach to it any one definite and exclusive meaning. The original signification is certainly gone, at any rate in English, though the title would be felt to be inappropriate to a sovereign with very small military power. Perhaps if the word emperor means anything more distinctive than a king on a great scale, it means the head of a composite body politic, who has smaller princes in some way under him. In this sense India is certainly an empire, and possibly the inventor of the title had this in view, and was not merely desirous of promoting queen Victoria to something above mere royalty. But it rather interferes with the modern English use of the term empire to denote that unique combination of diverse elements over which the British flag floats.

The Afghan war which began in 1878 was not quite so unnecessary as the previous one, and it has been followed by rational policy towards the Amir, which has gone far towards making Afghanistan what it should be, a real buffer state between India and Russia. From the geographical point of view its interest is twofold: the great passes across the Suleiman mountains, and not the Khaibar only, proved penetrable to a civilised army, and the frontier towards India has since been carefully determined. England acquired by the peace a small district in the extreme south, which with lands taken over from Baluchistan constitutes the English outpost of Quetta, west of the mountain chain. Geographical theory would pronounce this a mistake, but geographical theory is liable to be overruled by political considerations. The "forward" school of Indian politicians have so far had their way: it is a highly disputable question whether the advantages of our possession of the Quetta district are or are not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages.

The other geographical changes in India since the mutiny, apart from the conquest of Burma, which properly lies outside India, have been also chiefly in the north-west. The supremacy of Kashmir, which has become more or less permeated

by English influences, has been extended, as the result of successive small expeditions, over the desolate regions, rising many thousands of feet above the sea, which reach the Pamirs. There Russian and British territory meet, but it may safely be predicted that neither nation will ever select that route for attacking the other.

Burma, the region on the east side of the Bay of Bengal, is obviously related to India somewhat as Istria and Dalmatia are related to Italy. There is no geographical reason why the same government should extend round the bend of the dividing arm of the sea. At the same time proximity makes it natural that the inhabitants should have some characteristics in common, and natural also that they should come into some relation historically. The Burmese people are mainly of the yellow Mongolian stock which is found along the south of the Himalayas, and which perhaps occupied the Ganges delta before the Aryan immigration. Their religion they must have derived from India in the times when Buddhism was a great force in India, whence it has now almost disappeared. Historically nothing is known of any connection between Burma and India, whose historical relations have all been with the north-west rather than the north-east, until recent times.

In the middle of the eighteenth century a new dynasty arose in northern Burma, which acquired considerable power, and was distinguished above most oriental states by its barbarism and its lofty pretensions. The government of the East India Company was practically forced into two different wars, its interests being obvious, first on the common frontier, and still more in the repression of piracy and the protection of peaceful trade in the Bay of Bengal. The first war ended in 1826 with our occupation of long stretches of the coast, both north and south of the mouth of the river Irawadi, which is the chief artery of all northern Burma. The inhabitants welcomed British rule both there and in Assam, which had for a short time fallen under Burmese power. History repeated itself in 1852, when we took over the mouth of the Irawadi, where has grown up the great port of Rangoon. Ultimately, in 1885 it

became necessary to put a final end to the so-called Burmese empire, and to bring the whole country under the British crown.

Burma, including the wild Shan states on the eastern frontier which are under protection, is about as large as Germany, though its population is but scanty as compared with Indian standards. Most of the country is drained by the river Irawadi, which comes down from the frontier mountains dividing Burma and China. It is on the whole rich, the low-lying lands producing an immense quantity of rice, while the forests of the higher levels are full of valuable timber. Nor is it void of mineral wealth, though the celebrity of the Burma rubies has probably given a misleading impression on this head. It is now definitely one of the main administrative divisions of British India.

British India, properly so called, is divided up according to administrative convenience, most of the divisions being not very different in size from the United Kingdom. Two of them only bear traces of the period when the East India Company ruled, with the three presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. The two latter have still governors separately appointed by the crown, though not possessing the same limits as formerly; but the rest are under lieutenant-governors or chief commissioners, who are members of the regular Indian service. The two latest administrative changes have been to form a frontier province on the north-west, which may be roughly described as the regions beyond the Indus, and to divide into two parts the original Bengal, which with the accretions to it had grown to an unwieldy size.

The native states included in the empire, which comprise among them about two-fifths of the area and one-fifth of the population of India, are some 650 in number and very diverse in size, from the Nizam of Haidarabad's territory, which is nearly as large as Great Britain, down to tiny districts of a few square miles. The amount of self-government left to them varies very greatly, but in all alike certain conditions hold good. They are absolutely precluded from having any direct relations with foreign powers. The

amount of their military forces, if any, is carefully fixed. British Indian law, as such, is not operative within them. Beyond this little more can be said than that native rulers are subject to the advice of a British resident, and that if they disregard this advice in matters of importance, pressure is applied by the Indian government. Further, the paramount power does not tolerate serious misgovernment, and deposes native princes who are deaf to remonstrance.

India is, as has been mentioned above, about equivalent to Europe without Russia; in other words, it is some fourteen times as large as the United Kingdom, and fully seven times as populous. It may be useful to carry the comparison a little further on in detail. Some parts of India are, of course, very thinly inhabited, such as the region of the upper Indus, but the fertile plains of the lower Ganges are as thickly populated as England, much more so than the United Kingdom. Yet so preponderatingly agricultural is India that, with 315 millions of people, it has only twenty-nine towns with populations that reach 100,000, containing in all seven and a quarter millions: whereas in the United Kingdom, where the people are on the average only twice as thick on the ground, and the total number is not one-seventh, there are as many towns with populations over 120,000 and an aggregate fully twice as great. Calcutta alone has with its suburbs over a million, a mere fraction of London. Bombay has nearly a million, fairly equivalent to Glasgow or Liverpool. Madras may be compared to Birmingham or Manchester, Haidarabad to Leeds. And there are practically no Indian towns to match with Dublin and Belfast, Edinburgh and Newcastle, Bristol and Sheffield.

B. THE WEST INDIES

The West Indies is the general name for the mass of islands extending across the entrance to the Caribbean Sea, from near Florida to the mouth of the Orinoco. As is well known, the name testifies to the fact that Columbus, who

discovered some of them on his first voyage in 1492, supposed that he had reached the outer fringe of the true Indies. With the two largest islands, Cuba and Haiti, England has no concern. The latter lies about midway between Florida and South America, Cuba to the west of Haiti, almost in the opening to the Gulf of Mexico. South of Cuba, and far distant from the smaller islands, lies Jamaica, the third in size. The rest are in two well-defined groups, the Bahamas north of Cuba, the Lesser Antilles, as they are called, from east of Haiti southwards to near the mainland.

The Spaniards were conquerors, not colonists, eager for gold, but indifferent to industry. Hence they pushed on to the American continent, occupying the large islands which promised wealth of the kind that they desired, but leaving the small outer ones alone. Thus these islands were left open to the enterprise of other nations, and England had a considerable share from the first. As time went on, and England grew in naval power, she acquired more islands, the first and most important conquest being Jamaica, and is now mistress of the large majority of them. Indeed the only exceptions worth mentioning, besides Cuba and Haiti, are Puerto Rico, Martinique, and Guadeloupe, to which should perhaps be added the small Danish island of St. Thomas, important for its harbour. Puerto Rico, which lies east of Haiti, was conquered by the United States from Spain in the war of 1898. Guadeloupe and Martinique, which are among the Lesser Antilles, are French: the latter has an excellent harbour and is well fortified.

Geographically the British West Indies, other than Jamaica, divide into two parts. The Bahamas are essentially a group by themselves. They have been formed along a coral bank stretching many hundred miles in a direction from NW. to SE.: as a natural result they are mostly long and narrow in shape, and rise but little above the sea. They are most of them north of the tropic of Cancer, and therefore have on the whole a cooler climate, as appears in their products, for they have never grown sugar.

The Lesser Antilles are essentially tropical, and contain a line of volcanic summits, two of which some seventeen years ago have proved themselves to be by no means

extinct.[1] The northern portion of them, between Puerto Rico and the French island of Guadeloupe, were nearly all originally settled by Englishmen; the southern portion, except Barbados, the most English of all, were conquered at a later date, chiefly from France.

The total area of the British West Indies is given as about 13,000 square miles, or little more than one-quarter of the area of England. Some idea of the extent of sea over which they are scattered may be obtained by noting that the line of the Lesser Antilles is about equal to the distance from the extreme north to the extreme south point of Great Britain, and that Jamaica is half as far again from the nearest of them. The total population is estimated as somewhat under two millions, or about 150 to the square mile, which is at a lower rate than a purely agricultural county in England, such as Norfolk, though of course there are great differences in this respect between one island and another. Not more than one-twentieth of the population are white: the remainder, save for 100,000 or more Indian coolies, who have been introduced to do the work which the negroes are not industrious enough to undertake, are nearly all descendants of the emancipated slaves.

The administrative divisions of the West Indies are those which geography suggests, modified in some respects by their history. The Bahamas naturally are separate from the rest, and Jamaica, isolated in position and history, would stand alone, had not convenience dictated the annexation to Jamaica of the Turks and Caycos islands. These tiny groups geographically belong to the Bahamas, but have a separate trade of their own in salt: it was, however, the historical fact that the inhabitants have had no connection with their nearest neighbours, and have a traditional dislike to them, which led to their being administratively united to Jamaica. Barbados, with its uninterruptedly British history, has little in common with its neighbours, more recently

[1] It is an apt illustration of the current vagueness about geography that the frightful disasters in Martinique and St. Vincent checked, so it was stated in the newspapers, emigration to Jamaica, which is much as if an eruption of Vesuvius were to make people afraid to live in Paris.

acquired and partly French in population. Trinidad also, our latest conquest, stands geographically apart, and has a separate government, under which is included its small neighbour, Tobago. The remainder are divided into two groups, known as the Leeward and the Windward islands. The distinction is somewhat arbitrary, since the whole line of islands lies to windward of the Caribbean Sea, towards which the trade wind is always blowing. But the English sailors early limited the name of Windward to the southern islands, which lie rather further to the east; and the terms were officially used when the two groups were placed under separate governors in the reign of Charles II. Since then the number of islands under English rule has increased, and various changes have been made in the exact significance of the terms. The original division was made at the French island of Guadeloupe, all south of it being called the Windward islands. Now Barbados is separate, Dominica is united with the Leeward islands, and Tobago with Trinidad. Thus the Windward islands comprise only St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Grenada, with the tiny islets which lie between.

THE BAHAMAS

The Bahamas group consists of some twenty inhabited islands, with hundreds of others, many of which are mere rocks. The total area is given as 4,404 square miles, or two-thirds of the size of Wales, and the population is almost exactly fourteen per square mile. The first English settlers in the Bahamas came from Bermuda, and occupied two of the largest islands in the middle of the seventeenth century. During the war of the Spanish succession the French and Spaniards destroyed the English settlements, and for some years the islands were a mere home for pirates. In 1718, however, the British government took the Bahamas seriously in hand; and since then they have been a real crown colony, administered according to English law. As sugar was not in question, the emancipation of the slaves did not trouble the Bahamas so much as some other islands, though the coloured inhabitants still outnumber the whites by fully three to one.

Nassau, the administrative capital, on the island of New

Providence, has a fairly good harbour; and its proximity to the coast of the southern states of the American Union gave it great importance during the war of secession. The power of the South to continue the struggle largely depended on what it could import, and on the possibility of exporting cotton to pay for its purchases, in the face of the blockade of the whole coast attempted by the North. And the existence of a port reasonably near at hand, to and from which the blockade-running vessels could go, was a condition almost indispensable.

Commercially, the Bahamas stand rather apart from the rest of the West Indies, the only produce which they export in common with the other islands being fruit. They have two specialties of their own—sponge is largely found in the neighbouring seas, and of late years the fibre aloe has been very extensively cultivated.

JAMAICA

Jamaica is situated about 200 miles south of the eastern part of Cuba, and the same distance west of the nearest point of Haiti. As the map shows, it is considerably nearer than any other West Indian island to the mainland of central America. The position of Jamaica made its capture by Cromwell's forces in 1655, and its retention in defiance of all that Spain could do, a most significant event. Spain in that age possessed the whole of the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, from the Mississippi to the Orinoco, besides the great islands, and she sought to exclude foreigners from any access to her dominions. The English conquest of Jamaica was the first breach in this exclusive dominion; and though it was achieved more or less accidentally, by way of compensation for the discreditable failure of an attack on Hispaniola, as Haiti was then called, Cromwell and his successors realised its value.

The settlers were from very various sources—soldiers of the conquering force, emigrants from home induced or compelled to go in order to strengthen the colony, political refugees, adventurers who were or had been connected with the buccaneers. Slaves were of course imported, and as

the island is extremely fertile, healthy for the tropics, and capable of producing almost anything, the colony throve steadily. From the first it had some measure of self-government, though things did not always work smoothly, as was perhaps inevitable under the conditions.

The position of Jamaica made it the natural emporium for the buccaneers, and thus brought much commercial prosperity. Of these famous adventurers it is difficult to give an accurate description. Pirates they were not, for their sole enemy was Spain: with other nations they sought to live in peace. Privateers in the strict sense they were not, for their depredations on Spanish possessions were carried on in peace time as well as during war. Lawless they certainly were, and they committed many acts of atrocious violence that were at variance with their own theory. The cruelties perpetrated by Spain, alike upon American natives and European prisoners, provoked a certain fury of retaliation, which explains, though it does not justify, their lawless violence. So long as the buccaneers flourished, they had a large amount of trade to carry on, which centred in Jamaica for obvious geographical reasons.

The physical formation of the island accounts for much in its history. It is large enough (4,450 square miles) to contain a considerable chain of mountains near the north coast, and much steeper on the north side than on the south, which rises in the Blue Mountain to over 7,000 feet. Thus Jamaica comprises places of very various climate, and therefore with very various products. Hence though in fact sugar was at one time the main industry, as in other islands, Jamaica is by no means dependent on sugar, and is at present largely engaged in fruit culture.

The mountains also made possible the continued existence of the Maroons, long a disturbing element in the affairs of Jamaica. The Maroons (the name is said to be a corruption of the Spanish *cimarones*, meaning mountaineers) were originally slaves of the Spaniards, who escaped into the hills at the time of the English conquest. They were recruited from time to time by fugitive slaves and other refugees, mostly if not all coloured men, and long succeeded in main-

taining their independence, occasionally breaking into open war. Eventually however they were partly conquered, partly induced to accept terms: and some of them, who were unwilling to settle down among the ordinary population, were ultimately placed at Sierra Leone.

As early as the reign of Charles II. Jamaica had a regularly constituted representative system, and after some conflict with the home government obtained in 1728 a formal recognition of the principle that statutes passed by the British Parliament should have force in Jamaica only if accepted as laws in the island. When negro emancipation came, the Jamaica assembly was naturally hostile to it; and in fact the problem presented by that measure was especially difficult there, since at that time practically the only industry was sugar planting, which made the proportion of negroes very large. Half a century of trouble followed, complicated by one serious negro insurrection. More than one change of constitution was tried, and ultimately the local legislature surrendered its powers. For some years Jamaica was governed as a thorough crown colony: but in 1884 it received a new constitution, under which the elected members of the legislative council are sufficiently numerous to exercise financial control. A larger amount of self-government could hardly be given to a community in which the coloured population are in the proportion of forty or fifty to one, especially as the bulk of the negroes have no liking for industry.

Jamaica possesses in its capital, Kingston, the largest town in the British West Indies (population 62,700), and one of the two finest harbours, the only harbour comparable to it being St. Lucia.

BARBADOS

Barbados lies furthest to the eastward of any West Indian island, and is about 100 miles distant from its nearest neighbour. It owes to its position both its healthy climate, since it is fully open to the north-east trade wind, and considerable prosperity as an *entrepôt* for the other islands, until steam altered the conditions. Uninhabited till the English

began to settle there in 1624 or soon after, it has always been genuinely English. The first half-century was a period of steadily growing prosperity, in spite of some troubles. Royal charters, granted apparently with very imperfect knowledge of geographical facts, saddled Barbados, like some other early colonies, with a heavy burden in the shape of proprietary rights held by English noblemen. Some of these merely drew money from the colony, though others made a return in the form of efficient government; and when the island was at length vested in the crown a heavy export duty on all produce was imposed, mainly in order to satisfy these proprietary claims, which lasted till 1838. The Great Rebellion in England led to further complications. While it lasted, authority of all kinds from England was in abeyance, and the Barbadians were left very much to themselves. After the fall of Charles I. they proclaimed his son, refusing to acknowledge the supremacy of the Parliament in which they were not represented. A fleet was sent to reduce them to obedience, and after a short time Barbados submitted on terms which recognised the rights of self-government that they had enjoyed almost from the first.

Barbados probably gained more than it lost by having political offenders sent out, both under the Protectorate and later, to work as slaves in the sugar plantations. Such men were not ordinary criminals, and after their term of servitude had expired, became valuable members of society. One way or another the number of inhabitants grew considerably, and Barbados served as a centre of English influence in the West Indies, sending out settlers to occupy some islands, and contributing troops to conquer others. Sugar growing, however, became more and more the staple industry of the island, with the result of continually increasing the proportion of slaves to white men. In spite of this, Barbados is the nearest approach to a genuine European colony, as distinguished from a society in which a small white minority dominates masses of coloured men, that is to be found in the tropics—unless it be Queensland, which is only partially tropical.

In size it but little exceeds the Isle of Wight, and the very absence of marked natural features implies that the whole soil of the island is cultivable. Its worst defect is the lack of a harbour, there being only an open roadstead on the leeward side, off Bridgetown, the capital. The population is dense in proportion to the area—nearly 156,350—of whom about one-tenth are white, a larger proportion than in most of the islands.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Trinidad is in many respects very unlike the other British islands. Only a few miles separate it from the coast of Venezuela: indeed there is little doubt that it once formed part of the mainland. Hence it was occupied with the mainland by Spain, and was not acquired by England till the Napoleonic wars, our formal title dating from the Peace of Amiens. Like most other Spanish possessions, it had been more or less neglected industrially, and its resources were little developed. Hence it had not, like Jamaica and Barbados, gone through the ordeal of having every other form of cultivation abandoned for sugar, with the consequent vast increase in the proportion of slaves, though slavery had been introduced there as everywhere else in tropical America. Hence also it has a very mixed population; besides English and the Indian coolies brought there as elsewhere since the emancipation of the slaves, there are descendants of the Spanish proprietors, and of their negro slaves, and of not a few French and other settlers during the Spanish period. Hence, too, Trinidad has had no self-government, but remains a crown colony, the governor's council being altogether nominated.

Trinidad naturally has the same products as the neighbouring mainland. Besides sugar, which is grown there almost to as much advantage as in British Guiana, it raises large quantities of very fine cocoa, the special product of Venezuela; in fact, cocoa is exported to about twice the value of the sugar. Moreover, cocoa growing does not, like

sugar, require expensive plant; it is therefore a suitable industry for peasant proprietors, and is the chief occupation of the Indian coolies, who, having fulfilled their term of hired labour, obtain a grant of land and settle down as permanent inhabitants. Trinidad has also, alone among West Indian islands, valuable mineral wealth in the famous pitch lake. In area it exceeds all the British islands among the Lesser Antilles put together, and is thickly populated, being estimated, with Tobago, at about 366,000.

Tobago, the small island which for administrative purposes is united to Trinidad, has had a history full of vicissitudes. Early attempts at colonising it, first by English and then by Dutch, failed entirely. Then in 1642 the duke of Courland, the only minor potentate who ever had any concern with the West Indies, established a colony; and twelve years later some Dutch merchants did the like. By a curious anomaly the Dutch came under the protection of Louis XIV., and the duke of Courland placed his claims under the protection of England. Naturally Tobago became the sport of the complicated relations between England, France, and Holland during the reign of Charles II., to the great detriment of the colony. In the Seven Years' war it was conquered by England, in the war of American independence by France, in the Napoleonic wars it was again and finally conquered by England. After having been for two generations included among the Windward islands, it was in 1889 politically united to Trinidad, from which it is distant only eighteen miles. As might be expected, it has the same elements of population and the same products as its larger neighbour.

LEEWARD ISLANDS

The Leeward islands, in the original sense of the term, were all originally colonised by Englishmen in the seventeenth century, and have been permanent British possessions, though one or another has been seized by our enemies during a war. In St. Kitts there were French settlers side by side with the English, but the island was definitely resigned to Great Britain at the Peace of Utrecht. Dominica alone,

which has now been annexed to the Leeward islands, was conquered. Like its nearest neighbours, Guadeloupe and Martinique, it was originally French, though the Caribs remained in sufficient numbers to make the French dominion over it imperfect. Like many other islands, it fell into our hands during the Seven Years' war, and was retained at the peace.

All the Leeward islands except Antigua are mountainous and volcanic, like those to the south of them, which gives them some advantages in variety of temperature, and therefore of possible produce. Dominica in particular almost rivals Jamaica in this respect, and is beginning to make good use of its opportunities. The other islands grow little but sugar, except Montserrat, where limes are cultivated on a great scale.

The Leeward islands have a single governor and a federal council, but each group has its separate administration. These groups are, reckoning from the north : (1) The Virgin islands, which are not all British, the Danish island of St. Thomas being among them ; (2) Antigua, with two smaller islands ; (3) St. Kitts and Nevis ; (4) Montserrat ; (5) Dominica. The area of the whole is but 700 square miles, and no single island is nearly as large as the Isle of Wight, except Dominica, which is twice the size. The population, which contains but a small white element, is given at 122,240, many of whom may be described as peasant proprietors.

WINDWARD ISLANDS

What are known as the Windward islands have a history much less English than their northern neighbours. In them the original Carib inhabitants, their disposition apparently stiffened by an intermixture of runaway negroes, maintained a virtual independence later than elsewhere. Indeed, St. Vincent was recognised as neutral on this ground in the eighteenth-century treaties between England and France, both of which had claims, ancient but vague, over the Windward islands. In Grenada the French, having exterminated the Caribs, had made effective settlement. In St. Lucia

beginnings of colonisation had been made early in the seventeenth century by both English and French, but practically the French had the best of it. After the Seven Years' war, during which England seized on all the Windward islands, as the term was then understood, a sort of partition was made. Grenada and St. Vincent were assigned formally to England, while St. Lucia and Martinique, which was undoubtedly French, were restored to France. In the war of American independence these islands nearly all temporarily changed hands, and the harbour of St. Lucia was the base from which Rodney issued to his great victory in 1782; but the former ownership of all was restored at the peace. Finally St. Lucia, after being captured and recaptured in the course of the wars of the French Revolution, remained permanently British after the fall of Napoleon.

All these islands are of volcanic origin, but the only active volcano is the Soufrière, in St. Vincent, which burst into disastrous eruption in 1902, after being quiescent for ninety years. Naturally they are much alike in formation and climate, but they have come to differ much in products. Grenada is more or less given over to cocoa. St. Vincent produces a good deal of arrowroot. St. Lucia, which though nearly as large as the other two together, has the smallest population, is still clothed with much forest, though like nearly all the islands it produces sugar. The great value of St. Lucia, however, lies in its harbour, which is a rival in security and commodiousness to that of Martinique, and has now been fortified as a naval base.

The three islands are under a single governor, but each has its own council, which however is non-elective, and its own laws. In St. Lucia, which remained latest in French hands, French law is still administered, the other islands being under English law, except so far as either is modified by local enactments. Such an administrative system is typical of the advantages and disadvantages of our habit of maintaining as far as possible the laws and customs under which new subjects had previously lived. Neither St. Lucia, whose white population is mainly of French descent, nor St. Vincent, which is equally English, can complain of being

sacrificed to the other. At the same time it is expensive to maintain three more or less separate governments for three islands whose total population is only about 162,000, less than that of many provincial towns in England.

BRITISH GUIANA

For convenience of the map one naturally groups with the West Indies the two mainland colonies which England owns in the same region, British Honduras, which lies along the coast of the Caribbean Sea, and British Guiana, our sole possession in South America, which is just outside it. The latter competes successfully with the islands in the production of their most important export, sugar. The former, though its trade is a specialty of its own, had a close historical connection with Jamaica, whence the first logwood cutters started before they made permanent settlements.

The early history of Guiana has an interest for English readers, in that it was the scene of Ralegh's last disastrous adventure. Not long after the Spanish conquests in the New World began, a legend gained currency that somewhere up the Orinoco, or between it and the Amazon, was a city of incalculable wealth, the centre of a flourishing state. There was absolutely no basis for it, though in view of what actually existed in Mexico and Peru it might well seem credible; and after the failure of Ralegh's expedition, which was ruined by encounter with the Spaniards, not by natural obstacles, we hear little more of the golden city of Manoa. Before the end of the sixteenth century, however, sundry trading ports had been established, chiefly by the Dutch, on the coast between the mouths of the Orinoco and Amazon, which Spain never even professed to occupy. The Dutch, there as elsewhere, were essentially traders and not colonisers, nor indeed was the climate suitable for a white community. There, as everywhere else in America, the slave trade was introduced; and though the energies of the Dutch in that region were largely expended on an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Brazil from the Portuguese, they maintained their hold on Guiana. French and English

conquests were only temporary, and at the end of the eighteenth century the region which is now British Guiana was still essentially Dutch with a large slave element, though a certain number of English had come into the country. One of the first consequences of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens was the seizure of Guiana by England, Holland being virtually a part of Napoleon's dominions. England retained possession till the peace, when her right was formally acknowledged, the Dutch obtaining the region to the eastward, which, strangely enough, had once been in English hands. Hence the law of the colony is still, as at the Cape, the Roman-Dutch law, except where it has since been modified, and some parts of the administration retain their Dutch form.

The history of British Guiana since our rule began has been almost blank, the chief event being the emancipation of the slaves, in spite of which the sugar industry has thriven, thanks to the extraordinary fertility of the soil, and to the enterprise of the planters. The only other incident was the sudden assumption by the United States government of a hostile attitude towards England at the end of the year 1895, in consequence of the long-standing dispute as to the western frontier of the colony with its anarchical and faithless neighbour, Venezuela. The question was however referred to arbitration, and the award gave to the colony nearly all the debateable territory. British Guiana has now an area of about 89,480 square miles, almost the same as that of the United Kingdom, and the population is now estimated at 298,000, of whom only about 17,000 are of European birth, the remainder being coloured. Here, as in the West Indian islands, the emancipated negroes have proved of little industrial use; and they are now a smaller element in the population than the natives of India, who have been introduced to fill the vacancy.

The boundaries of British Guiana are very clearly marked except on the west. The sea coast, from the mouth of the Orinoco to the Corentyne river, is the northern frontier. The Corentyne in its whole length separates British from Dutch Guiana. The Acarai mountains, less than two degrees

from the equator, divide it from Brazil. The western frontier has in its northern part been recently fixed by the arbitrators, who followed physical lines of demarcation as closely as was consistent with what they considered the just rights of both parties.

A series of roughly parallel rivers run down to the coast of British Guiana, of which the Essequibo is considerably the largest. Their alluvial deposit forms the soil of the coast strip, which is low-lying and wonderfully fertile, though rather unhealthy. Whether the unassisted operations of nature would ever have rendered this land cultivable is not quite certain. Its actual condition is due to the Dutch, who aided nature by embanking the shore and shutting out the ocean, after a fashion familiar in their native country. On this reclaimed land the sugar is grown, which is the main industry of the colony; indeed there is little other cultivated land within its limits, the total extent being only about 125 square miles. The high uplands of the interior, which are said to be very healthy, are mainly covered with forest, intermixed with grassy plains. Timber thence derived is the other export of the colony. West of the Essequibo river, which cuts British Guiana roughly in half, gold has been found in various places. It was largely the news of this discovery, and the resulting settlements in parts which hitherto had never been effectively occupied, that led Venezuela to lay claim to districts now definitely assigned to Guiana. Now that this region is under settled government, the gold industry has every chance of being developed if better railway facilities were introduced. In 1914 a new gold district was discovered between the head waters of the Takutu river and the Tucurutu mountains. This district has been described as "the largest undeveloped auriferous area in the world."

One proof of the prosperity of Guiana under British rule is that Georgetown, the capital, at the mouth of the Demerara river, has now a population of 55,000, exceeding that of any other town in the region of the British West Indies, except Kingston, the capital of Jamaica.

BRITISH HONDURAS

British Honduras is a broad strip of territory, about as large as Wales, on the east side of the Yucatan peninsula, about opposite Jamaica, which however is over 600 miles off. It is mainly tropical forest, producing logwood, mahogany, and other valuable timber. Like some other British colonies, it owes its existence to the action of individuals, who settled for trade purposes on a coast over which Spain claimed sovereignty, but where she had never exercised effective authority. Things followed their normal course: the Spaniards, instead of adopting the new and energetic settlers, tried to expel them, but they, with intermittent support from England, made good their position by force. Ultimately it became necessary to organise the voluntary and self-governed colony as a regular British possession.

The population is only 45,000, of whom the large majority are coloured; and the climate of the low-lying parts, where the valuable products grow, is far less healthy than that of the West Indies generally. The colony however is fairly flourishing, and the scarcely explored interior may be found to possess mineral and other wealth.

It is bounded on the north by Mexican territory, on the west and south by the republic of Guatemala; and in the improbable event of the latter becoming highly civilised and industrial, its one town, Belize, would probably become an emporium as important as its rather poor harbour will permit.

The West Indies furnish the most unsatisfactory chapter in the history of the British empire. Beginning as true colonies, they became slave-holding communities, in which the proportion of free whites to enslaved blacks grew ever less and less. Finding early in their career that sugar was the most profitable product, they dropped other industries; and sugar growing was both impossible without black labour and calculated steadily to diminish the number of white men employed. The great value of sugar made the British government eager to acquire fresh islands, which naval superiority made it easy to do. And when the French Revolution ruined the great French colony of St. Domingo,

the British sugar growers seemed to have it all their own way, only to find that this was the first step towards ruin. The absolute supremacy of the British navy during the wars of the French Revolution made it impossible for any sugar grown outside the British possessions to reach Europe; and Napoleon, in the hope of crushing England, did his best to exclude her trade from the Continent. The inventiveness of man was as usual equal to the occasion: it was found possible to make sugar out of beetroot, so that when at length peace came the product of the sugar-cane was no longer of so much importance. Then followed the emancipation of the slaves, which deprived the West Indies of any certain supply of labour, for the negroes, once freed, were mostly unwilling to work hard; and though Indian coolies partly remedied the evil, sugar growing was carried on under difficulties, that were greatly aggravated by the action of the European countries where beet-sugar is made, in granting a bounty on the export of their own produce. The Brussels convention of 1902 was intended to put an end to this unnatural system, but time has yet to prove whether the West Indian sugar trade will once again flourish or entirely disappear.

Meanwhile, in most of the islands, a beginning at last has been made of producing other tropical commodities. Cocoa is grown in several islands, especially in Trinidad, which has the reputation of supplying almost the finest in the world. Coffee and ginger are well-established Jamaica products. Montserrat is largely given up to the cultivation of limes. The fibre aloe has of late years become a valuable export from the Bahamas. Cinnamon and other spices are grown to a small extent in several islands. Most important perhaps after sugar is the trade in tropical and semi-tropical fruits, such as the banana and pineapple. The West Indies have long sent produce of this kind to the United States, but of late years there has grown up a large trade in fruit, especially bananas, sent direct to England.

Thus the islands are not entirely dependent on the sugar-cane, though that industry is still probably greater than all others put together. It is possible also that, now the Isthmus of Panama is pierced by a canal, the West Indies will derive much advantage from being on the direct route of great ocean traffic.

Part VI

THE PROTECTORATES

"A BRITISH protectorate is a country which is not within the British dominions, but as regards its foreign relations is under the exclusive control of the king, so that its government cannot hold direct communication with any other foreign power, nor a foreign power with that government."[1]

Such is the definition given of a protectorate by a most competent authority: but, as the author goes on to point out, the nature and extent of the control exercised by the protecting power over the internal affairs of the protected people vary almost in every case. Something has already been said of the vassal states included in the Indian empire. A native prince technically governs his own dominions, but practically he is controlled in many things by the advice of the British officer resident at his court. In other places we merely enforce peace among savage tribes, or prevent outlying islands from becoming the haunt of pirates. In Africa, both east and west, we are introducing law and industry among the natives, in a manner which is calculated to convert mere protection into effective government. Other protectorates, as in the Malayan peninsula, have grown up alongside colonies. All of these are mentioned in their own connection. There are, however, others which stand entirely apart, having no relation to the British crown except the strictly protective one; and two of these have an orderly and civilised government of their own.

[1] Sir H. Jenkyns, *British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond the Seas*, p. 165.

NORTH BORNEO

When the English first reached the Indian seas, they, like other nations, began by trying to get a commercial footing in the rich islands of the eastern archipelago. The Dutch, who had been slightly earlier in the field, were our chief rivals, and succeeded in keeping the upper hand in the spice islands. Gradually, as by a process of natural selection, the English East India Company confined its attention to the mainland of India, abandoning all attempt to rival the Dutch in the islands. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, Englishmen planted themselves in Borneo, long considered the least valuable of the islands, partly because the ferocity of the native inhabitants prevented any real knowledge of its resources. The larger southern half of Borneo is claimed by the Dutch, but in the north two states have arisen, ruled by Englishmen but with a population mainly native, which are under British protection. These furnish recognised exceptions to the general rule that territories acquired by Englishmen in foreign parts come *ipso facto* under the jurisdiction of the crown.

The origin of the kingdom of Sarawak, the earliest in date of the protected states in Borneo, is unique in history. A private Englishman, travelling in the east, became so much interested in Borneo that he obtained in 1841 from one of the native princes a grant of some territory on the north-west coast, and set himself to build up a civilised state there. The materials seemed unpromising; the country was in utter confusion through the fierce hostility between the Malay settlers on the coast and the natives, who are commonly known as Dyaks, though that name is strictly applicable only to certain tribes. The Dyaks themselves had atrociously murderous customs, but they proved amenable to better influences, as if their customs were due to tradition rather than natural ferocity. Raja Brooke developed extraordinary capacity for his self-imposed task, to which he devoted his whole life and fortune. He soon imposed order and gradually taught his new subjects, Dyaks and Malays alike, the habits and arts of peace. He added

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piecemeal to his dominions, until they are now as large as England, obtained formal recognition from the British government, and then transmitted his sceptre to his nephew, Sir Charles Johnson Brooke. He died in 1917, and was succeeded by the present Raja, Charles Vyner Brooke, who has continued to rule on the same lines as his predecessors.

Sarawak, with the small adjacent kingdom of Brunei, was formally taken under British protection in 1888. It is now a flourishing state, administered by Englishmen who are regularly engaged in the Raja's service, though he himself reigns supreme, with a peaceful population of some 600,000, and a revenue considerably exceeding a million dollars. Its capital Kuching is, if one may trust the enthusiastic description of a recent traveller, a model town, with all the appliances of advanced civilisation. The mineral wealth of the country, especially in coal, is known to be considerable; in fact it already exports some gold and other metals. Nor is there any doubt of its fertility, though a large area is still covered by forest. As its industrial development progresses, it may be expected to yield more and more of sago, pepper, and other tropical produce.

In 1846 Great Britain obtained from the sultan of Brunei the small island of Labuan, some thirty square miles in area, off the west coast of Borneo. This was done at the instance of Raja Brooke, who was the first governor, chiefly for the purpose of putting down piracy. Coal was discovered there and worked for some time, but other sources of supply have proved more satisfactory. Labuan has a good harbour, but the trade more naturally belongs to the ports of the mainland of Borneo. Thus it has never thriven as a colony; but it remains British territory, the only land belonging to the British crown in the wide range of the Indian archipelago. In 1889 it was put into the charge of the North Borneo company, but was taken back by the crown in 1905, and has now been formally declared part of the Straits Settlements, of which Singapore is the centre.

In 1878 an Englishman obtained from a native ruler a large concession at the extreme north of the great island. In consequence of this a company was formed, which ob-

tained a royal charter in 1881. This charter expressly declared the lands of the company not to be British territory; they were, however, formally taken under British protection a few years later. The company has governed them ever since, enlarging them till they are now about the size of Ireland, with a population of less than 150,000. Their administration is, like that of the East India Company before 1858, or of the existing chartered company in south Africa, worked by a regular service of Englishmen. The inhabitants include a good many Chinese and Malays, introduced for the sake of the industries, among which the growing of tobacco is probably the most important, though rubber is beginning to be produced in considerable quantities. Much of the uncleared interior is mountainous, the highest peak having an elevation approaching 14,000 feet. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that North Borneo, like Jamaica, may prove suitable for very diverse products. In other respects it is very like the neighbouring Sarawak. Many minerals are known to exist, but only coal and manganese have as yet been worked to any great extent. In a region naturally covered with tropical jungle, the first *desideratum* is means of communication, and these are being gradually supplied. Small steamers ply round the coasts, and one line of railway has been constructed. It should be added that North Borneo possesses a magnificent harbour at Sandakan, on the east side of the northern extremity of the great island, which may hereafter prove of great value to the empire.

Thus North Borneo comprises three different units, none of which stands in exactly the same relation to the British crown. Sarawak is a protected state, pure and simple. In North Borneo the protecting government further requires that the appointment of the governor should be subject to its approval, and that its advice shall be followed in matters relating to the treatment of natives. The Sultan of Brunei, which is a small and decaying state, agreed in 1906 to receive and to be guided by a British resident, so that he is in exactly the same position as an Indian feudatory prince.

PERSIAN GULF

It is mainly for the sake of India that England has for most part of a century taken an active interest in the affairs of the Persian Gulf.* Much of the trade of that region is Indian, and the route from the Red Sea to the Indian ports is obviously flanked by the mouth of the gulf. Hence English naval power has been used to put down piracy there, as well as slave trading, and to survey and light its waters. This is a real service to civilisation in general, irrespective of the benefit to our Indian empire, which was the primary motive. A further step in the direction of maintaining peace was to induce the Arab chiefs along the western shore of the gulf to enter into treaties with the Indian government, binding them to refer their quarrels to the arbitration of the British resident, whose head quarters are at Bushire, on the Persian side. Under these conditions, Great Britain has obviously earned a claim to a preponderant voice in the affairs of the Persian Gulf. How her influence should be used, whether especially it is worth her while to insist that no possibly hostile European power shall acquire a naval station, or what may be converted into a naval station, on the Persian side of the gulf—these are questions rather of policy than of historical geography.

What Great Britain undoubtedly possesses, apart from general influence, is localised to the Arabian shore of the gulf. Here the chiefs, otherwise entirely independent, have agreed, as already mentioned, to submit to British arbitration. And there is also a definite protectorate, dating from 1867, over the Bahrein islands, near the middle of the Arabian shore. There is one island considerably larger than the Isle of Wight, and a small one with a town on it, the rest being mere rocks. These islands are a principal seat of the pearl fisheries, exporting to the value of over £460,000 annually. They also serve as an emporium for trade with the Arabian coast, and altogether possess a considerable commerce.

* Of recent years Great Britain has had other interests to the north of the Gulf, because, under the terms of the Treaty of 1920, Mesopotamia or Iraq was entrusted to her, and in the following year, with British sanction, King Feisal was elected sovereign. By the Treaty between Great Britain and Iraq, in October, 1922, it was agreed that the mandatory powers of Great Britain should cease on the admission of the newly formed kingdom to the League of Nations.

Part VII

THE BRITISH DOMINIONS IN AFRICA

§ 1. GENERAL

IN the year 1800 the British possessions in Africa were limited to a few spots on the west coast, only one of which, Sierra Leone, was other than a trading station, and that one was of very recent origin. The Cape of Good Hope was acquired soon afterwards, with a nominal territory as large as Great Britain, though very thinly inhabited: but it was valued entirely as a stepping-stone on the way to India and the east. It was only very gradually that our South African dominion was extended and developed into Cape Colony and Natal. Forty years ago, though the Cape territories had been almost trebled in area, the total amount of our possessions in Africa fell considerably short of 400,000 square miles. At the present time the extent of African territory directly or indirectly under British rule, if Anglo-Egyptian Sudan be taken into account, is not far from ten times as great. Included in this vast aggregation are self-governing colonies, including the recently conquered German East Africa, the older trading settlements which are crown colonies, protectorates over regions which are administered by English companies, and protectorates over native states in various stages of assimilation. In west, south, east, and north we have assumed responsibility for very large portions of the "dark continent," with populations which are estimated as high as 75,000,000, and cannot be less than two-thirds

of that number. It will be convenient to take these possessions, or quasi-possessions, in geographical order, beginning with the west coast, which happens also to be the historical order, except that in a great part of the west coast area the development of our control has been the most recent of all.

§ 2. WEST COAST

The west coast of Africa was explored piecemeal by the Portuguese during the fifteenth century, under the impulse given by prince Henry the Navigator. The ultimate object being to find a way to the East Indies round the south of Africa, they had no motive for penetrating inland from the coast. Gradually the trade winds came to be known; and the best course for sailing ships that intended to double the Cape of Good Hope was found to take them nearly across the Atlantic, instead of fighting their way down the African coast. Hence there was nothing to attract to west Africa, except trade; and the climate was so obviously unhealthy that the less time Europeans spent on the coast the better. The result was that for centuries west Africa remained a *terra incognita*, no white men having gone out of reach of the sea. Late in the eighteenth century it was supposed that the two considerable rivers of the extreme west, the Senegal and the Gambia, were mouths of the Niger. Nearly fifty years later the first traveller to reach its upper waters imagined that the Niger would prove to be one with the Congo.

The commercial attraction of Guinea, as the long reach of coast running east and west a little north of the equator came to be called, consisted in the first instance chiefly of gold. Indeed a considerable portion of it, now in English hands, is called the Gold Coast to this day. Very soon, however, a much more absorbing form of traffic arose: the slave trade became, and continued till far into the nineteenth century, the determining factor in the history of west Africa. The Spaniards urgently needed labour for their new possessions in central America, where the natives could not, or would not, work either in mines or on plantations. And other nations,

as they by degrees acquired territory in tropical or semi-tropical America, found the same need. The African negroes were at once the nearest source of supply and the most efficient; it is probable that without them the lands on the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea would never have been settled by white men. And it was easy to procure them in their own country, where slavery was rampant. The chiefs were ready to sell their captives, or their own subjects, to the white traders, who made a large profit by transporting them across the Atlantic. The evil caused to Africa, by perpetuating war and the cruelty of slave raids, was incalculable. It is doubtless true that a negro, once caught, gained by being transferred to a Cuban plantation, where his master had a pecuniary interest in his welfare. But for the American demand, however, comparatively few would have been captured: and there might have been a possibility of the native savagery being gradually mollified through European influences.

Spain was excluded from Africa by the terms of the famous papal bull which divided the world outside Europe between Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, the Portuguese were still in exclusive possession on the African coasts when the demand for slaves arose, and they first developed the slave trade. Other European nations began to push their way among the Portuguese, and to establish trading stations in Guinea: but none of them even attempted to acquire more than mere right of occupation. The English were the last to take up the slave trade; the voyages of Sir John Hawkins in Elizabeth's reign were entirely exceptional. A small general trade had grown up during the first half of the seventeenth century; and after the Restoration a new company, formed to carry it on, entered upon the slave business in earnest, and during the eighteenth century the English had a bad eminence in the traffic in human flesh. Hence when sentiment gradually changed, the prohibition of the slave trade by the English Parliament in 1807, though not actually the first blow struck at the abominable system, was considerably the most important. And when the civilised world had agreed in forbidding the slave trade, England as the dominant maritime power took the chief part in that policing of the west African

coast, which killed the trade before slavery had been abolished in America. Hence England has had a very large share in the new developments in Africa, which only became possible after the slave trade had ceased.

A short account of the general geography of west Africa proper, that is of the part between the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea, is necessary in order that the relation to each other of the various British possessions may appear. Tunis is some two thousand miles due north of the eastern corner of the Gulf of Guinea, and the middle of the western coast is about the same distance from such a line. Of this vast area of four million square miles, or little less, the northern half is desert, known as the Great Sahara, save for a strip along the Mediterranean, of which no account need here be taken. For hundreds of miles, nearly down to the river Senegal, the coast of the Sahara is bare; but further south, and along the Gulf of Guinea, the shore is lined with a belt of dense forest, between which and the sea is a malarious strip, much of it swampy. Inland, between the forest belt and the Sahara, the country is open, and more or less fertile. The key to the interior is the great river Niger, which rises only two hundred and fifty miles inland from the west coast, and making a great semicircular sweep to the northward, turns south and enters the Gulf of Guinea not far from its eastern corner. The Senegal, which rises not far from the Niger, has a course rather north-westwards into the Atlantic: and the Gambia, much shorter but still navigable far inland, fills up the space between them. It will thus be obvious that, whatever amount of western Africa may prove available for the residence of white men, it all lies far inland on the middle or upper Niger. The coast is not merely impossible for colonisation: it has a climate which makes it necessary to minimise residence there even for trading purposes. Whether the very recent discovery of the part played by the *anopheles* mosquito, in propagating malarious disease, will lead in time to measures rendering the west coast of Africa much less unhealthy, has yet to be seen. For the present England has a sufficiently costly task in governing her protectorates.

English ships found their way to the west coast during the reign of Elizabeth ; indeed, a temporary company for trading there was formed in the very year of the Armada. It was not, however, till 1618 that trading stations were established, one on the Gold Coast, the other in the mouth of the Gambia. At first the English repudiated any idea of dealing in slaves : but before 1662 circumstances had greatly changed. Colonies had been acquired both on the mainland of North America and in the West Indies, where there was a great demand for black labour. The company which received its charter in that year went into the slave trade on a large scale ; and England, as her naval strength grew, obtained an ever larger share of this as of other forms of commerce. Between that date and the close of the wars of the French Revolution there was much fighting on the African coast, with frequent vicissitudes. The Dutch in Guinea lost ground ; the French around the Senegal and Gambia about held their own. All this time, however, England did not even profess to have acquired sovereignty over a single spot, except Sierra Leone, which had been obtained for a definite purpose. The trading stations existed, and were fortified for the sake of security : but in theory the native proprietorship had not ceased. The first exploration into the inland regions was English, prompted rather by the scientific or adventurous spirit than by any practical aims. Mungo Park reached the upper Niger in 1795 from the Gambia, and again in 1805. Clapperton, starting from Tripoli in 1821, explored much of the central region, visiting Lake Chad. Lander, reaching Bussa on the Niger in 1830 from the Guinea coast, followed the river's course down to the sea. Explorers of other nations contributed further knowledge ; thus before 1840 a rough idea had been obtained of the general structure of the whole of west Africa, though it was only rough.

Meanwhile the point of view had changed greatly since England had pronounced strongly against slavery. Trade obviously flourishes in proportion as peace and order prevails. The due administration of justice required that the territories held in fact by England should be taken formally under the sovereignty of the English crown. Fresh lands were ob-

tained by formal cession from native chiefs, by purchase or cession from other European powers. And the value set by the natives on justice as administered in British courts, together with the obvious advantage to the colonies of having peaceful neighbours, led to the gradual extension of more or less informal protectorate over the regions surrounding them. Nevertheless, the British government was averse to enlarging, even to continuing, its responsibilities in west Africa. So late as 1865 a parliamentary committee reported in favour of curtailing them when possible. The tide, however, was running too strongly, and since then events have moved rapidly.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a rush for Africa on the part of the European powers, ending in the whole continent being divided up into "spheres of influence," the new and convenient phrase invented to suit the case. As the upshot of various negotiations, chiefly with France, the share of England in west Africa has been delimited as appears on the map. And every year adds to the reality of our sway over the vast regions within which no other European power can interfere, however our position is technically defined. The greatness of the scale may be well illustrated by a recent incident. On May 22nd, 1903, the Colonial Secretary announced in Parliament that, as a consequence of recent operations in Nigeria, fresh provinces had been taken under our effective rule, comprising about 100,000 square miles. That is to say, a territory not much smaller than the British Isles was taken in hand in the ordinary course of business, and no one thought it an important event.

The British dominions in west Africa may be properly classed under two heads. There are our so-called colonies, and there are the two Nigerian protectorates. The colonies have protected districts attached to them, and all alike are under the Colonial Office. Still there is a technical difference which corresponds with a more important historical and political one.

Gambia.—The mouth of the Gambia was one of the first places where an English trading post was formed. The actual colony was created in 1843 and became a separate

government in 1888. It now consists of 4,132 square miles of territory with a total population, including that of the island of St. Mary and of the Protectorate, of about 146,000. It is needless to follow the vicissitudes of two centuries, during which there were repeated conflicts with the French around the mouths of the Senegal and Gambia. It is sufficient to say that at the close of the wars of the Revolution, during which England had used her maritime strength to occupy all the French settlements, the Gambia alone was retained. Subsequent arrangements with France, the power which is supreme in all the neighbouring regions, recognised an English protectorate over the natives dwelling on both banks of the Gambia, nearly up to the first rapids. Nothing could more clearly indicate the purely commercial nature of our interest. For the sake of the trade descending the river we are content to police a strip of land about 250 miles long by 12 or 14 wide. Bathurst might no doubt be made a coaling-station, as the water is deep; but we have a better one at Sierra Leone, 500 miles off, and to plant one in the midst of the territories of a possible enemy would obviously be to court its immediate loss in case of war.

Sierra Leone.—The value of the best harbour on the west coast of Africa, with an excellent supply of fresh water, was early recognised by European mariners. The trade of the locality was not, however, nearly as valuable as that of the Gold Coast, apart from the traffic in slaves. Hence, perhaps, though all nations used it more or less for the latter purpose, none of them tried to monopolise it. Consequently it was feasible for the English philanthropists, who in 1787 wished to establish a colony in Africa for the benefit of emancipated slaves, to purchase from the natives the little peninsula which forms, or protects, the harbour. The colony had to go through sundry troubles, but its founders persevered. The population was formed of very diverse elements, released or escaped slaves from America, Maroons from Jamaica, and as time went on African blacks rescued from slave traders by British men-of-war. Under British guidance and control the motley population shook together, and now forms a peaceful and fairly prosperous community.

Sierra Leone was the first portion of African soil formally recognised as belonging to the British crown. Its original territory was but small, but successive purchases have carried it along the coast for 200 miles, with an average depth of about twenty. Therein dwell about 85,000 British subjects, all but one thousand being black; Freetown, the original settlement, accounts for nearly a third of this number. It is a fortified and garrisoned coaling-station, formerly of much more importance than now, as a resort for the squadron which was employed to put down slave trading. Its trade is more than a million a year, or nearly double that of Bathurst on the Gambia, the chief exports being in both cases palm kernels and rubber.

Besides the actual colony, there is a protectorate extending inland for some 200 miles, which is vaguely estimated as having a population of more than a million. Since the establishment of this protectorate in 1896 the *pax Britannica* has encouraged industry, and caused a district naturally fertile, and less malarious as it recedes from the coast, to supply a great variety of tropical produce to the European markets.

Gold Coast.—When western Africa was first visited by European traders, the Gold Coast alone offered great attractions, until the slave trade grew up. What now constitutes the chief vegetable wealth of the whole region, indiarubber and palm oil, was not yet appreciated: but gold was sought even more eagerly than at present. Hence the European nations one after another established trading stations on the portion of the Guinea coast where alone gold was procurable in any quantity. Late in the seventeenth century a map of the Gold Coast would have been like a reduced copy of the present map of all west Africa, if protectorates and spheres of influence were ignored, and nothing shown but the portions actually occupied by the European powers. The Portuguese had been ousted, but the rivalry of England and Holland on the seas was fully represented there; Denmark and Brandenburg had settlements of less importance: the French, though their main attention was directed to the Senegal region, did not ignore the Gold Coast. European

wars naturally led to fighting between the same powers on the African coast, and as England slowly rose in general maritime strength she became also the leading power in this region.

The first English settlement was made in 1618, at a place now forgotten. This particular fort was taken by the Dutch in the reign of Charles II., but we conquered instead Cape Coast Castle, which for two centuries was the English head quarters on the Gold Coast. Gradually other English ports were established, and other Europeans dropped out, till in the early part of the nineteenth century England was altogether preponderant. The change of sentiment and policy, of which putting down the slave trade was the centre, has been described above. The result on the Gold Coast was to spread British influence further and further among the natives, though it was not till queen Victoria had been for some years on the throne that Parliament formally recognised the existence of British sovereignty in this region. In 1850 the Danish settlements were bought, and the Dutch surrendered on very easy terms all that they still retained, including the original Portuguese fort of Elmina, which had been the Dutch capital for over two centuries.

A war with Ashanti followed in 1873–4. The king of Ashanti, who in the course of the last two generations had become supreme over all the *hinterland* of the Gold Coast, thought himself cut off from the sea when Elmina, where Ashanti trade had been concentrated, passed into strange hands. He attacked the Fantee natives, who were under English protection, and even invaded the actual English territory. A campaign through the tropical forest belt was no small undertaking, but was successfully carried out by Sir Garnet, afterwards Lord Wolseley, and the power of Ashanti was restricted. British arms were equally victorious in the wars of 1896 and 1900–1; and the kingdom of Ashanti was definitely added to the dominions of the Crown. The country beyond the forest belt is most fertile, and gold is found, by systematic mining, in very considerable quantities.

The surface gold, however, which gave that part of the coast of Guinea its name, is now almost exhausted, though

it has enriched the English language by a word[1] that does not seem likely to be forgotten. There is besides the export of gold a considerable trade in the staple west African products, palm oil and rubber, though as yet little or none in things which require more regular cultivation. A serious drawback to commerce is the lack of good harbours: nor are the rivers navigable. Hence whatever industrial development of the interior may achieve in civilising the natives, its trade will always be carried on under difficulties; though something is being done to extend railways and improve the sanitary conditions of the towns.

The length of coast is about 350 miles, dotted with small towns, many of them dating back to the seventeenth or even the sixteenth century. The depth varies, but the official Gold Coast is reckoned at a little over 24,000 square miles. This is exclusive of the ex-kingdom of Ashanti, and of other territories originally merely protected, but now under real government, which have more than treble the area of the colony proper, while the total population under British rule approaches one and a half millions.

Lagos.—The fourth crown colony in west Africa has virtually no history. It only dates from 1861, when England took it over as an incident of the crusade against the slave trade. The island of Lagos, which commands the sole entrance to a vast series of lagoons lying inside the coast for nearly 200 miles, became the main seat of the slave trade when the European powers had all agreed to put it down. The native prince, unable or unwilling to fulfil his engagement that Lagos should cease to be the slave-dealers' head quarters, was at length made to cede the coast strip near the island to Great Britain. The natural consequences followed: a prosperous town has grown up at Lagos, the direct ownership of more lands was acquired, the natives came willingly under

[1] Guineas obtained their name from being coined out of the gold supplied by the company chartered in 1662, and were at first stamped with the figure of an elephant, then fairly plentiful on the west coast.

British rule, and a considerable protectorate was gradually formed, somewhat smaller in area than the Gold Coast, but nearly equal to it in volume of trade and in population. The trade being, through the geographical peculiarity above-mentioned, concentrated at one place, the town of Lagos is twice as large as any on the Gold Coast. Lagos has now ceased to exist as a separate colony, having been united in 1906 to southern Nigeria.

Nigeria.—The history of Nigeria is briefer even than that of Lagos; but the possibilities involved in our control of it are infinitely greater. Though Englishmen were the first to explore the course of the Niger in the early part of the nineteenth century, they paid little or no attention to the vast region which it drains, till about thirty years ago. Then the Royal Niger company was formed to work its trade, and received a charter in 1886. It carried on extensive and successful operations till 1899, obtaining influence among the natives far inland, and establishing trading stations on the coast. Then it was felt to be time that its affairs, which were growing more and more political, should come immediately under the crown. Accordingly, on the first day of the year 1900 the crown took over the powers and liabilities of the chartered company, and a direct protectorate was proclaimed over the sphere of its operations, to which were added the coast strips, previously treated separately as the Oil Rivers protectorate.

Meanwhile the limits of Nigeria had been determined. A British protectorate was proclaimed in general terms in 1884, over the region in which the Niger company was beginning to trade. In subsequent years agreements were made with Germany and France, the other European powers interested, by which the sphere of British influence was determined. Its eastern boundary, settled by agreements with Germany from 1889 to 1895, is, roughly speaking, a line about 700 miles long from the south-western corner of Lake Chad to the coast at the north-eastern corner of the Gulf of Guinea, in a direction nearly from N E. to S W. The frontier towards the French sphere on the west runs about north and south for nearly 600 miles. The northern frontier, mathe-

matically defined by agreement with France in 1898, was modified in April, 1904, in order to give the French a reasonably direct route from the upper Niger to Lake Chad.

Geographically speaking, British Nigeria is the middle and lower portions of the great river, with virtually the whole basin of its chief tributary the Benue. On the north-east it reaches Lake Chad: on the south it includes the huge delta which in course of ages the Niger has pushed out into the ocean, intersected by its many mouths, some of which were until recently supposed to be separate rivers. Its area is estimated at from four to five hundred thousand square miles, or more than France and the Spanish peninsula together. Its population has been reckoned as high as forty millions, but such figures are a mere guess.

For administrative purposes Nigeria was divided into a smaller southern and a larger northern section. This division has a real geographical basis, for southern Nigeria includes not only the swampy coast strip, but also its share of the broad belt of forest which stretches along most part of west Africa. Its people are all heathens, except so far as Christianity has spread among them, and though not unwilling to work, give little promise of civilisation. Its produce is also the same as in Lagos, with no great scope for other products. Hence it was natural to unite Lagos and southern Nigeria under a single administration, with its head quarters in Lagos town, which is officially called the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.

In northern Nigeria the tropical forest has been left behind, the climate is healthier, the heat somewhat tempered by greater elevation above the sea, the soil capable of growing many semi-tropical crops, and some that belong to more temperate regions. The bulk of the population are Hausas, totally different in race from the coast folk, mostly Mohammedan in creed, capable of rising fairly high in the scale of civilisation, excellent soldiers under English leaders. They are, or have been, dominated by the Fulani, another race from the interior, also Mohammedans, who came in as conquerors not so long ago, and have maintained their supremacy till very recently. Under the Fulani empire the

slave trade had flourished northwards towards Tripoli, though it had been stopped by the Niger company within their sphere: and raiding of caravans and other lawless practices were rife. It was obvious that so long as the Fulani kingdom of Sokoto, which held sway over all the northern part of the British sphere, remained in unbroken strength, the Hausas would not have a fair chance. Early in 1903, fortunately, the aggressions of the Fulani rendered it necessary to send an expedition against them, which with unexpected ease reduced them to submission. Thus the whole of Nigeria, that is to say of the region recognised by foreign powers as the sphere of British influence, has now come under actual control.

In some sense Nigeria is a novelty, even to the extremely varied experience of English colonial development. When the East India Company began to dominate India, its subjects at any rate in the Ganges basin had an ancient, if somewhat barbaric, civilisation of their own. And the company had English troops to form at least a nucleus for their armies. In northern Nigeria about two hundred Englishmen, with no armed force except what they can make by enlisting natives, are undertaking to rule many millions of people, spread over an area twice as large as France, who are little trained to industry, and appreciate peace and order chiefly because they have suffered from the opposite evils. They have to create all the elements of civilisation, to repress disorder, administer justice, collect revenue, make roads, initiate industries. And all this has to be done by the influence which the white man, when he is in earnest, can exert over most of the lower races; for appeal to irresistible force, which is in the last resort open to civilised governments, is not apparent to their subjects, though it is of course available in case of absolute necessity. The beginning is so recent that it is impossible to forecast the future. The Hausas are favourable material on which to work: but at best the task is herculean, for a handful of Englishmen to rule and civilise fifty thousand times their own number of black men.

Lokoja, at the confluence of the Niger and Benue, was

naturally selected as the military head quarters, and it still contains the principal garrison ; but the head quarters of the government have been transferred from Zungeru to Lagos, although it was proposed in 1919 to establish a new capital at Kaduna as being more centrally situated. Steady progress is being made with railways, the Niger having hitherto been the only highway of commerce. A direct line has been made from Lagos to the great native town of Kano, not far from Lake Chad, and branch lines run from Minna and Baro, and from Zaria to Bukuru.

§ 3. SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is usually taken to mean all south of the Zambesi, the only river of any importance which has its mouth on the eastern side of the continent. Great Britain possesses about two-thirds of this region, which may be roughly reckoned at a million and a quarter square miles, or as large as the whole of continental Europe except Russia and Scandinavia. Our share includes all that is of much value except the harbour of Delagoa Bay, and over this we have by long-standing treaty a right of pre-emption if Portugal ever desires to part with it. Previous to the great war our territory included all the extreme south and the centre, Germany having a broad piece, mainly desert, on the west northwards from the Orange river, and Portugal having the coast lands on the north-east.

The chief geographical feature of this region is a curved chain of mountains, which extends under various names, and at varying distance from the sea, round the whole south of Africa. It begins very near the coast south of the Orange river, passes somewhat further inland along the extreme south, and is continued north-eastwards till it sinks away in Portuguese territory again near the coast. The whole of the strip between the mountains and the sea, except at the north-west end, is on the whole fertile, getting rain enough from the south-east trade winds, though the rivers are too rapid for navigation and harbours are scarce. North of the mountains is an elevated plateau, healthy but too dry for great fertility, and becoming mere desert towards the Atlantic. Nearly the whole of this region, which has of late years

proved to be very rich in minerals, is drained by the Orange river, which is unfortunately useless for navigation, and has not even a harbour at its mouth. The river itself, and its chief tributaries, the Caledon and Vaal, have been made to serve as political frontiers, but they can hardly be called natural boundaries. The desert extends on both sides of the lower course of the Orange river. The Vaal divides what were the two Boer republics, but the surface of the land on each side of the stream has the same character.

This region is the southern end of the plateau which fills a great part of Africa; and though the Zambesi is a convenient boundary line for political description, there is physically little or nothing to divide its basin from that of the Orange river, or to divide either from the Limpopo, that much smaller parallel of the Zambesi which serves as the northern frontier of the Transvaal. In the centre British territory crosses the Zambesi, and the source of the river, which runs for some distance southwards, is itself in the Congo state. The whole of this last district is very imperfectly explored, but there seem to be no marked physical features to separate the Zambesi from the Congo.

It was not, however, until recently that European nations interested themselves in south Africa, or even knew anything about it away from the coast. The Portuguese, who were the first to make their way to and beyond the Cape of Good Hope, did so in order to reach the East Indies, and cared nothing about Africa itself. Moreover, the formation of the land does not invite settlement or facilitate exploration. The first discoverers never in fact troubled themselves to occupy even Cape Town, the best port for hundreds of miles, though they named sundry points on the coast. It was not till a century and a half later that the Dutch, who had in the meantime almost superseded the Portuguese in the east, occupied the Cape of Good Hope; and they took it merely because they found the need of a halting-place on the way to and from the Indies. Though the Dutch were then at the height of their power, they had no surplus population wherewith to form colonies. Cape Town was a necessary appendage to their eastern commercial empire, not the starting-

place for a new dominion. Nor were the geographical features encouraging, especially to men accustomed to the endless waterways of Holland. Not only were there no navigable rivers giving easy access inland, there were positive obstacles. All along the south end of Africa there are three parallel ranges of mountains, with dry plateaus between, forming a series of steps up to the interior. Thus from the neighbourhood of Cape Town, which was in fact the only port used during the Dutch occupation, the geographical obstacles to colonisation, or even to exploration inland, combined with the lack of adventurers eager to settle to make the occupation of the land a very slow process. An infusion of French Huguenots, expelled from France by the bigotry of Louis XIV., gave some assistance; but the decline of Holland during the eighteenth century more than counteracted this advantage. The Hottentots, who were the only native race with whom the Dutch had any dealings—the Bushmen were the merest savages, and the Kaffirs had not yet made their way so far south—were of no value. They had not the energy to resist the appropriation of their lands, which might have knit the Dutch strongly together, as the Red Indians helped to consolidate New England. And they had not the capacity for civilisation which might have made them useful if subordinate members of a growing society. There was nothing to compel, or to induce, the few Dutchmen who pushed out into the wilderness as settlers to hold together. The geography also favoured their apparently instinctive inclination to isolate themselves; and the government at Cape Town seems to have been more oppressive than useful to those who had once turned their backs on town life. Hence the Boers acquired the habit of solitude—a family would consider itself cramped for room if another dwelling was anywhere within sight—and also of taking life easily. Very little labour sufficed to supply their very modest wants, and that could in general be got out of the natives. Thus, although Dutch settlers extended by degrees over a large extent of country, their total number was very small, and the proportion of cultivated land smaller still.

England had attempted to seize the Cape in 1780, when at

war with half Europe, Holland included, but had been foiled by the promptness of the French admiral Suffren. Fifteen years later she took possession in the name of the stadtholder of the Netherlands, whom revolutionary France had expelled, virtually annexing Holland; but she surrendered it at the Peace of Amiens, only to reconquer it in 1806. At the general peace which followed the fall of Napoleon, Great Britain finally retained the Cape of Good Hope, paying to Holland a very large sum of money, which also purchased what is now called British Guiana. The value of the Cape to England, as to Holland originally, was as a stepping-stone on the way to India, where during the latter half of the eighteenth century she had acquired a great empire: but the original purpose has been lost sight of, and to Cape Colony has been accreted gradually the now vast dominion of south Africa.

When Cape Colony became English, it extended nominally over 90,000 or 100,000 square miles, but the population was extremely scanty. Outside Cape Town there were some hundreds of Dutch families scattered about, whose ideal was to live in isolation, their work being done by slaves, Hottentot or imported. The free natives were either Bushmen, savages whom the Dutch settlers destroyed without mercy, or Hottentots partly nomad, and having very little capacity for industry or settled life of any kind. On the eastern frontier, and always tending to encroach beyond it, were the Kaffirs, the most important element in the affairs of the Cape for many years.

The history of colonisation contains instances of the native inhabitants being displaced by European settlers, under every variety of moral conditions. Sometimes they were cheated, sometimes dispossessed by force. Sometimes they welcomed the Europeans, and more often than not repented later of their confidence. In few cases could the colonies be justified except on the principle that civilised man is not bound to let the fairest portions of the earth's surface be wasted on savages —a theory which can be defended in this general form, but which is obviously liable to abuse in specific instances. South Africa is one of the few marked exceptions. Long before the

Dutch occupation ended it was a question not between them and their Hottentot subjects, but of an intruding black race who threatened to expel the white men and destroy or enslave the blacks.

Successive tribes of the Bantu race, of whom the Kaffirs were the advanced guard, had been migrating southwards in Africa for at least a hundred years. In the middle of the eighteenth century they came in contact with the Dutch, and the Fish river had been made the nominal eastern boundary of the Cape territory, though the Kaffirs repeatedly crossed it. The Bantus are as a whole considerably superior to most black races, both physically and mentally. Several individuals among them have shown real ability as rulers, not always associated with ruthless cruelty, and a fair number of them have proved capable of civilisation. If they had begun their migration a generation or two earlier, so as to have been in possession when Dutch settlers first began to go out from Cape Town, south Africa would probably never have been a white man's country, even in the qualified sense in which it is so described to-day.

The history of south Africa during most part of the nineteenth century is somewhat confused, all the more so because of the vacillating policy of the English government. But there are always three elements in it—the growth of colonisation by Englishmen, the movements of the Dutch seeking to set themselves beyond the reach of government, and the Kaffir wars. These elements are intermingled throughout, and are always controlled by the main geographical fact of the existence of the great mountain chain, with the coast strip outside it and the high veldt inside. The briefest outline is all that can be given here.

Cape Town is at the western extremity of the blunt south point of Africa, which is nearly five hundred miles across. On the Atlantic coast to the north of it there are no useful harbours, and the land soon degenerates into desert. Thus extension from Cape Town must needs take a direction east or north-east. Just before the coast begins to trend to the north, more than four hundred and fifty miles east of Cape Town, is the first convenient harbour, Algoa Bay, on which

stands Port Elizabeth. This was the landing-place for the first systematic English colonisation soon after the conquest, in what was then the extreme east of our territory. The primary aim was to hold the country against the encroaching Kaffirs, and the result was to make the eastern half of Cape Colony almost exclusively British, while the Dutch continued to predominate near Cape Town. It would be irrelevant to follow out in detail the history of the next half-century. It proved impossible to adhere to the policy of leaving the Kaffirs entirely alone beyond a definite frontier; for they would not respect it, and made war again and again. By degrees the whole coast region as far as the boundary of Natal was dominated by English influence, pacified and civilised to a certain extent, and ultimately annexed to Cape Colony.

Meanwhile the Dutch colonists nearer Cape Town had been carrying out a series of movements destined eventually to bring a much larger part of south Africa under British government. They were by habit uneasy under any government, and had, or thought they had, a grievance in the abolition of slavery and the inadequate compensation allotted to them. Thousands of them in 1836 "trekked" out of British territory, packed their families and goods on to wagons and marched away into the veldt beyond the Orange river, which had now become for a long distance the northern frontier of Cape Colony. Their avowed object was to escape from all control, and live in the wilderness in their own fashion, but it was long before they could achieve anything like this. The English government was swayed in turn by several conflicting influences. No civilised state will allow its subjects to repudiate their allegiance at their own will and pleasure, and it was especially obnoxious that they should occupy lands adjoining British territory without having any organised government. On the other hand, there was a strong feeling against adding to British responsibilities, whether in south Africa or elsewhere. Matters were further complicated by the influx into south Africa of successive Bantu tribes, killing and destroying. The most formidable of these, the Zulus, had reached the height of their power

before the Boer "trek" began; and the Boers were involved in several fierce wars with them.

As the upshot of many years of confusion three things happened:

1. The region between the Orange and Vaal rivers became an independent Boer republic, known as the Orange Free State: but the British government afterwards took under its protection the Basutos, a Bantu tribe occupying the hilly region in which the Orange river rises north of the mountain chain.

2. What is now the colony of Natal, after having been a battle ground for Zulus coming along the coast from the east, and Boers coming over the mountains, and also to a certain extent for the English coming by sea, was definitely organised as a separate British colony, the irreconcilable Boers retiring again across the mountains.

3. The Transvaal republic was formed between the Vaal and Limpopo rivers, with Zululand on the east and other Bantu powers on the west. This large territory was very thinly populated, had only a rudimentary government, and was involved in continual troubles with the Zulus.

In 1877 the British government annexed the Transvaal, under the impression that it was the only way to save the country from ruin, and that annexation would therefore be welcome. The immediate result was a war in which the Zulu power was finally broken by England, and their country placed under administration from Natal. Then the Boers revolted, the danger being removed under which they had reluctantly submitted to annexation, and succeeded in defeating the very small English forces immediately available. The British government thought fit to revoke the annexation, and concede to the Transvaal a qualified independence. The step may have been magnanimous, but it had disastrous results. The bulk of the Boers were so ignorant as to believe themselves superior to the whole power of England, and their unscrupulous leaders intrigued persistently to free themselves from British suzerainty, ultimately forcing on the war in which their independence was lost.

The discovery in 1870 of the great diamond mines where

now is the town of Kimberley led gradually to vast increase in the territory for which England is responsible. They were in the district occupied by the Griquas, a tribe of mixed descent that had long been more or less under English protection, just north of the Orange river, on the west of the Orange Free State. The latter indeed put forward a claim to some part of the diamond field, which was decided against them. It was obviously necessary that some sort of order should be enforced among the adventurers crowding to the diamond diggings. The Griquas asked for annexation, and in process of time the whole region known as British Bechuanaland, extending westwards into the desert, became part of Cape Colony; and a huge territory to the north of it, inhabited by Bechuana tribes fairly peaceable and well governed, was taken under our protection. Later again the British South Africa company, in which Mr. Rhodes was the moving spirit, explored and occupied in some sense the vast region between the Limpopo and the Zambesi, finding an exit to the sea through Portuguese territory to the east.

Before the temporary annexation of the Transvaal, suggestions had been made from England for a customs union in south Africa, which it was hoped would lead to some sort of political federation. They had not, however, met with much favour. Cape Colony did not see that it had anything to gain. The Boer republics, who were cut off from the sea and had everything to gain from the point of view of material progress, preferred their rude isolation. And this feeling was strengthened by the success of the Transvaal in recovering autonomy. It was the discovery, which may be said to date from 1885, that the Transvaal was extraordinarily rich in gold, which changed the whole aspect of affairs in south Africa. Scarcely less important was the fact that the gold lay in reefs, requiring to be elaborately mined, instead of being washed out of the alluvium of streams as in Australia. The gold could not be successfully worked without machinery involving considerable capital, nor without an organised system of industry. The mines were so productive that the capitalists who worked them could bear very heavy taxation, and the government of the Transvaal became suddenly very rich.

All political power was, and remained, in the hands of the original Dutch burghers; the new-comers had many grievances, for which they could obtain no redress. As many of them were British subjects, and the British government had sovereign rights over the Transvaal, though the Boers persisted in trying to explain them away, disputes inevitably followed; and ultimately there was an attempt to obtain redress by an armed expedition starting from Cape territory. This raid was as futile as it was illegal, and only served to encourage the Transvaal government in its plan of accumulating munitions of war, and expelling the English by force from south Africa. The vast sums obtained by taxing the gold industry were mainly expended in preparing for war. But for the geographical fact that the south of the Transvaal is full of gold there could have been no war, and there would have been very little occasion for it.

When the war actually broke out, its course was determined by geographical considerations at least as thoroughly as in any war that has ever happened. In the first place, the Orange Free State took part with the Transvaal, without having, or even pretending to have, any grievance against Great Britain. It would be irrelevant here to inquire into the reasons for this step, which, though it greatly increased the number of enemies arrayed against us, simplified the problem in every way. If the rulers of the Orange Free State had honestly attempted to maintain neutrality, they would have been unable to do so. There was a strong feeling of race sympathy between the two peoples, and an apparently universal ignorance as to the rules and limitations of civilised war. Under these conditions the Transvaalers would have been able to obtain supplies from or through the Orange Free State, to take refuge within it in case of need, to draw recruits from it, while the English troops would have been hampered by respect for formally neutral territory until the grievance became intolerable. As a matter of fact the English strategy, as soon as our forces were large enough to assume the offensive in earnest, was directed, as was geographically natural, towards overrunning the Orange Free State first, and making it the base for further advance into

the Transvaal. As a matter of fact also, both states, when their resistance had been overcome, were reduced to the same position as dependencies of Great Britain.

Secondly, the first stage of the war was altogether determined by the peculiar geographical conditions. Northern Natal is a triangle, of which the base is formed by the river Tugela, the north-western face by the Drakensberg mountains, beyond which lay the Orange Free State, while the north-eastern face abutted on the Transvaal. It was thus exposed to invasion on the whole of two sides. The railway runs from the coast to the extreme north point, where it enters the Transvaal: and there is a branch into the Orange Free State *viâ* Van Reenen's pass, the best route through the Drakensberg mountains, which turns off from the main line at Ladysmith, a little north of the Tugela. Ladysmith was also the place where a considerable amount of military stores had been collected. Under the circumstances the Boers had at the outset considerable superiority of force available in Natal, and they determined to invade and overrun as much of the colony as possible. To occupy the whole down to the coast might have been of immense service to their cause, but this they proved unable to achieve. On the British side, the ordinary principles of strategy seemed to dictate abandoning northern Natal, which was for the above geographical reasons not defensible, and holding the line of the Tugela. Political considerations were strong in favour of abandoning nothing that could possibly be held, and these so far prevailed that the English general allowed himself to be besieged in Ladysmith.

The Boer war was the first in which certain new military inventions were tried in earnest—smokeless powder, magazines, firearms of vastly increased range, all of which, as it happened, were calculated to assist the defence. Whenever new problems present themselves the burden of solving them must fall on the attacking side; and in this case the burden was on the English, and was necessarily heavy. The Boers showed great skill in utilising the immense advantages for standing on the defensive given by the new conditions: and the formation of the country increased these advantages

tenfold. Nearly the whole theatre of the actual warfare is open rolling ground, studded with hills, isolated or in clusters, which furnished innumerable defensive positions. There are very few woods and but scanty water-supply, which meant that at most times the streams were no obstacles, though occasionally they rose suddenly in flood and were impassable, and that troops on the move usually raised great clouds of dust. It is needless to point out how these conditions assisted the defence, which had also the inherent advantage of knowing a country in which topographical detail was of special importance. The Boers could always move by night or in bad weather, the English but rarely. It was inevitable that the former should achieve occasional surprises, and frequently escape when nearly hemmed in. The fact that the Boers were able to continue their resistance for two years after the capitals of both republics were in British hands is the best illustration of the exceptional character of the war, exceptional mainly, though not entirely, in the geographical conditions.

Early in 1909 the self-governing colonies of British south Africa agreed on terms of federation into a single political whole, like Canada and Australia; this federation obtained statutory ratification in the September of that year. On May 31, 1910, the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Orange River Colony, and the Transvaal were united in a legislative union under one government with the title of the Union of South Africa. It may be assumed also that the native protectorates will before long be put under the control of this Union. It must not be forgotten, however, that the circumstances in south Africa are in one respect widely different. In Canada the red men are of no account whatever, and are in fact dwindling away. In Australia the natives are disappearing even more rapidly, though in the tropical parts the question is a serious one, whether any use can be made of the country without imported black labour. In south Africa the natives form the bulk of the population, the proportion of black and white varying greatly in different regions; and they are mainly of the strong Bantu race, which is very far from dwindling

away. The complication of the problems presented for solution in federating south Africa will best appear from a sketch of the geographical conditions of each colony.

Cape of Good Hope.—It has been found convenient to attach so much to the modest province taken over from the Dutch that Cape of Good Hope is no longer a homogeneous whole in any geographical sense. The coast strip south of the mountains, 800 miles or more in length and of varying width, but in all about as large as the United Kingdom, has the same general character as to climate and products, but in the eastern part the natives are practically all Kaffirs, and are more numerous proportionally to the white men, who are mainly English. At the Cape Town end there are many Dutch, and many of the natives are Hottentots. The space between the mountains and the Orange river, somewhat less in extent, is comparatively thinly peopled, and in fact includes a certain amount of desert at the west end, which however contains the valuable copper mines of Ookiep. The railway from Cape Town runs due ENE. for convenience of penetrating the mountains, and other lines meet it from the two good ports east of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London. Thus the railway communications from the coast converge on that part of the Orange river which has now for two generations been the frontier between Cape territory and the Free State. Beyond the Orange river is British Bechuanaland, about as large as England, but much of it desert: in fact most of the population is centred in Kimberley and the diamond fields in its south-eastern corner.

The Province is well able to feed its own population, but its exports, apart from diamonds, are mainly of a pastoral character, a million and a half in wool, and more than half that value of ostrich feathers. The coast region is capable of supplying much wine and fruit, but the former has lost the reputation which it had a century ago, and the fruit trade is only now beginning to be developed.

Technically included in Cape of Good Hope, though entirely isolated from it, is the small settlement of Walfish Bay, seven or eight hundred miles north of Cape Town. This is the only tolerable harbour on the west coast of south Africa, and

had long been used as a resort for whaling-ships, as its name suggests, though not formally occupied till 1878. The British territory is a mere strip of coast forty miles long, and has only 3000 inhabitants, but it serves as a trading-station with the natives, and as a refuge on a long reach of inhospitable coast.

Natal.—The second in date of establishment, the smallest in extent of territory, if we except Basutoland, of the components of British south Africa, Natal is in some respects the most favoured of them all. Its name was given by Vasco da Gama, who happened to discover its one good harbour, now called Durban, on Christmas Day. But it had no other history until half a century ago, when, under circumstances already referred to, it was declared a separate British colony, with frontiers much as they are now.

Natal has a sea coast of less than two hundred miles on the Indian Ocean, the opposite frontier being formed by the Drakensberg, the highest part of the south African watershed. To the south-west is Cape Colony: on the north-east the Buffalo and Tugela rivers formed the original boundary. In 1897, soon after Natal had become a completely self-governing colony, Zululand, the coast district beyond the Tugela, inhabited almost entirely by natives, was annexed to it; and as a result of the Boer war some districts beyond the Buffalo river have been transferred to it from the Transvaal. With these accretions Natal is about as large as Ireland, and has a population of 1,429,400, of whom more than five-sixths are Kaffirs. Part of the remainder are immigrants from India, who have come to work on the sugar plantations and have chosen to stay. The white inhabitants are mainly English, though there are a few Dutch in the interior.

Situated between 31° and 27° of south latitude, Natal has a semi-tropical climate, but this is tempered by its elevation above the sea. The land rises rapidly from the coast; the capital, Pietermaritzburg, though only seventy miles from the sea, is 2,200 feet above it. Thus it can produce sugar along the coast, as well as wool and tea. Its chief wealth, however, is the great coalfield in the north, the only one as yet worked in earnest in south Africa, besides iron and other

minerals. Its main railway, from Durban to the northern point where it tunnels the Drakensberg, has always conveyed to the coast much of the gold exported from the Transvaal; and under the new conditions the transit trade to and from the Transvaal is certainly not likely to diminish.

Orange Free State.—The frontiers of this, the smaller of the two former Boer republics, are marked nearly all round by natural features. The Drakensberg separates it from Natal, save that in one part the small territory of Basutoland, on the continental side of the chain, is divided by the Caledon river from the Orange Free State. The Vaal runs round its north and north-eastern sides, and the Orange river divides it from Cape Colony proper. A rolling plateau 4,000 feet above the sea, with very little wood, and rather scanty water-supply, it is a good pastoral country, which might possibly become valuable for agriculture if artificial irrigation proved feasible. Before the Boer war it was a quiet community, if that word is applicable to a population less than that of Newcastle, two-thirds of it black, spread over a region nearly as large as England. It had practically no trade, hardly any wants, did no good and no harm to the world. The ambition of its rulers forced it to join with the Transvaal in attacking England; and it is now part of the British Empire, with consequences to its condition which may be judged from the fact that in twenty years its population has doubled.

Transvaal.—The greater part of this territory, which is more than twice as large as the Orange Free State, is of the same general character, high above the sea, bare and dry. Part of it in the north descending to the Limpopo river, which forms its northern frontier, and on the eastern side towards Portuguese territory, is on a lower level, and is on the whole unhealthy. Much of this part is scarcely inhabited, most of the population being concentrated in the gold region on the south, known as the Rand. Here has grown up at Johannesburg the largest city in south Africa: and it is impossible even to guess at the development which may await this extraordinarily rich district, if the labour problem can be solved. At present the population of the

Transvaal is, according to the census of 1921, 2,087,636, three-quarters of them natives. A third of the remainder are of Dutch extraction, including the sparse farming population dotted over three-quarters of the territory. The residue have been attracted to the mines from all over the world, though the majority are English. For working the gold mines the Kaffir inhabitants do not nearly suffice, even if they were more industrious than they are. White men will not work side by side with black, even if the mines could afford the greater cost of white labour; and as an avowedly temporary expedient Chinese labourers were imported under carefully regulated conditions. But their employment terminated in 1910, and the importation of Indian coolies has also been forbidden by law, so that the labour problem is of considerable difficulty. There is coal and other mineral wealth as yet undeveloped; and it is believed that much of the soil only needs irrigation to become good for agriculture. If the gold mines can be satisfactorily worked there will be ample revenue for all purposes, and ample markets for all produce.

Four railways reach the gold region of the Transvaal, two from Cape Colony, one running through the Orange Free State, and the other via Mafeking; one from Natal, and one from the Portuguese port of Lorenço Marques. The latter gives far the quickest access to the sea, and was naturally favoured by the Boer rulers of the Transvaal, whose dominant purpose was to have as little as possible to do with England. Now that the Transvaal is under the same flag as the rest of the federation the conditions are somewhat altered.

Basutoland.—This is a native territory governed by a Resident Commissioner, who is directed in his actions by the High Commissioner for south Africa. In all legal cases between natives the Basuto chief adjudicates, but cases between Europeans and natives are brought before the magistrates' courts. It is a mountain region on the inner side of the Drakensberg, drained by the head-waters of the Orange river, and naturally is very largely pastoral. The inhabitants, who number about 495,000, in a territory somewhat larger than Wales, have made a very fair advance towards civilisation.

Bechuanaland.—This is a genuine protectorate, inhabited

entirely by blacks of the Bantu race, who govern themselves under an English commissioner. It is rather larger than France, but has a population of less than 160,000. The people are peaceful, and seem likely to improve in civilisation. Whether the country will ever be of any commercial value the future must show; up to 1912 the cost of administering it was part of the burden of empire; but in 1917–18 the revenue was in excess of the expenditure.

Rhodesia.—This vast region, which is administered by the British South Africa company, extends from the Congo watershed and Lake Tanganyika in the north, to the Limpopo river in the south. It is divided into two sections, southern and northern, both of which are being rapidly settled, for both are rich in mineral deposits; while the southern is well suited for the cultivation of fruits, cereals, and tobacco, the northern is equally suitable for stock-raising on a large scale. Southern Rhodesia,* or Matabeleland and Mashonaland, is the country between the rivers Limpopo and Zambesi, with Portuguese territory to the east, and Bechuanaland to the west. It is larger than the British Islands, and contains goldfields estimated as covering 5,000 square miles. It is substantially part of the great plateau of Africa, much of it being more than 4,000 feet above the sea, and has therefore a climate not unfavourable for Europeans, of whom it contains about 33,600, who govern considerably over three-quarters of a million natives. There is a railway to Buluwayo, via Salisbury, the capital of Mashonaland, from the Portuguese port of Beira, and the "Cape to Cairo" railway has been carried 500 miles beyond the great falls. The Victoria Falls, which exceed Niagara in height though less in volume, are regarded as a future source of motive power for this region; and the Zambesi, which is navigable for a long distance above the falls, affords a valuable highway. It is reasonable to presume that the development of northern Rhodesia will largely depend on the use which can be made of the Zambesi. The European population is estimated to be 3,600 and the native about 980,000. The whole area of Rhodesia is estimated at 440,000 square miles.

* Responsible government was constituted in southern Rhodesia on October 1, 1923.

South-West Africa.—This was taken from Germany by General Botha in July, 1915. It was arranged at the Peace Conference in 1919 that the mandate for the administration of this territory (322,500 square miles) should be held by the Union, as geographically it was a part of that area. There is no doubt that in a short time it will become an integral part of the Federation of South Africa, subject to certain safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population.

Now that the two former Boer republics have been federated with Cape Colony and Natal, South Africa contains a non-British element in the white population, as in Canada. Thus insurrection is a possibility, as illustrated in the Boer rebellion instigated by Germany in 1914. It was, however, confined to a section of the rural population, and thanks to the loyalty of General Botha and his followers was suppressed in the December of that year. South Africa also contains a vast territory governed, as India once was, by a company under an English charter, and native states under British protection. And there is throughout the Union, the Chartered territory, and the Protectorates an element which can scarcely be said to exist in the other self-governing colonies—a vast black population. Some of these peoples are more intelligent than others, but on the whole they are capable of civilisation. At any rate there is no sign that any of them will wither away before the oncoming of the white man, as the natives have done in Canada and Australia. The problem of how white men and black shall live side by side will be always before the rulers of South Africa.

§ 4. EAST AFRICA

One of the most conspicuous features in the geography of Africa is the line of lakes running north and south on the eastern side of the continent. At the first glance one would expect to find that all are, like the Canadian lakes, strung on a single great river. So far, however, is this from being the case that Lake Nyasa drains southwards into the Zambesi, Lake Tanganyika westwards into the Congo, while the greatest of them all, the Victoria Nyanza, is the source of

the Nile. It was not until half-way through the nineteenth century that a beginning was made of exploring this vast region. Most part of the work has been done by Englishmen, and England has a proportionately large share of the burden, and the profit, such as it may prove to be, of opening it to civilisation.

Until comparatively recently the parts of this region subject to British control were under the Foreign Office. This was natural in view of the fact that other European nations possess territories conterminous with ours, and that the limits of the various "spheres of influence" were determined by negotiations for which the Foreign Office was the proper instrument. Now, however, the process of substituting for mere influence a system of peaceful administration, controlled if not everywhere carried on by British officers, has been brought far enough to admit of these regions being transferred to the charge of the Colonial Office.

Nyasaland.—The southernmost territory on the east side of Africa which is in our hands bore till 1907 the misleading title of British Central Africa. It is now called Nyasaland, quite properly, for Lake Nyasa forms its core, and no part of it approaches the real centre of Africa. More appropriate still would have been the perpetuation in its name of the memory of David Livingstone. To his energy as a traveller is due the first exploration of the Zambesi, and the discovery of Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. To his Christian zeal were due the several missions, English and Scotch, which have contributed, perhaps more in proportion in this region than anywhere else, towards laying solid foundations for peace and civilisation.

Lake Nyasa, which is long and narrow and extremely deep, is the southern end of a vast rift in the African plateau, that is continued northwards in Lake Tanganyika. Mountains rise steeply on the eastern side, most of which is Portuguese territory. The British province lies on the western side of the lake, with a strip running from the south end of it down the Shiré river, which drains it into the Zambesi. Its limits were finally settled in 1891, as the result of by no means amicable negotiations with Portugal, which power

claimed dominion completely across Africa, though on the east side, at any rate, she had no effective authority inside the coast. As the map shows, the frontier is singularly complex, but the essential fact is that the navigation of both the Zambesi and the Shiré is free. The latter is interrupted by rapids some way below the lake; otherwise communication to Nyasaland is adequate. It is high enough above the sea to be reasonably healthy for Europeans, though hardly for colonisation proper; and it promises a good return for cultivation, coffee being already grown there on a large scale.

The British sphere extends northwards as far as the end of Lake Tanganyika, with what was before 1919 the German sphere to the east and north, though the so-called Stevenson road connecting the two lakes is in British territory. To the south-west it is, as has been already said, conterminous with northern Rhodesia, and to the north-west and north with the Congo state. The population, which is estimated as over a million, is, so far as is known, of Bantu stock: and the people, at any rate near Lake Nyasa, have proved amenable to peaceful influences, and inclined to industry.

What is officially known as British East Africa comprises three distinct parts. These are:

1. Zanzibar, which is now administered by a Resident under the Governor and Commander-in-Chief in the East African Protectorate.

2. The East African Protectorate, which is the coast region.*

3. The Uganda Protectorate, which is inland.

The two latter are more directly under British rule, though the authority of native chiefs is utilised as far as possible.

Zanzibar.—The sultan of Zanzibar was formerly a very great potentate, but his dominions have gradually been curtailed, until now they consist of merely the two islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which are off the coast of east Africa, a little south of the British frontier. The two islands have between them about 198,000 inhabitants, of very various origin. The trade is mainly in the hands of natives of British India, and is not very extensive, the most lucrative

* Now known as Kenya Colony and Tanganyika Territory.

branch of commerce, the slave trade, having been pretty effectually put down since 1897.

East African Protectorates.—The vast area included in these two protectorates is best described geographically as one. The division between them was made for administrative convenience, and has indeed been altered once already. The southern frontier was determined by agreements with Germany in 1886 and 1890, and is formed by a line drawn in a south-easterly direction to the coast, from the point where the parallel of latitude 1° south cuts the east shore of Lake Victoria Nyanza. This line passes through Kilimanjaro, slightly the highest of the three great isolated mountains which stand at roughly equal distances from the lake: but the frontier was so drawn as to leave Kilimanjaro in what was the German sphere. It is now, however, included in the Empire, and the whole district is to be administered under conditions generally approved by the members of the League of Nations. Due north of Kilimanjaro, within the fairly explored parts of the British protectorate, is Kenia, slightly lower, but still exceeding 18,000 feet. The third, Ruwenzori, is beyond Lake Victoria Nyanza, on the extreme western edge of the British sphere, and among the head-waters of the Nile. Here, as in other instances, the vague legends of antiquity seem to have had some basis in geographical fact. It is at least probable, though it is obviously not capable of positive proof, that Ruwenzori represents those Mountains of the Moon in which the Nile was supposed to rise. When, after repeated explorations, Ruwenzori was climbed, it proved to be somewhat lower than Kenia and Kilimanjaro.

The remainder of the southern boundary is the first parallel of south latitude, across the lake to the 30th meridian E. The latter artificial line, and further north the watershed between the Nile and Congo, separate British East Africa, now known as Kenya Colony, from the Congo state. On the east there is the sea as far as the Juba river, beyond which is the Italian sphere of influence. The northern boundary is artificially defined in its eastern part towards Italian and Abyssinian territory. Most of the northern side is, however, conterminous

with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, along the 5th parallel of north latitude, while in the north-west all is vague.

The area of British east Africa proper is about 400,000 square miles, exclusive of a vast region to the west of the upper Nile, much of which is scarcely inhabited ; and also exclusive of the 365,000 square miles of what was formerly German east Africa, now known as Tanganyika Territory. The smaller half, between the coast and the great lake, forms the East African protectorate, and contains about four million inhabitants of various races, among whom the warlike Masai, who dwell round the foot of Kenya, are the most conspicuous. If they should prove as amenable to English discipline as some other dark-skinned races—the Gurkhas, for instance, and the Hausas—the policing of east Africa ought not to be difficult. A tropical land, not rising in general to any high level above the sea, it is unsuited for white men, of whom indeed there are but a few hundreds in the whole country. And as it is ill watered, is not likely to prove of great worth for produce. Its real value is moral, the enforcement of peace, and the suppression of slave raiding. Mombasa, its one large town, possesses the only good harbour on the east coast of Africa north of Delagoa Bay. From it a railway has been constructed with infinite labour to the shore of Lake Victoria Nyanza, which will, it is believed, prove the most efficient of all instruments of civilisation.

The Uganda protectorate, if the phrase be used in its strictest sense, has made much greater advance. It is the country round the northern half of the great lake, and has already been mapped out into comparatively small districts under English officers. In Uganda itself, the region at the north-west of the lake, the natives have been converted to Christianity, which has greatly conduced to peace and industry, though in a secondary way to trouble through disputes between rival missions. The surface of the country is nowhere below 3,000 feet above the level of the sea ; Lake Victoria Nyanza itself is, indeed, nearer 4,000 feet. Hence its climate is fairly healthy for white men, so that, though there is no reason to anticipate white colonisation in the strict sense, Europeans can easily live and trade among the natives,

and the prospects of agricultural development seem good. The centre of English administration is in Uganda proper, but the railway from Mombasa has naturally been brought to a point on the east shore of the lake, on which steamers now ply. Since 1913 the traffic of Uganda has been still further affected by the completion of the trunk line from the coast to Kigoma.

The Nile issues from Victoria Nyanza over a waterfall, which though fine is not great in volume as the overflow of a lake which has a surface of over 26,000 square miles, or not much smaller than Scotland. Evaporation, which on the equator is naturally large, must account for the remainder of the rainfall. It does not seem probable, therefore, that civilisation will succeed in greatly augmenting the volume of the Nile, on which the cultivable area of Egypt depends. The river flows thence into the lower end of the much smaller lake, known as Albert Edward Nyanza, in which is concentrated the drainage from the region of which mount Ruwenzori is the centre, and then begins its long journey northwards, at first through a region where cannibalism is not unknown. How far the present state of that part of British east Africa where it merges in the Egyptian Sudan is due to depopulation and degradation caused by slave raiding[1] in the past—how far it represents the natural outcome of climatic conditions—is a question on which light may eventually be shed. All that can be said now is that the *pax Britannica* will give the people of that region a better chance than they have ever had before.

There is a close parallel between east and west Africa, as to those parts which are now included in the British empire. In both regions a commercial company began little more than thirty years ago to establish trade, where hitherto nothing was known except through the visits of explorers, largely

[1] Mr. Hereford George remembered some thirty years ago hearing an explorer describe in public the methods of the Arab slave raiders, and express the opinion that every slave brought to market cost at least ten human lives. He mentioned this afterwards in conversation to an experienced official familiar with the east coast of Africa, asking whether the estimate was exaggerated. "Not at all," was the reply; "I should think the figure was nearer fifty than ten."

English. In both cases considerable success attended their efforts, of a kind which tended steadily in the direction of the companies becoming rulers as well as traders. In both regions the competition of other nations made itself felt, but competition rather political than commercial, being in fact phases of what has been described as the scramble for Africa. In both regions boundaries for "spheres of influence" were settled by negotiation with the other nations concerned; and, more or less in consequence, the British government took on itself the direct responsibility. In both cases fabulously rapid progress has been made with the task of establishing peace and effective control, even of direct administration. In both cases the reward is found, not in revenue or national strength, but in the satisfaction of redeeming from barbarism additional masses of the dark-skinned peoples who have never yet had a fair chance.

§ 5. EGYPT *

Before 1914 it was equally impossible to claim Egypt as part of the British empire, and to ignore it altogether when attempting a survey of the empire as a whole. Nothing could well be more anomalous than the political conditions affecting Egypt. Theoretically it was a province of the Turkish empire: but the sultan had formally granted it complete self-government, an annual tribute being the sole badge of his sovereignty. Practically it was under English control: we inspired the government, officered the army, kept a few thousands of our own troops in military occupation of the country. Nevertheless England had always carefully limited the exercise of any direct authority: everything was done through the Khedive and his ministers, and with the avowed purpose of fitting Egypt for autonomy.

But in 1914, after the outbreak of war with Turkey, the British Government deposed the Khedive Abbas Helim and offered the post, with the title of Sultan of Egypt, to His Highness Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha. The Government had decided that Great Britain could best fulfil its responsibilities by the declaration of a British Protectorate. The first sultan under protection ruled until 1917, when he was succeeded by the present sultan Fuad I.

* See footnote, p. 292.

The history of Egypt, where civilisation can be traced as having existed several thousand years before the Christian era, has always been dominated by one geographical fact. It consists of the Nile valley, with more or less of desert on each side of it. In all the lower part of its course the Nile gives extraordinary fertility to all lands within reach of its annual flood, lower Egypt being simply its delta. Not far off across the desert to the eastward is the Red Sea, which gives maritime access to the eastern world, and the Isthmus of Suez, across which is the sole land communication between Asia and Africa. In such a position, a country rendered exceptionally fit for civilised habitation by the Nile flood naturally played a great part in the restricted area of the ancient world. Its importance in modern times depends on another aspect of the same geographical fact. The Suez canal is now a great avenue of the world's commerce, and the country through which it is cut, though it has lost its ancient strength, is consequently an object of interest to all commercial nations.

Supremacy in India has long made Egypt important to English policy. It was from India that the expedition was sent which expelled the French in Napoleon's time. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century a regular passenger route from England to India was established across Egypt, and tended to promote its general prosperity; English influence was thus naturally extended, and it became a matter of interest for England that Egypt should be tranquil and well governed. The cutting of the Suez canal, opened in 1867, was mainly a French enterprise, but some years later England acquired a very large interest in it, and from the first the greater part of the traffic through it has been under the English flag. Under these circumstances it was not unnatural that a joint English and French control over the country should arise. And this might have continued had not France refused in 1882 to co-operate in putting down a military revolt against the Khedive. England consequently undertook the task alone, and a military occupation began which has lasted ever since.

Since Egypt depends entirely on the Nile, it has been the natural policy of her rulers in all ages to extend their

authority as far up the river as possible. In about 1880 the Khedive enjoyed some sort of supremacy not only over the Nubian desert, through which the Nile passes in a long valley seldom more than a few miles wide, but also over a vast and indefinite territory to the southward, known as the Egyptian Sudan. The rise of the Mahdi, a fanatical religious leader in the Sudan, led to the temporary loss by Egypt of the whole of this region. The British government declined to commit itself to the task of reconquering the Sudan for Egypt: but it was necessary, if only for defence against the Mahdi, to make the Egyptian army efficient. By slow degrees this was done, and plans were developed for taking the offensive against the Mahdi's power. In 1898 this was carried out with complete success. Khartum, at the junction of the two great branches of the Nile, was occupied, the Mahdi's successor killed and his power annihilated. By agreement between the British and Egyptian governments, the whole region south of Wadi Halfa on the 22nd parallel of north latitude, where the Egyptian frontier had for some years been drawn, is under their joint authority, thus adding one more anomaly in the relations of England and Egypt.

The extent of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is estimated as somewhat under a million square miles. Before the rise of Mahdism the population[1] was 8½ millions, but oppression and war had reduced this total to less than two millions in 1903. The present estimate is about three millions. Since 1898 the greater part of this region has been divided into provinces, and is administered by Englishmen on the lines familiar in other parts of the globe. So far as present appearances indicate, the Sudan is not only peaceful, but likely to regain prosperity, if money can be found for improving its means of communication. A good beginning was made with a railway from Suakim, on the Red Sea, to Berber, the nearest place on the Nile some way below Khartum; and in 1915 about 1500 miles of railway were open for traffic.

In the interval between the rise and the overthrow of Mahdism, England had acquired definite and undisputed

[1] So the figures stand in Lord Cromer's report for 1903.

control of the region described above as British east Africa, that is to say, from the east coast round the northern end of the great lake Victoria Nyanza, whence issues the Nile. Hence for the first time in history Egypt, more or less in partnership with England, controls the whole course of the Nile. The first fruits have already been reaped, in the clearing of the river from the masses of vegetation that choked many parts of its upper course. The Nile is now navigable from the great lakes to its mouth, except so far as rapids in some localities interfere. And the time may not be far distant when the railway which already runs beyond Khartum is carried on to Uganda. Here, as elsewhere, commercial interests have led a civilised power to intervene in regions wholly or partially devoid of civilisation. And here, as elsewhere, this has led to a vast development of power and responsibilities for the intervening nation, and offers a prospect—it is too soon to say more—of extending the blessings of peace and good government over another large section of the earth's surface.

Meanwhile Egypt has greatly advanced under English control in every essential of civilisation, especially in education and in the administration of justice. The population has grown rapidly, trade has increased, and the great barrage works on the Nile have already doubled the productiveness of the country, by increasing the area of well-watered land and by ensuring that the irrigation shall be permanent and not intermittent.*

* Since the above was written great changes have taken place in Egypt. On March 15, 1924, King Fuad I. inaugurated the new Parliament of Senate and House of Deputies, according to the Constitution promulgated on April 30, 1923. This may be regarded as the fulfilment of the constitutional rule foreshadowed in the Declaration of Great Britain on February 28, 1922, whereby the independence of Egypt was recognised.

Part VIII

SUMMARY

THE component elements of the British empire have been successively sketched in the preceding pages. It may be convenient, in conclusion, to glance at the empire as a whole, and to note its essential characteristics.

The land surface of the globe is estimated to contain more than fifty-five millions of square miles. Of this area nearly twelve millions, or about one-fifth, are included in the British empire, on the very comprehensive definition of it adopted at the outset. Nearly a million of these square miles, however, can only be regarded as nominal territory, being permanently uninhabitable. The empire extends far within the Arctic Circle, and has outposts not very far from the Antarctic Circle, about one-third of the whole being in the southern hemisphere. In Canada it comprises by far the largest region on the face of the earth, possessing a healthy temperate climate, in which there is still room for a white population to develop under thoroughly favourable conditions. In Africa it possesses vast regions in which there are indefinite possibilities for the black races, if they can be led to improve under white rule.

The British Islands, the nucleus of the whole, form but an insignificant fraction, about one-hundredth part, of the entire empire, more than half of which is included in the two great daughter nations of Canada and Australia. To use a concrete illustration, the British Islands are a less fraction of the empire than Cornwall is of the British Islands. Its components are of all sizes, from Canada, which covers nearly half of North America, down to Gibraltar, which is not much bigger than Hyde Park with Kensington Gardens. And the stepping-stones, those essential elements of the empire, of which Gibraltar is the nearest to the centre, possess an area almost as disproportionate to their importance

as the United Kingdom itself. If we exclude the Malayan territories and protectorates, for which Singapore has been made the capital for administrative convenience, and Somaliland, which has accreted to Aden, the whole of the stepping-stones amount to less than England alone; and all the others together are no larger than the one island of Ceylon.

The estimate commonly given for the population of the world—from the nature of the case it can be little better than a guess—is two thousand millions. Of this likewise the British empire comprises somewhere about one-fifth, or four hundred millions. Nearly three-quarters of these are inhabitants of India, while Canada and Australia, which possess half the area, furnish little more than a fortieth part of the population of the empire; the proportion will doubtless be very different after the lapse of a generation or two. The British Islands on the contrary, as is natural, count for ten times as much in respect of inhabitants as in respect of area, having fully one-tenth of the population of the whole empire.

It is a familiar commonplace that the British empire is based on the sea: and this is true in more ways than one, historically as well as from the point of view of present protection against enemies. Our first foreign possessions—for the French dominions of the Plantagenets were in no sense English, they were merely the personal heritage of our kings—were strictly maritime. They were settlements made on distant shores by merchants in pursuit of trade, or by adventurers paving the way for regular commerce. Some were planted in the midst of settled communities, such as the factories out of which was gradually evolved our Indian empire. Others were formed on spots actually uninhabited, or, more commonly, where mere savages disappeared before the white man. And these became at once new communities, dependent on the crown of England, but not subject, like Surat or Madras, to any local authority. Others were conquered from prior European occupiers, by naval expeditions sent when England was at war with their possessors. All were obtained, whether peacefully or by force, directly from off the sea, and all were intended to further the maritime

trade of England, though some served also as colonies in the true sense.

And as the various components of the empire were first reached over sea, so they are connected by means of it with the mother country and with each other. If we except India, which from one point of view may be regarded as comprising a large number of separate elements of the empire, there are hardly any two British possessions which can communicate save by sea.

The naval power of Great Britain is of course necessary for the defence of all these widely scattered territories: but the more important, and less generally remembered, consideration is that they are essential to the strength of the navy. Since under modern conditions no war-ships can dispense with large and frequent supplies of coal, naval operations can only be carried on efficiently within reach of available coaling-stations. If the British navy is to do the work imposed on it, coaling-stations and oil depots in all seas are indispensable. And from these conditions it results that Great Britain is at present practically much stronger at sea than a mere enumeration of the battleships that she could bring into line would imply. There are few seas in which the fleets of other powers could even maintain themselves in war time, when it is a deviation from strict neutrality if men-of-war are allowed to obtain more than a limited modicum of fuel. No wonder that the naval powers have been in the past on the look-out to obtain these all-important stations in distant waters.

This enormous advantage is no doubt purchased by a corresponding drawback: the larger the number of our isolated possessions, the greater also is the number of vulnerable spots in case of war. It is obviously impossible to make them all secure against attack. All that can be deemed feasible is to fortify and garrison adequately the few vital points, so that they can defend themselves for a reasonably long time, and to protect important fuel-stations against a surprise. Beyond this risk must be run, but the risk of loss is smaller than it appears. It would obviously be possible for an enemy to plan an expedition large enough,

assuming that it reached its destination unopposed, to capture with certainty Mauritius or Bermuda. Such a small success would however be very dearly purchased, since it would be gained by diverting fighting strength from the vital point to an unimportant one. It is scarcely to be hoped that any enemy would make so great a mistake: the general naval strength of the Empire, so long as it can maintain its superiority, is the one efficient, if indirect, defence of its most extreme points, as was proved in the recent war.

Of the land frontiers which the Empire has, and of the possibilities of danger which exist in consequence of them, or which alarmist imagination may picture as existing, enough has probably been said already.

It remains to ask whether the Empire, as at present constituted, is in a state of stable equilibrium. An empire, it is said, must continue to grow, or it will begin to dwindle. This may prove true, but there is no analogy from which to argue: the British Empire has too few points of resemblance to any power which has ever borne the same title. Assuredly no sane statesman would wish to add indefinitely to our responsibilities, but circumstances may compel some extensions of them, as shown by the recent settlements of the Peace Conference. The previous anomalous relations of England and Egypt, the still more anomalous state of things in the Sudan, and thence to the sources of the Nile, have been altered and improved. There are doubtless two or three small acquisitions—small relatively to the Empire as a whole, though important to the localities concerned—which we might be glad to make by friendly purchase or exchange. And it might be possible to find similar things which we might part with without detriment, and to the benefit of some other nation. Apart however from such adjustments, apart from questions, which are not geographical, of the future relations between the daughter nations and the mother country, the Empire is as large and as complete as any reasonable man can wish it to be. It is for Englishmen to see that they make the most of it, for their own benefit, no doubt, but primarily in the true interests of the countless millions over whom we have acquired supremacy.

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